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Abstract
These essays examine how relaxing common assumptions affect the strategic interactions
between agents. It investigates how the presence of an agent with a simplified causal model
influences the contract and disclosure of information with other agents, as well as the
impact of changes to the institutional settings. By theoretically modelling these choices,
it aims to improve the understanding of equilibrium effects and thereby contributing to
debates about the optimal design of contracts, strategic information transmission and
political budget cycles and the impact of assumptions.
The first chapter analyses the contract between a firm owner and a employee, when the
firm cannot observe the employee’s action and the employee’s belief about how her ac-
tion influences the contractible variable is governed by a misspecified causal model. It
contributes to the existing literature by explicitly modelling the source of the employee’s
misspecified beliefs. This approach allows us to shed light on the variables the firm owner
would want to include in the contract given the employee’s mistakes as well as the inter-
mediate variables the employee needs to include in her causal model in order to act as if
she understands how her action influence the contractible variable.
The second chapter examines how an informed agent conveys information to an unin-
formed agent when he can simultaneously influence the messages she receives and how she
interprets them. This relaxes the assumption that agents always understand the meaning
of messages in equilibrium.
The third chapter analyses how political budget cycles change when the politician in
charge can choose to call for a snap election in periods before the end of the term. This
contributes to the existing literature by taking the equilibrium effects of early election into
consideration and thereby the effect of the continuation value of being in office.
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The canonical principal-agent model of contracting under asymmetric information assumes
that the agent knows the probabilistic consequences of all available actions. Formally, these
are defined by a production function p(y | a), where y is the contractible output and a the
agent’s action. Given the incentives provided by the contract, the agent chooses an action
that – according to this function – maximizes her expected payoff. However, in an organi-
zation, p(y | a) is typically a complex object. It may reflect knowledge that is unavailable
to the agent or that the agent cannot process due to cognitive limitations. Herbert Simon
therefore proposed that administrative behavior may be “boundedly rational” (Simon,
Simon, 1947, 1955).
The common approach to contracting with boundedly rational agents is to assume directly
that beliefs p̂(y | a) about the production function are biased so that p̂(y | a) 6= p(y | a).
This captures, for example, an agent’s overconfidence. An important implication of this
approach is that the optimal contract may exploit the agent, in the sense that her (true)
expected payoff falls below her reservation utility (e.g., Kőszegi, 2014). However, it is
unclear how sustainable biased beliefs – and hence exploitation – would be when the
agent gathers experience.
In this paper, we apply a new approach where the agent derives her beliefs about p(y | a)
from the data generated by the true production process, the implemented strategy q, and
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a non-parametric subjective model R. A strategy q is a probability distribution over the
agent’s actions and a model R is a collection of variables and causal relationships between
these variables. It captures what the agent knows about the production process. This
model may be misspecified. For example, it may be “too simple” relative to the complexity
of the organization: Empirical regularities that matter for the principal’s project may not
appear in R. We derive the agent’s subjective beliefs about p(y | a) using Spiegler’s (2016)
Bayesian network framework; we denote them by pR(y | a; q). An equilibrium contract
implements a strategy q if it is optimal for the agent to follow q under this contract given
her beliefs pR(y | a; q). We study the properties of the optimal equilibrium contract, and
obtain several new results on optimal contracting and organization.
Our framework captures a variety of misconceptions that even experienced decision makers
may exhibit. Consider the basic management practice of inventory control. Its implemen-
tation reduces the working time spent on dealing with inputs that are not needed, which
in turn increases productivity. However, if the manager does not have the causal chain
“inventory control → working time allocation → productivity” on her mind, she may see
no benefit from implementing inventory control, and choose a suboptimal organization
of the workplace. Indeed, Bloom et al. (2013) document that the managers in several
large Indian textile factories did not acknowledge the positive impact of basic manage-
ment practices (like inventory control) on productivity. They only changed their mind
after substantial consulting and after these measures proved effective.1
Another example is the choice of management style. Individuals who are appointed to a
management position often struggle to find the right approach. Suppose a mid-level man-
ager has to choose whether she closely controls her subordinates’ actions (“micromanage-
ment”). This reduces misbehavior, but it also diminishes her subordinates’ performance
(DeCaro et al., 2011). Nevertheless, in the fog of business, the manager may only focus
on reducing misbehavior and neglect employee motivation. Micromanagement then ap-
pears to her as more appealing than it really is, and she therefore may adopt an inefficient
management style.
Finally, decision makers may not fully understand their clients. Consider a marketer
whose job is to increase sales. One strategy to increase sales is to make cold-calls, that is,
calling potential customers without prior consent. Making cold-calls improves consumers’
information about the firm’s product, but also reduces the firm’s reputation since some
1There are a number of further well-documented cases where experienced decision makers ignore im-
portant aspects of their operation; see, e.g., Nuland (2004) or Hanna et al. (2014).
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customers start doubting the quality of the product if such a marketing strategy is applied.2
Sales increase both in consumer information and reputation. However, when choosing her
action, the marketer may not take the firm’s reputation into account. Then the only
mechanism on her mind is that making cold-calls improves consumer information, and
that more information translates into more sales. In all these examples, the decision
makers arguably know the expected outcomes from their usual actions. They just may
incorrectly infer the counter-factual consequences of a change in their behavior. This is
what we can capture in our framework.
The Bayesian network approach roughly works as follows3 in the marketer example (which
we use as running example throughout the paper). The setting describes an “extended pro-
duction function” p(x1, x2, y | a), i.e., a joint probability distribution over the realization of
consumer information x1, reputation x2, and sales y for any given action a. This function
reflects the objective model R∗ of the project: R∗ contains all relevant variables, {action,
consumer information, reputation, sales}, and the causal relationships between these vari-
ables. The agent’s subjective model R is a simplified version of R∗ as it only contains the
variables {action, consumer information, sales}, and their causal relationships. Her beliefs
are derived by fitting R to the objective probability distribution, which is generated by
the implemented strategy q and the extended production function p(x1, x2, y | a). Thus,
the different elements in the agent’s subjective model R are quantified using input from
the true data-generating process. Combining these elements yields the agent’s subjective
beliefs pR(y | a; q), which in general are not invariant to changes in q.
We show that the optimal equilibrium contract exhibits the following features. First, a
weak restriction on the agent’s subjective model guarantees that the participation con-
straint is not affected. This restriction is that R is “perfect”, which means that the agent
takes into account the link between any two variables in R that have a joint influence on
a third variable in R. She then correctly predicts the marginal equilibrium distribution
over output (Spiegler, 2017), so that the optimal equilibrium contract does not exploit the
agent. Importantly, a perfect R ensures in many cases that there are no informational
cues in the data the agent gathers on the equilibrium path that could alert her about the
misspecification in R.
Second, the principal may strictly benefit from the misspecification in the agent’s model
even when exploitation is infeasible. In the marketer example, if the principal implements
2This mechanism is called “demarketing” (Miklós-Thal and Zhang, 2013): Extensive marketing can
backfire since it may be interpreted as a signal for low quality.
3Missing technical details will be explained thoroughly in the next section.
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making cold-calls, then, by not taking reputation into account, the agent overestimates
the drop in sales after deviation to not making cold-calls, i.e., she is “control optimistic”
as defined by Spinnewijn (2013). This relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint, so
that the principal can implement cold-calls with fewer incentives than if the agent had
rational expectations.
Third, whenR is perfect, the incentive scheme in the optimal equilibrium contract appears
to the agent as optimal for the principal. The agent then cannot deduct from the shape
of incentives that her beliefs are biased. This is again different from the optimal contract
under exogenously given biased beliefs where the agent may notice that the principal is
betting against her. We show that in some cases the optimal equilibrium contract is
“justifiable”, i.e., it is optimal for the principal from the agent’s point of view.
Taken together, these results show that an agent’s misperceptions can be sustainable in an
organizational context: Neither her experiences on the equilibrium path nor the shape of
the incentive contract inform the agent about the mistake in her thinking, and the principal
benefits from this mistake. Building on these insights, we further analyze three topics in
organizational economics: First, we derive a behavioral version of the informativeness
principle. Second, we characterize when misspecifications in the agent’s model affect her
beliefs. And third, we revisit the trade-off between risk and incentives. We briefly describe
each topic in turn.
An important question in contract theory is on which variables the optimal contract should
condition the agent’s wage. According to the informativeness principle (e.g., Holmström,
1979, Chaigneau et al., 2019), the optimal contract conditions on an additional signal z
only if z provides information about the agent’s action that is not contained in y. We can
derive an analogous statement when the agent has correct expectations on the equilibrium
path about the joint distribution of y and z (with a further qualification this holds if R is
perfect). In this case, the optimal equilibrium contract conditions on z only if the agent’s
action a and z are not independent conditional on y according to the agent’s subjective
beliefs. This result does not depend on other properties of the agent’s subjective model R,
and hence would hold in any setting where the agent’s beliefs about the joint distribution of
y and z are correct. Nevertheless, we can use results from the Bayesian network literature
to state sufficient conditions on R so that the result’s requirements are satisfied. We apply
these findings to provide a new explanation for why executive compensation contracts often
do not condition on peer-performance (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001, Bebchuk
and Fried, 2004).
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Next, misspecifications in R do not always affect the agent’s beliefs and optimal equi-
librium contract. The agent is “behaviorally rational” if she correctly anticipates the
production function, or, formally, pR(y | a; q) = p(y | a) for all possible a and q, regardless
of the parametrization of the extended production function. We can find a correspondence
H∗(R∗) which indicates for a given objective model R∗ the set of variables the agent must
take into account in her simplified subjective model R so that she is behaviorally rational.
We show that H∗(R∗) is often a strict subset of the variables in R∗, and that the difference
between a variable i ∈ H∗(R∗) and a variable j 6 ∈H∗(R∗) can be quite nuanced.
The characterization of H∗(R∗) shows which variables matter for the agent’s beliefs. An
important interpretation of the objective model R∗ is that it captures the agent’s job,
i.e., through which tasks, interactions, and decision-making powers she influences the
final output. We can have two extended production functions that give rise to the same
“reduced-form” production function p(y | a), but that differ in their causal model R∗, and
hence in the extent to which simplifications affect pR(y | a; q). This allows us to examine
which organizational features potentially cause the agent to overestimate the productivity
of her effort. Consider an agent in a management position in which her effort influences the
behavior of other workers (e.g., a group of marketers). If the agent does not understand the
difficulties of their job (e.g., that cold-calls have a partial negative effect on sales through
their effect on firm reputation), she overestimates her subordinates’ – and hence her own
– productivity. There are different instances where this could happen: The agent may be
a technical expert who is promoted into a management position in which she oversees the
actions of workers whose job she does not fully understand. Alternatively, it may be the
case that subordinates do not communicate the problems they face to their managers (due
to career concerns). These phenomena are usually discussed critically in the management
literature (e.g., Porter et al., 2004), but in our framework they advance the agent’s effort
motivation and hence benefit the principal.
Finally, our framework allows for comparative statics since the agent’s beliefs are derived
from the parameters of the true production process. We briefly revisit the trade-off be-
tween risk and incentives, which has been extensively debated both in the theoretical and
empirical contract theory literature (e.g., Prendergast, 2002). We show that when the
agents subjective model is misspecified, then there can be a positive association between
risk and the level of incentives the optimal equilibrium contract provides.
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Related Literature. Our basic model is the principal-agent framework introduced by Holm-
ström (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983). Holmström (1979) states a version of the
informativeness principle. A generalization of it can be found in, e.g., Chaigneau et al.
(2019). In the canonical framework, both principal and agent know the production func-
tion p(y | a).
There are different approaches in behavioral contract theory that relax the assumption
of unbiased beliefs about p(y | a). First, several contracting models directly assume that
the agent’s beliefs about the production function are biased, i.e., p̂(y | a) 6= p(y | a); see
Fang and Mocarini (2005), Van den Steen (2005), Gervais and Goldstein (2007), Santo-
Pinto (2008), De la Rosa (2011), Sautmann (2007), Sautmann (2013), Spinnewijn (2013),
Spinnewijn (2015). Specifically, this approach is used to model an overconfident agent
who overestimates the probability of good states and underestimates the probability of
bad states. This typically allows the principal to exploit the agent by paying more after
high output and much less after low output, in which case the agent’s expected payoff is
below her reservation utility.
Second, a rich literature builds state-space models of “unawareness” (e.g., Dekel et al.,
1998, Heifetz et al., 2006, Heifetz et al., 2013) and applies them to contracting settings.
Auster (2013) examines a principal-agent model with an agent who is unaware of some
output levels y, which again implies that the contract is exploitative. von Thadden and
Zhao (2012) and von Thadden and Zhao (2014) assume that the agent is unaware of
her available actions a and chooses a default action unless the principal educates her.
Unawareness then relaxes incentive compatibility at the default action.
Third, in order to justify biased beliefs, several papers assume that the agent knows the
link between action and outcomes p(y | a), but potentially gains from holding biased
beliefs. She then chooses beliefs p̂(y | a) that solve the trade-off between the losses from
biased decision-making and the gains from managing a self-control problem (Bénabou
and Tirole, 2002) or from enjoying anticipatory utility (Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005,
Kőszegi, 2006). For an organizational context, Bénabou (2013) shows how the interaction
between group members can make the suppression of bad news a strategic complement, so
that collective denial of adverse signals (“groupthink”) occurs in equilibrium. Immordino
et al. (2015) show that if anticipatory utility is not too important, the principal may
provide incentives so that it is optimal for the agent to choose correct beliefs.
Our approach to boundedly rational expectations and contracting is more conservative.
The agent derives her beliefs from the true data-generating process, as in the canonical
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model; she just may not take into account all empirical regularities that matter for the
principal’s project. The misspecification in the agent’s subjective model may cause her to
overestimate her productivity, but, under a weak restriction, she still correctly anticipates
the equilibrium distribution over output.
We also contribute to the literature on Bayesian networks/directed acyclic graphs (DAGs),
which have been used extensively in the artificial intelligence literature. Pearl (2009) pro-
motes the view that DAGs represent causal relationships and provides a broad introduc-
tion to DAGs. In economics, Spiegler (2016) and Spiegler (2017) use Bayesian networks
to model agents with boundedly rational expectations. DAGs provide a general method
to capture a variety of different inference errors such as reverse causation and coarseness.
We build on these insights and apply them to contracting. Other recent papers use causal
models to capture boundedly rational decision makers in monetary policy (Spiegler, 2020),
political competition (Eliaz and Spiegler, 2020), Bayesian persuasion (Eliaz et al., 2021),
and decision theory (Schenone, 2020).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes our framework.
In Section 1.3, we examine how a misspecification in the agent’s subjective model affects
the optimal contract. In Section 1.4, we state a behavioral version of the informativeness
principle. In Section 1.5, we characterize when a misspecification leads to biased beliefs
about the production function, and illustrate the implications of this characterization. In
Section 1.6, we revisit a classic comparative static result from the canonical contracting
framework. Section 1.7 concludes. Proofs and further results can be found in the appendix.
1.2 The Model
We consider a standard principal-agent problem and combine it with the Bayesian network
model of boundedly rational beliefs, as introduced in Spiegler (2016).
Basic Framework. Let A ⊂ R be a finite set of actions, Y ⊂ R a finite set of outputs,
and W ⊆ R|Y | the set of possible incentive schemes. The principal proposes a contract
(w, q), where w ∈ W is the agent’s wage conditional on the output y ∈ Y and q ∈ ∆(A)
is the probability distribution over actions that the principal wishes the agent to choose.
The agent can reject or accept the contract. If she rejects it, she enjoys the outside option
value Ū , while the principal earns zero. If she accepts the contract, she chooses an action
a ∈ A. The agent’s personal cost of choosing a is given by a function c(a). The action
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stochastically influences the project’s output. The agent’s utility from wage w is given
by the utility function u : R → R, with u′ > 0 and u′′ ≤ 0. When the output is y and
the agent’s action is a, the principal’s payoff is V = y − w(y) and the agent’s payoff is
U = u(w(y))− c(a).
Causal Structure. We model the causal structure through which the agent’s action affects
the output. Let N∗ = {0, ..., n} be the set of relevant variables (or nodes). This set
contains the agent’s action and output, but may also include other variables. A generic
realization of variable i is given by xi ∈ Xi, where Xi is a finite set that contains at least
two elements. Node 0 is the agent’s action (x0 = a, X0 = A) and node n is the output
(xn = y, Xn = Y ). The state is a vector xN∗ = (x0, x1, ..., xn) and the set of all states is
XN∗ = ×i∈N∗Xi. For every subset M ⊆ N∗ and xN∗ ∈ XN∗ , we write xM = (xk)k∈M .
Denote by p(x1, . . . , xn | a) the extended production function. For any action a ∈ A, it
has full support over X1 × ... × Xn. We represent its causal structure by an irreflexive,
asymmetric, and acyclic binary relation R∗ over N∗, and denote it by the DAG R∗ =
(N∗, R∗), see the graph on the left of Figure 1.1 for an example. For two nodes i, j ∈ N∗
one may read iR∗j as “node i impacts on node j.” The set of nodes that influence i
is defined, with abuse of notation, as R∗(i) = {j ∈ N∗ | jR∗i}. Nothing influences the
agent’s action, R∗(0) = ∅. The probability distribution over states, p(xN∗) ∈ ∆(XN∗),




p(xi | xR∗(i)). (1.1)
The “objective model” R∗ is one of the sparsest DAGs so that p(xN∗) factorizes according
to R∗. That is, R∗ faithfully represents the conditional independence conditions that are
satisfied by p(xN∗); see Koski and Noble, 2009, page 39.
4
Figure 1.1: An objective model R∗ (left) and the agent’s subjective model R (right).
4This rules out trivial cases such as when the objective distribution is consistent with the agent’s
subjective model (as defined below), but the agent’s subjective model excludes links that are in R∗.
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Beliefs, Personal Equilibrium, and Equilibrium Contract. The agent has her own subjec-
tive model R = (N,R), see the graph on the right of Figure ?? for an example. We assume
that {0, n} ∈ N ⊆ N∗ and R(0) = ∅. The assumption that the agent includes her own
action and the output in her subjective model ensures that her utility is measurable with
respect to her beliefs. N ⊆ N∗ is assumed purely for simplicity. R(0) = ∅ implies that
the agent knows that she does not receive any information about other variables prior to
choosing an action, and that she has correct beliefs about the marginal distribution over
her own action.
Definition 1.1. We say that R is misspecified if R 6= R∗, and that R is a simplification
if N ⊂ N∗ and R = N ×N ∩R∗.
A simplification is a misspecification where the agent’s subjective model R emerges from
R∗ by dropping nodes from R∗ and the links adjacent to them. It will receive considerable
attention in this paper. However, only the results in Section 1.5 rely on the assumption
that the misspecification is a simplification. Denote by xN = (xi)i∈N the state vector for
the agent’s subjective model and XN = ×i∈NXi. The agent fits her subjective model R
to the data generated by p(xN∗), so her beliefs factorize according to the formula
pR(xN ) = q(x0)
∏
i∈N\{0}
p(xi | xR(i)). (1.2)
Thus, all the conditional independence assumptions embedded in R also appear in the
agent’s beliefs. For example, when the agent’s subjective model is R from Figure 1.1, her
beliefs factorize according to pR(a, x1, y) = q(a)p(x1 | a)p(y | x1), where q(a), p(x1 | a)
and p(y | x1) follow from the probability distribution p(xN∗). Given the objective model in
Figure 1.1, p(y | x1) will depend on q through variable 2. Hence, in contrast to the objective
probabilities, the agent’s beliefs about how her action influences the output may depend
on q. We therefore augment notation to indicate which strategy q is used when deriving
beliefs and write pR(x; q) instead of pR(x). For any subset M ⊂ N , the agent’s belief
about the marginal distribution over xM is pR(xM ; q) =
∑
xN\M∈XN\M pR(xM , xN\M ; q).
The agent follows the prescribed strategy from the contract only if it maximizes her
expected utility given the wage scheme w and her subjective beliefs about the output
conditional on her action, which we denote by pR(y | a; q). These are computed as
pR(y | a; q) =
pR(a, y; q)∑
y∈Y pR(a, y; q)
. (1.3)
To close the model, we need to specify the agent’s strategy q that is used to derive these
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beliefs. We adapt the personal equilibrium concept from Spiegler (2016) to our setting.
Definition 1.2. The strategy q is a personal equilibrium at R and w if for all actions
a ∈ A in the support of q we have




pR(y | a′; q)u(w(y))− c(a′),
where pR(y | a′; q) = limk→∞ pR(y | a′; qk) for all actions a′ ∈ A and a sequence qk → q
of fully mixed strategy profiles.
With the full support assumption, a fully mixed action profile ensures that all condi-
tional probabilities are well-defined. The definition requires that equilibrium beliefs are
the limit of a sequence of fully mixed profiles. The equilibrium beliefs are independent
of the sequence of fully mixed strategies used to approximate them, and a personal equi-
librium always exists in our framework; see Appendix 1.8.1. We call a contract (w, q) an
“equilibrium contract” if q is a personal equilibrium at R and w. An optimal equilibrium
contract is an equilibrium contract that maximizes the principal’s expected payoff. For
convenience, we denote beliefs by pR(y | a; a∗) when a pure action a∗ is implemented, and
pR(y | a;α) with q(a = 1) = α when we have a binary action set A = {0, 1}.
Instead of considering a personal equilibrium, we could in principle assume that the agent
derives beliefs from some arbitrary joint probability distribution p̂(xN ). In this case,
we would have a model with exogenously fixed biased beliefs p̂(y | a). The personal
equilibrium definition imposes restrictions on the agent’s beliefs: Through the factorization
in equation (1.2), they must respect the agent’s strategy q and the extended production
function. One interpretation is that the agent is experienced and thus has data on how
her action impacts on the variables in her subjective model. An alternative interpretation
is that there are (or have been) many other agents in the organization who exchange data
with their new colleague to which she can fit her subjective model. One might suppose
that the agent estimates the distribution over the output separately for each available
action. This is however not what happens in this model. Instead, the agent “pools” the
data from different actions when she estimates the conditional probabilities for variables
that (according to her subjective model) are not directly influenced by her action. We
return to this discussion at the end of Subsection 3.2.
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1.3 The Optimal Equilibrium Contract
In this section, we study the properties of the optimal equilibrium contract for a given
extended production function p(x1, ..., xn | a) and subjective model R. If (w∗, q∗) is an







q(a)p(y | a)(y − w(y)) (1.4)
subject to the constraints




q(a′)[pR(y | a′; q)u(w(y))− c(a′)] ≥ Ū . (PC)
When the agent’s subjective modelR equals the objective modelR∗, the problem collapses
to the canonical principal-agent problem, and can be solved as suggested by Grossman
and Hart (1983). We first find for each pure action a ∈ A the wage scheme w that
implements this action at lowest possible cost. Then we choose the action-incentive scheme
combination that maximizes the principal’s profit. If the agent’s subjective model R
differs from the objective model R∗, we find the optimal equilibrium contract by applying
the same procedure. However, since the agent’s beliefs pR(y | a; q) may depend on the
implemented strategy q, the first step has to be done for all pure and mixed strategies
q ∈ ∆(A).
Suppose the agent is risk-averse with unlimited liability, and the principal implements a
(possibly mixed) strategy q. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the principal’s problem are
then necessary and sufficient for an optimum. Choose any action a in the support of q.















for all y ∈ Y , where µ and λa′ are the usual Lagrange multipliers for the participation and
incentive compatibility constraint, respectively. Equation (1.5) allows us to disentangle
how a misspecification in R may change the contracting problem. First, the PC is affected
when the agent holds biased beliefs about the equilibrium distribution over output; see the
first term on the right of equation (1.5). In Subsection 1.3.1, we state a sufficient condition
onR so that this belief is unbiased. Second, the IC may be affected. Suppose the principal




pR(y|a;a) , in which case the optimal incentive scheme depends on a likelihood
ratio as in the canonical framework. Any difference between the contracts under the
objective and subjective model is then driven by differences between the corresponding
likelihood ratios. In Subsection 1.3.2, we examine in an example how these differences
may affect the optimal equilibrium contract.
1.3.1 Correct Expectations on the Equilibrium Path
We use a Bayesian network result from Spiegler (2017) that characterizes under what
circumstances the agent’s beliefs about the equilibrium output distribution are correct,
so that pR(y; q) = p(y) for all q ∈ ∆(A). To this end, we introduce a few definitions. A
v-collider is a triple of nodes (i, j, k) such that iRj, kRj and there is no link between i and
k (neither iRk nor kRi is in R). The set of v-colliders of a DAG is called its v-structure. A
DAG is called perfect if it has an empty v-structure. A subset of nodes M ⊂ N is a clique
in R = (N,R) if iRj or jRi for any two nodes i, j ∈ M . For example, in the DAG R∗
from Figure ??, the set M = {1, 3, 4} is a clique, while the set M ′ = {2, 3, 4} is not. Each
node is a clique in itself, so the output node n is a clique. The following result essentially
restates Proposition 2 from Spiegler (2017).
Proposition 1.1 (Equilibrium Beliefs). If the agent’s model R = (R,N) is perfect, her
equilibrium beliefs satisfy pR(xM ; q) = p(xM ) for all q ∈ ∆(A) and any clique M ⊂ N .
If the agent’s subjective model R is perfect, then, in a personal equilibrium, the agent
correctly anticipates the marginal distribution over each variable in her model, and also
the joint distribution over variables in cliques. The intuition behind this result is that
perfectness excludes biased estimates due to neglect of correlation. Imagine two variables
i, j that influence a third variable k. Suppose that i and j are correlated, and that the
agent treats them as uncorrelated. Through the application of the factorization formula
(1.2), the agent may then obtain a biased estimate of the marginal distribution over k.
Perfectness implies that the agent always checks for correlations between two variables i, j
when, according to her subjective model, they influence a third variable k. We obtain two
useful corollaries from Proposition 1.1.
Corollary 1.1. If the agent’s model R = (R,N) is perfect and her equilibrium strategy
is a pure action a∗, her equilibrium beliefs satisfy pR(xM | a∗; a∗) = p(xM | a∗) for every
clique M ⊂ N .
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If the equilibrium contract implements a pure strategy a∗, the agent’s belief about the joint
distribution of any clique M conditional on her equilibrium strategy is correct. Corollary
1.1 is in general not true if the equilibrium contract implements a mixed strategy q∗.
While the agent still gets the marginal equilibrium distribution over each variable right,
her beliefs may also exhibit pR(xi | a′; q∗) 6= p(xi | a′) for an action a′ in the support of q∗.
Thus, the agent’s expected utility conditional on a′ may be biased, ER[u(w(y)) | a′; q∗] 6=
E[u(w(y)) | a′].
The second direct implication of Proposition 1.1 is the following result.
Corollary 1.2. Suppose (w, q) is an equilibrium contract. If R = (R,N) is perfect, the
PC is satisfied at this contract if and only if this is also the case under the objective model
R∗.
To see why Corollary 1.2 is true recall that every single node is a clique. Hence, Proposition
1.1 implies p(y) = pR(y; q) =
∑
a∈A q(a)pR(y | a; q). If R is perfect, the incentive scheme
therefore has to satisfy the same participation constraint as under the objective model.
Thus, an agent with a misspecified – but perfect – model cannot be exploited. Throughout
the paper, we will assume that R is perfect. As we see next, a perfect R does not imply
that the principal cannot benefit from the agent’s misperception.
1.3.2 Incentive Effects
We examine how a misspecification in the agent’s subjective model R can change the equi-
librium contract. We do this in the context of the marketer example from the introduction.
Figure 1.2 shows the objective model R∗ and the agent’s subjective model R.
Figure 1.2: Objective model R∗ (left) and subjective model R (right) in the marketer
example.
Since the marketer believes that her action only affects output through the information
channel (node 1), her subjective model R is perfect. By Corollary 1.2, only the incentive
compatibility constraint can then be affected by the misspecification. We analyze a simple
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setting with two effort levels a ∈ {0, 1}, two output levels y ∈ {yL, yH} with yH > yL,
and cost c(1) = c > c(0) = 0. The probability of output yH increases in the agent’s effort.
Node 1 is the level of consumer information. It can be low (x1 = 0) or high (x1 = 1). Node
2 is the firm’s reputation, which can be bad (x2 = 0) or good (x2 = 1). The subjective
model R captures that the agent does not take reputation into account. For the objective
probability distribution, we use the parametrization p(xi = 1 | x0) = βi + β0ix0 for
i ∈ {1, 2} and p(yH | x1, x2) = β3 + β13x1 + β23x2. Making cold-calls increases consumer
information, β01 > 0, and decreases reputation, β02 < 0; consumer information x1 and
reputation x2 both have a positive influence on sales, β13 > 0 and β23 > 0. We obtain the
following result.
Proposition 1.2 (Marketer Example). Consider the marketer example of this subsection.
(a) The simplification in the agent’s subjective model R relaxes the IC for α = 1.
(b) The optimal equilibrium contract implements α ∈ {0, 1}. If and only if effort costs
c are small enough, the optimal equilibrium contract implements α = 1 and the
principal strictly benefits from the simplification in the agent’s subjective model R.
Before we prove this result, we explain the intuition behind it and its implications. First,
consider statement (a). When the principal implements α = 1, the agent overestimates
the drop in expected output when she exerts low instead of high effort. According to her
subjective model R, the only effect of her action on the output occurs through consumer
information x1. She does not take into account that a deviation to low effort would also
have a positive effect on expected reputation, which translates into a positive effect on
expected output. Formally, the IC under the objective model R∗ is
[β01β13 + β02β23] (u(w(yH))− u(w(yL)))− c ≥ 0. (1.6)
The term in squared brackets is the effect of effort on output and contains the consumer
information channel β01β13 and the reputation channel β02β23. Under the subjective model
R, this second channel is missing. When the agent calibrates her model, she correctly
estimates the impact of her action on the distribution of consumer information. However,
when she estimates the impact of consumer information on sales, it is as if she suffers
from omitted variable bias, and her estimate will depend on the implemented strategy α.
Hence, the perceived effect of action on sales – and therefore also the IC – depends on
α. In the proof of Proposition 1.2 , we derive the IC for all α ∈ [0, 1]. For α = 1 the IC
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becomes
β01β13 (u(w(yH))− u(w(yL))) ≥ c. (1.7)
Since the effect of effort on reputation β02 is negative, the simplification in R relaxes the
IC. As long as α ∈ (0, 1), the reputation effect is partly reflected in p(yH | x1). The
extent of this depends on α since α affects the correlation between consumer information
and reputation. A higher correlation between consumer information and reputation would
mitigate some of the effect of the agent’s misperception.
Next, consider statement (b). The observation that the principal implements a pure
strategy would be trivial in the canonical framework with rational expectations. This
is not the case here as the agent’s perceived effect of effort on output pR(yH | a =
1;α) − pR(yH | a = 0;α) may vary non-monotonically in α. In the present setting, the
perceived effect of effort on output is maximal at α = 1, so that there is no reason for
the principal to implement a mixed strategy. At the end of this subsection, we present
an example where the unique optimal equilibrium contract indeed implements a mixed
strategy α ∈ (0, 1).
Importantly, if the agent chooses a pure strategy, then, by Corollary 1.1 and the fact
that R is perfect, she correctly anticipates the joint distribution over all variables in R
conditional on her equilibrium action. Thus, in the data that the agent gets under the
optimal equilibrium contract, there are no informational cues which could alarm her about
a misspecification in her subjective model. This is a crucial difference between the present
framework and models where beliefs about outcomes are biased for equilibrium actions.
Finally, the last part of statement (b) spells out that the principal strictly benefits from the
simplification in R when effort costs are small enough so that it is profitable to implement
high effort. For a range of effort costs c, the principal implements low effort when the
agent has rational expectations, but high effort if her subjective model is R. This is of
course not true in general. For example, if the agent’s action has a positive effect on
reputation, β02 > 0, the simplification in R tightens the IC for α = 1 as the agent does
not take all positive effects of her action on output into account.
To illustrate our approach, we present the proof of Proposition 1.2.
Proof of Proposition 1.2. We first derive pR(yH | a;α) for a given mixed equilibrium strat-
egy α ∈ (0, 1). The agent’s equilibrium belief about the joint probability distribution of
the variables in R is given by pR(a, x1, y) = q(a)p(x1 | a)p(y | x1). Since node 0 and
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node 1 form a clique and R is perfect, the agent’s belief about the joint probability
distribution of a and x1 is correct. Hence, p(x1 | a) is independent of α and we have
p(x1 = 1 | a) = β1 + β01a. However, p(y | x1) depends on α since the distribution over y
also depends on x2. To get p(y | x1), we first derive p(x2 = 1 | x1), i.e., the probability
that x2 = 1 given that value x1 is observed at node 1 when the agent’s equilibrium action
is α. We calculate
p(x2 = 1 | x1 = 1) =
α(β1 + β01)(β2 + β02) + (1− α)β1β2
β1 + αβ01
, (1.8)
p(x2 = 1 | x1 = 0) =
α(1− β1 − β01)(β2 + β02) + (1− α)(1− β1)β2
1− β1 − αβ01
. (1.9)
With this we can calculate the equilibrium probability that output yH realizes after ob-
serving x1 = 1 and x1 = 0, respectively:
p(yH | x1 = 1) = β3 + β13 +
α(β1 + β01)(β2 + β02) + (1− α)β1β2
β1 + αβ01
β23, (1.10)
p(yH | x1 = 0) = β3 +
α(1− β1 − β01)(β2 + β02) + (1− α)(1− β1)β2
1− β1 − αβ01
β23. (1.11)
From pR(a, x1, y) we can now calculate the agent’s subjective probability of a high output
after high and low effort, respectively:
pR(yH | a = 1;α) = (β1 + β01)p(yH | x1 = 1) + (1− β1 − β01)p(yH | x1 = 0), (1.12)
pR(yH | a = 0;α) = β1p(yH | x1 = 1) + (1− β1)p(yH | x1 = 0). (1.13)
We then use these terms to compute the IC for α ∈ (0, 1),
[pR(yH | a = 1;α)− pR(yH | a = 0;α)] (u(w(yH))− u(w(yL))) = 0. (1.14)
By taking the limit for α→ 1, we obtain the IC for α = 1, which is the inequality in (1.7).
Since β02 < 0, this completes the proof of statement (a). To prove statement (b), note
first that both IC and PC must be binding at the optimal equilibrium contract. Simple
calculations show that β01, β13, β23 > 0 and β02 < 0 imply
pR(yH | a = 1;α)− pR(yH | a = 0;α) ≤ β01β13 (1.15)
for all α ∈ (0, 1]; that is, when the agent exerts high effort with positive probability, her
perceived effect of effort on output is largest at α = 1. The principal then cannot gain
from implementing a mixed strategy. Finally, given that the optimal equilibrium contract
implements either α = 0 or α = 1, the last part of statement (b) follows from a simple
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comparison of expected profits under the equilibrium contracts that implement these two
actions.
Mixed strategy example. We show by example that it is not always optimal for the principal
to implement a pure strategy. Consider again the marketer example. Assume that the
agent is risk-neutral, protected by limited liability so that w ≥ 0, her outside option value
is zero, and yL = 0. Suppose payoff parameters are such that the principal optimally
implements some α > 0. Standard arguments show that w(yL) = 0, and that w(yH) is
chosen so that the IC in (1.14) is satisfied. The principal’s expected payoff from this
contract is then







where ∆R(α) = pR(yH | a = 1;α) − pR(yH | a = 0;α) is the agent’s perceived effect of










1− β1 − β01
)
. (1.17)
Let the agent’s action have a positive impact on both consumer information and repu-
tation, β01 > 0 and β02 > 0. Then for β01 → 1 − β1 the slope in (1.17) converges to
minus infinity. Hence, if all else equal β01 is sufficiently close to 1 − β1, then, starting
from α = 1, a small reduction in α reduces w(yH), and in terms of profits, this reduction
overcompensates the smaller probability of high output. The optimal equilibrium contract
then implements a mixed strategy. Thus, when the agent is induced to switch between
periods of working hard and periods of shirking, her effort appears to her as particularly
important for the final output.
Of course, when the agent chooses a mixed strategy, then the data generated in equilibrium
would suffice to identify the real effect of effort on output. For this, the agent would have
to analyze the data like an experimentalist and compare the average output under high
and low effort, respectively. However, according to her subjective model, this “test”
is unnecessary, and she therefore saves herself the trouble of performing it. Thus, one
interpretation for the mixed strategy equilibrium is that the agent does not use her data
effectively to correctly derive the effect of her effort on output.
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1.3.3 Justifiability
In our framework, the agent has a fully specified model that makes predictions about
outcomes for all actions a ∈ A. A natural question is then whether the optimal equilibrium
contract is also optimal for the principal when evaluated from the agent’s (potentially
biased) perspective. If according to her subjective beliefs the principal should have offered
another contract, the agent may suspect that her subjective model R is not correct.5 We
call this refinement “justifiability.” It has first been defined in the unawareness literature
by Filiz-Ozbay (2012). We can conveniently adapt it to our framework. In the following
definition, we distinguish between “justifiability” and “partial justifiability.”








q(a)pR(y | a; q∗)(y − w(y))
subject to the constraints that, for all a in the support of q, we have
a ∈ arga′∈A max
∑
y∈Y





q(a)[pR(y | a; q∗)u(w(y))− c(a)] ≥ Ū .
An equilibrium contract (w∗, q∗) is partially justifiable at R if w∗ is a solution to this
maximization problem when q = q∗ is given.
An equilibrium contract (w∗, q∗) is justifiable if the choice of the incentive scheme w∗ and
the implemented strategy q∗ maximizes the principal’s expected payoff when evaluated
according to the agent’s beliefs pR(y | a; q∗). It is partially justifiable if the incentive
scheme w∗ maximizes the principal’s expected payoff, when evaluated according to the
agent’s beliefs, given that the principal wants to implement strategy q∗. Partial justifia-
bility is a weaker refinement where the agent does not doubt her subjective model if at
least the incentive scheme appears to be optimal for the principal. We examine under
what circumstances an optimal equilibrium contract is (partially) justifiable, and obtain
this result:
5We do not model how in this case the agent adjusts her subjective model. One alternative is that,
after becoming suspicious, she looks at the production process more closely and discovers the objective
model R∗.
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Proposition 1.3 (Justifiability). Let (w∗, q∗) be an optimal equilibrium contract. If we
have pR(y; q) = p(y) for all q ∈ ∆(A), the following statements hold:
(a) This contract is partially justifiable at R.
(b) If A, Y are binary sets, q∗ is a pure strategy, and the principal strictly prefers this
contract to the optimal contract under the objective model R∗, it is justifiable at R.
The proof of this result is in Appendix 1.8.2. The first part of Proposition 1.3 states that an
optimal equilibrium contract is partially justifiable if the agent has correct expectations on
the equilibrium path. In this case, the maximization problem in (1.4) and that in Definition
1.3 are identical for a given strategy q∗. The optimal incentive scheme that implements
q∗ then also appears to the agent as optimal for the principal. Thus, by Proposition 1.1,
if the agent’s subjective model R is perfect, the optimal equilibrium contract is partially
justifiable at R.
This is a significant difference to a framework where the agent’s beliefs p̂(y | a) are exoge-
nously fixed. The optimal contract in such a framework may not be partially justifiable
since it may contain a bet that, from the agent’s perspective, is not optimal for the prin-
cipal. To illustrate, consider the two-actions-two-outcomes example from the previous
subsection. Suppose that the principal implements high effort α = 1, and that the agent’s
beliefs are biased so that p̂(yH | a = 1) > p(yH | a = 1) and p̂(yH | a = 0) = p(yH | a = 0).
Now let effort costs c converge to zero. Under rational expectations, this would imply that
the optimal contract converges to a fixed-wage contract. In contrast, under biased beliefs,
the optimal contract remains bounded away from fixed wages: To exploit the agent’s bias,
it pays more to her after output yH and less after output yL. However, from the agent’s
perspective, an incentive scheme that is close to fixed wages would be optimal. Thus, from
her perspective, the offered incentive scheme cannot be optimal for the principal.
To prove justifiability, we additionally have to show that, according to the agent’s beliefs,
the principal cannot benefit from implementing a different action. Unfortunately, it is
then no longer possible to derive a general statement. If an equilibrium contract is optimal
for the principal, this does not imply that it is justifiable, even if the agent has correct
expectations on the equilibrium path. Justifiability then has to be proven for each case
individually.
The second part of Proposition 1.3 states sufficient (but not necessary) conditions for jus-
tifiability for a relevant special case. In a two-actions-two-outcomes setting, an optimal
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equilibrium contract is justifiable if it implements a pure strategy and the principal strictly
benefits from the agent’s misperception (as in the marketer example of the previous sub-
section). The requirement of a pure strategy is crucial here. Consider the mixed strategy
example from the previous subsection where the principal implements α ∈ (0, 1) to alter
the agent’s sense for the importance of her effort. From the agent’s perspective, this does
not make sense. According to her, it would be optimal for the principal to implement high
effort with certainty. Note that she is indifferent between high and low effort, so (in her
mind) the incentive scheme can remain the same. Thus, the optimal equilibrium contract
in the mixed strategy example is not justifiable.
1.4 The Informativeness Principle
An important question in contract theory is on which information the principal should
condition the agent’s wage. For a setting with a risk-averse agent who has unlimited
liability, the informativeness principle states that the optimal contract conditions on an
additional variable z if and only if it is informative about the agent’s effort, i.e., if and
only if the likelihood ratio p(y,z|a
′)
p(y,z|a) varies in z for some y.
6 In this section, we derive a
version of the informativeness principle that allows for boundedly rational agents. To this
end, we exploit the fact that an agent with biased subjective beliefs may still have correct
expectations about the joint distribution of the contractible variables in equilibrium. We
then apply our version of the informativeness principle to provide a rationale for why in
executive compensation contracts peer-performance is mostly not used so that CEOs are
rewarded for windfall gains.
The original version of the informativeness principle may no longer hold when the agent’s
subjective model R is misspecified. Consider the marketer example from Subsection 1.3.2
and assume that the principal can also condition the agent’s wage on consumer information
x1. If the agent had rational expectations, the optimal wage scheme would condition both
on consumer information x1 and sales x3 since neither variable is a sufficient statistic of
the other (to avoid confusion below, we here use x3 instead of y). However, according to
the agent’s subjective model R, sales x3 are just a noisy signal of consumer information
x1. Therefore, the optimal equilibrium contract only conditions on x1 and appears as
“incomplete.”7
6Whether this result holds or not depends on the formal details of the contracting problem; see
Chaigneau et al. (2019) for a recent discussion and a further extension of the informativeness princi-
ple.
7A further interesting trade-off can be observed here. Recall from the marketer example that when
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We can generalize this finding and obtain a version of the informativeness principle that
allows for misspecified subjective models R. To get this statement, we assume that the
agent’s subjective model is such that she correctly anticipates the joint distribution over
the two contractible variables y and z. Recall from Proposition 1.1 that this is the case if
R is perfect and there is a link between y and z in R (so that they form a clique).
Proposition 1.4 (Informativeness Principle). Suppose the agent is risk-averse and has
unlimited liability. Let y and z be two contractible variables that are both part of the agent’s
subjective model R. If pR(z, y; q) = p(z, y) for all q ∈ ∆(A), the following statements hold:
(a) Suppose that a ∈ {0, 1} and c(1) > c(0). The equilibrium contract that implements
α = 1 at lowest cost to the principal does not condition on z if and only if for all
triples a, y, z we have pR(z | y, a;α = 1) = pR(z | y;α = 1).
(b) If for all q ∈ ∆(A) and all triples a, y, z we have pR(z | y, a; q) = pR(z | y; q), the
optimal equilibrium contract does not condition on z.
The proof of Proposition 1.4 is in Appendix 1.8.3. We provide an interpretation of this
result and explain its implications. First, the condition pR(z | y, a; q) = pR(z | y; q)
for all q ∈ ∆(A) and all triples a, y, z indicates that, in the agent’s mind, variable z is
independent of her action conditional on variable y (regardless of the implemented action).
If this condition is satisfied, the agent believes that z does not contain any information
about her action that is not already in y. However, this condition alone does not imply that
the optimal equilibrium contract does not condition the agent’s wage on z. In addition,
the agent’s subjective belief about the joint equilibrium distribution of y and z needs to
be correct. Otherwise, the principal may want to exploit the agent’s biased perception of
this distribution, and condition on z even if the agent thinks that z is uninformative about
her action given y. This is equivalent to betting when two individuals have different prior
beliefs about future events (as pointed out in the previous subsection, such a contract
would also not be justifiable).
An interesting special case emerges when the agent believes that z is independent of all
other variables. If y and z are independent in the objective model, the optimal equilibrium
contract would not condition on z (even if y and z are not independent conditional on
the contract only conditions on sales x3, the agent with subjective model R is control optimistic, which
relaxes the IC. In contrast, when the contract only conditions on consumer information x1, the agent has
correct expectations about her expected payoff under alternative actions, so the IC is unaffected by the
misspecification in R. Nevertheless, it is optimal for the principal to condition the agent’s wage only on x1
as it is a more precise signal about her effort than sales x3, that is, the informativeness effect dominates
the incentive effect from the misspecification since p(x1 = 1 | a = 1)− p(x1 = 1 | a = 0) = β01 > β01β13 =
pR(yH | a = 1;α = 1)− pR(yH | a = 0;α = 1).
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a). From the agent’s perspective that would only introduce noise to the wage scheme.
However, if z and y are correlated, the requirements of Proposition 1.4 are no longer
satisfied, and the optimal equilibrium contract may imply a bet on the joint realization of
y and z.
Second, Proposition 1.4 consists of two statements. Statement (a) is the informativeness
principle for the case of binary action spaces. It is very similar to the original version: The
statement implies that the optimal equilibrium contract that implements α = 1 conditions
on z if and only if the likelihood ratio pR(y,z|a=0;α=1)pR(y,z|a=1;α=1) varies in z for some y. Statement (b)
for general finite action spaces is weaker since the additional information embedded in z
may, according to the agent’s subjective beliefs, only affect non-binding ICs.8
Third, observe that Proposition 1.4 does not impose any further assumptions on the
agent’s subjective model R. It therefore applies to all settings in which the agent’s beliefs
satisfy the conditions outlined in the proposition. Importantly, we can state sufficient
conditions on R so that the agent’s beliefs satisfy the conditional independence assump-
tion. The Bayesian network literature establishes “d-separation” as a convenient tool to
check conditional independence of two sets of variables in a model R; we describe it in a
supplementary appendix.
Fourth, our Bayesian network framework allows for a causal interpretation of the infor-
mativeness principle. The optimal equilibrium contract conditions on both y and z if the
agent’s action has partially independent effects on these two variables according to R. It
does not condition on z if, according to R, variable z is a consequence of y. In this case,
the optimal contract conditions on the variable that is “causally closer” to the agent’s
action.
As an application, we consider a setting in which the principal can condition the agent’s
wage both on her output y ∈ {yL, yH} and on her relative performance z ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
The latter variable captures, for example, how the stock price of the company compares
to that of the company’s rivals. There is a common shock x1 ∈ {0, 1}, e.g., the state of the
economy, that positively affects both own output y and the rivals’ output x3 ∈ {yL, yH}.
Through competition, output y has a negative effect on the rivals’ output x3 (e.g., if y
is high, the rivals’ output tends to be smaller since consumers prefer the product of the
agent’s firm). The objective model R∗ on the left in Figure 1.3 illustrates this setting.
8This is a general issue of the informativeness principle and not specific to our framework.
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Figure 1.3: Objective model R∗ (left) and subjective model R (right) in the peer-
comparison example.
Under the objective model R∗, the optimal equilibrium contract that implements high
effort would, at any generic parametrization, condition the agent’s wage both on output
and relative performance. This can be established by visually inspecting R∗ using d-
separation.9 The intuition is as follows: Suppose we know the agent’s output y. Then
information about the agent’s action a provides additional information about the state of
the economy x1, and hence also additional information about peer performance z. Hence,
a and z are not independent conditional on y in R∗.
Now suppose that the agent does not take the common shock x1 into account so that
her subjective model is given by R on the right of Figure 1.3. Since R is perfect and
the variables y and z are linked in R, the agent correctly anticipates the equilibrium
distribution over the two variables. Moreover, if we know the output y, then, according to
R, the agent’s action contains no further information about z (one can formally show this
using d-separation). Proposition 1.4 then implies that the optimal equilibrium contract
that implements α = 1 only conditions on the agent’s own output y. It is therefore
incomplete and rewards the agent for windfall gains that come from good states of the
economy. In the agent’s mind, her relative performance is only a noisy signal of her own
output. Hence conditioning her wage on relative performance would only increase the
agent’s exposure to risk and hence implementation costs.
Many actual compensation contracts indeed do not make use of peer-performance and
reward executives for windfall gains. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Bebchuk and
Fried (2004) discuss this phenomenon and possible explanations. A popular explanation is
that executives use their influence over the board of directors to alter their compensation,
which then happens to increase in windfall gains. However, this theory cannot explain the
9The “usual” way to see this is to consider a particular parametrization. Consider our linear speci-
fication with binary outcomes at all variables except z. For z we assume that p(z = 1 | y > x3) ≈ 1,
p(z = 0 | y = x3) ≈ 1, and p(z = −1 | y < x3) ≈ 1. If the influence of y on x3 is small enough, the optimal
contract that implements high effort conditions on both variables, and the agent’s wage increases in both
y and z.
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inefficient risk allocation. In contrast, model misspecification can account for inefficient
risk allocation. For example, the manager’s model is misspecified as in the application if
she attributes the output to her action alone, or if she ignores the statistical implications
of common shocks and therefore evaluates peer-performance as uninformative about her
own action.
1.5 Behavioral Rationality
We learned in Section 1.3 that a simplification in the agent’s subjective model may affect
the incentive compatibility constraint. However, does a simplification in R automatically
imply that the agent’s beliefs are biased? In this section, we show that the answer is
negative. The agent may correctly anticipate the true production function even when
her subjective model R omits variables from R∗. When this statement holds for any
parametrization of the extended production function that factorizes10 according to R∗, we
say that the agent is “behaviorally rational.” We state the formal definition.
Definition 1.4. An agent with subjective model R is behaviorally rational if, at any prob-
ability distribution p ∈ ∆(XN∗) that factorizes according to R∗, we have pR(y | a; q) =
p(y | a) for all a ∈ A and q ∈ ∆(A).
For a given objective modelR∗ we can characterize when the agent is behaviorally rational,
provided that the misspecification is a simplification. This restriction is useful as it implies
that R∗ and the set of nodes in the agent’s subjective model N fully characterize R. We
will see that two extended production functions – which involve the same set of nodes N∗
and may give rise to the same production function p(y | a) – can differ in the extent to
which simplifications affect the agent’s beliefs about p(y | a). This extent depends on the
“channels” in R∗ through which the agent’s action affects the output. Intuitively, they
describe the agent’s role in the organization, that is, which components or behaviors of
others the agent affects directly or indirectly through her action. In Subsection 1.5.1, we
motivate this interpretation in an example where the agent’s job determines the scope for
biased beliefs and control optimism. In Subsection 1.5.2, we characterize when the agent
is behaviorally rational and generalize the main findings from Subsection 1.5.1.
10In this section, we deviate from our earlier assumption that p(xN∗) does not contain any additional
conditional independence assumptions compared to R∗. This allows us to use results and techniques from
the Bayesian network literature. Importantly, if the agent is behaviorally rational in the current setting,
she is also behaviorally rational under the earlier assumption.
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1.5.1 The Agent’s Job and the Scope for Control Optimism
We examine the interaction between the agent’s job, model misspecification, and incen-
tives. Let the agent first work as an ordinary marketer whose job is to increase sales. This
time, making cold-calls is not part of her job. Her effort only has a (positive) effect on con-
sumer information, for example, through informative advertising. Nevertheless, there is a
group of employees engaged in telemarketing. Their effort – making cold-calls – impacts
on consumer information and the firm’s reputation in the usual manner. The objective
model R∗ on the left of Figure 1.4 represents the causal structure of this extended pro-
duction function. Throughout, we use our parametrization with binary outcomes at all
variables i ∈ N∗ and p(xi = 1 | xR(i)) = βi +
∑
j∈R(i) βjixj . The telemarketers either con-
duct cold-calls or not, β1 ∈ {0, 1}; cold-calls have a negative effect on reputation, β13 < 0;
consumer information has a positive effect on reputation, β23 > 0.
11 All formal proofs of
this subsection are in Appendix 1.8.4.
Imagine that the marketer neither takes into account the telemarketers’ operation nor the
firm’s reputation so that her subjective model is given by R on the upper-left of Figure 1.5.
When choosing effort, she only considers the effect through consumer information. Does
this misspecification change incentives? The answer is negative. We can show – using the
results from the next subsection – that the agent’s subjective beliefs about the production
function are correct, so that pR(yH | a;α) = p(yH | a) for all a ∈ {0, 1} and α ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, given her role in the principal’s project (as captured by R∗), the subjective model
R is rich enough to produce correct predictions. The agent may ignore important parts
of the project and still act as if she were fully rational. The optimal contract is then the
same as in the canonical model.
Importantly, telemarketing still matters for the principal since the probability distribution
over sales depends on whether cold-calls are made or not. It is just not essential for the
agent to know whether cold-calls take place. Her estimate of the production function
implicitly takes into account the deterministic activity of the telemarketers.
Is there any simplification that would make the agent overestimate the effectiveness of her
effort? Again, the answer is negative. If the agent does not take node 2 into account, she
believes that her action has no consequences for the output. It would then be impossible
11Here we introduce a link between consumer information and reputation, and violate our full support
assumption by assuming p(x1 = 1) ∈ {0, 1}. The latter implies that in objective model R∗ we could drop
node 1 and factor the value p(x1 = 1) into the other conditional probabilities. If p(x1 = 1) ∈ (0, 1), node 1
would be a confounding factor and the behavioral rationality result in the example would no longer hold.
In terms of interpretation, this assumption just means telemarketing either takes place or not.
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Figure 1.4: Objective model R∗ (left) when the agent works as ordinary marketer, and
objective model R∗∗ (right) when the agent works as “head of marketing.”
Figure 1.5: Subjective models R (upper-left), R1 (upper-right), R2 (lower-left), and R3
(lower-right).
to implement high effort. If only node 1 or only node 3 were omitted from her subjective
model, the agent would again have correct beliefs about the production function. Thus,
there is no scope for control optimism when the agent works as ordinary marketer.
Next, we alter the agent’s job by promoting her to “head of marketing.” Her action now
influences the telemarketers’ effort, for example, by motivating or inspiring the telemar-
keters. Instead of p(x1 = 1) = β1, we now have p(x1 = 1 | a) = β1 + β01a. To keep things
as close as possible to the previous case, we assume β1 = 0 and β01 = 1.
12 Hence, the
agent needs to act in order to get the telemarketers going. The objective model of the
extended production function is given by R∗∗ on the right of Figure 1.4. How does a mis-
specification in the agent’s subjective model now affect equilibrium beliefs and incentives
in this environment?
Let us first assume that the agent has the same subjective model R as before (on the
upper-left of Figure 1.5). She neglects both the telemarketers’ activity and the firm’s
12Formally, we assume β1 = ε1 and β01 = 1− ε2 where ε1 < ε2, and consider the limit beliefs as ε1 → 0
and ε2 → 0. We show in the proofs for this subsection that our results do not depend on this assumption.
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reputation. This is not realistic since as “head of marketing” the agent should be aware
of her subordinates’ basic activities; so we will relax this assumption below. The misspec-
ification now affects incentives. Under the objective model R∗∗ the IC that implements
α = 1 would be
[(β02 + β01β12)(β24 + β23β34) + β01β13β34](u(w(yH))− u(w(yL))) ≥ c. (1.18)
The squared brackets contain the different channels through which effort affects output.
The partial negative effect of effort on output through cold-calls and reputation is captured
in the term β01β13β34; it is negative since β13 < 0. Under the subjective model R the IC
becomes
(β02 + β01β12)(β24 + β23β34)(u(w(yH))− u(w(yL))) ≥ c. (1.19)
Here the partial negative effect is missing so that the IC is relaxed. Note that through
the estimate of the link between the agent’s action and consumer information, the agent
implicitly takes into account her positive influence on the telemarketers’ effort, which in
turn positively affects consumer information (see the term β01β12). Therefore, by being
promoted to a job where the agent also influences telemarketing, she overestimates her
productivity. The principal benefits from this since the misspecification reduces the need
to provide effort incentives.
Assume now that the agent takes the telemarketers’ action into account, but still omits
reputation in her model. Therefore, her subjective model is given by R2 on the lower-left
of Figure 1.5. Does this inclusion correct, at least partly, the agent’s beliefs? It turns
out that this is not the case. The models R and R2 produce the same beliefs about the
effectiveness of effort, i.e., pR(yH | a;α) = pR2(yH | a;α) for all a ∈ {0, 1} and α ∈ [0, 1].
Including more variables does not necessarily make the agent more rational. This also
holds for the models R1 and R3 in Figure 1.5. Note that R3 is almost equal to the
objective model R∗∗, only the link between telemarketing and reputation is missing. Yet,
all subjective models in this figure produce the same beliefs. Thus, a small misspecification
in the agent’s subjective model can render several important variables as inessential for
estimating the production function.
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Proposition 1.5 (Scope for Control Optimism). Consider the job examples of this sub-
section.
(a) If the agent works as ordinary marketer (objective model R∗), the misspecification
in R has no effect on the IC and the optimal equilibrium contract is the same as in
the canonical model. There is no simplification that generates control optimism.
(b) If the agent works as “head of marketing” (objective model R∗∗), the misspecification
in R generates control optimism and relaxes the IC; the subjective models R, R1,
R2, and R3 generate the same beliefs about the production function.
Proposition 1.5 illustrates how the agent’s job may matter for optimal incentives. The
two jobs with objective models R∗ and R∗∗ may give rise to the same production function
p(y | a),13 so that incentives would be identical under rational expectations. However,
effort motivation is larger under a job with the objective model R∗∗ when the agent’s
subjective model is simplified in a way that benefits the principal. The crucial difference
between the jobs are the sets of channels through which the action affects the output. In
the next subsection, we will formally define these channels.
Part (a) and (b) of Proposition 1.5 combined demonstrate that an agent’s degree of con-
trol optimism may be determined by the nature of her job. In the example, the agent
with misspecified model R was behaviorally rational in her job as ordinary marketer, but
overestimated the importance of her effort after being promoted to “head of marketing”
where she influences the actions of others. Thus, in our framework, the agent’s control
optimism is not caused by certain features of her personality, but it is a consequence of
her environment when her subjective model does not capture all empirical regularities of
this environment.
1.5.2 A General Result on Behavioral Rationality
To obtain a general result on behavioral rationality, we assume that the objective model
R∗ is perfect, and that the agent’s subjective model R is a simplification. R will then
be perfect. No v-structure emerges if we take out nodes from a perfect R∗ and all links
attached to them. The assumptions on R∗ and R are not overly restrictive: Any proba-
bility distribution p(xN∗) factorizes according to some perfect DAG R∗. The assumption
13Specifically, when we denote parameters for the job with objective model R∗ (R∗∗) with “∗” (“∗∗”)


























on R is satisfied by almost all subjective models in this paper. All formal proofs for this
subsection are in Appendix 1.8.5.
In the following, we characterize for any perfect R∗ the subset of nodes the agent needs to
have in her subjective model R so that she acts as if she had fully rational beliefs about
the production function. We use the following definitions and results from the Bayesian
network literature. Consider any DAG R = (N,R). Its skeleton (N, R̃) is obtained by
making the DAG undirected. We have iR̃j if and only if iRj or jRi.
Definition 1.5. Two DAGs R and G are equivalent if pR(xN∗) ≡ pG(xN∗) for every
p ∈ ∆(XN∗).
Proposition 1.6 (Verma and Pearl, 1991). Two DAGs R and G are equivalent if and
only if they have the same skeleton and v-structure.
Two different models produce the same beliefs if they share the same skeleton and the
same set of v-colliders. A subset of nodes M ⊂ N is called ancestral in R if for all nodes
i ∈ M we have R(i) ⊂ M . A path τ of length d from node i to node j is a sequence of
nodes τ0, τ1, ..., τd so that τ0 = i, τd = j, and τh−1R̃τh for all h ∈ {1, ..., d}. The length of
the shortest path between i and j is called the distance between these nodes and denoted
by d(i, j). A path of length d is active if there is no h ∈ {1, ..., d− 1} so that τh−1Rτh and
τh+1Rτh.
Define by E the set of DAGs in the equivalence class of R∗ in which the action node 0 is
ancestral (nothing influences the agent’s action). In each of these DAGs, all active paths
between the action node 0 and any node i point towards i. Thus, the assumption that
node 0 is ancestral pins down the direction of many links in a perfect DAG. We call such
links “fundamental links.” There is a close connection between fundamental links and the
set of nodes that can be removed while maintaining behavioral rationality.
Definition 1.6. Consider two nodes i, j ∈ N∗. If iGj for all G = (G,N∗) ∈ E, then the
link iGj is called fundamental link and denoted by iEj.
An intuition for fundamental links is that they capture empirically relevant directions of
causality (given agreement on the ancestral node). Specifically, they describe how the
agent’s action impacts on other variables. Consider R∗ from Figure ??. Since the action
node is ancestral, the links pointing from node 0 to other nodes are fundamental (0R∗1,
0R∗2, and 0R∗3). Thus, the two links pointing into the output node (1R∗4 and 3R∗4) also
must be fundamental. If we would turn around one of them, we would create a v-collider
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since there is no link between node 0 and node 4. The remaining links 1R∗2, 1R∗3, and
2R∗3 are not fundamental. We can state a result that characterizes all fundamental links
in any perfect DAG; see Appendix 1.8.5. For now, we go a step further and consider
sequences of fundamental links.
Definition 1.7. Let τ be an active path in R∗. Then τ is a fundamental active path if all
the links between neighboring nodes in τ are fundamental.
Fundamental active paths are what we so far called “channels.” Consider again R∗ from
Figure ??. The path τ = {0, 1, 4} is a fundamental active path since both links 0R∗1 and
1R∗4 are fundamental. In contrast, the active path τ ′ = {0, 2, 3, 4} is not fundamental
since the link 2R∗3 is not fundamental. We define the set of nodes that are part of at least
one fundamental active path between the action and the output by
H∗(R∗) := {i ∈ N∗ | i is part of a fundamental active path between 0 and n in R∗}.
It turns out that the nodes in H∗(R∗) are exactly those nodes the agent needs to have
in her subjective model in order to be behaviorally rational, provided that her subjective
model is a simplification. We can prove this by finding a DAG G that is equivalent to R∗
and in which there are no links pointing from nodes in N∗\H∗(R∗) to nodes in H∗(R∗). In
this DAG, the nodes that are not in H∗(R∗) have no influence on the output, so the agent
can safely ignore them. By Proposition 1.6, the agent correctly anticipates the production
function if H∗(R∗) ⊆ N .
Proposition 1.7 (Behavioral Rationality). Let R∗ be a perfect DAG and let the agent’s
subjective DAG R be a simplification. The agent is behaviorally rational if and only if R
contains all nodes from H∗(R∗).
Proposition 1.7 implies that the agent does not necessarily have to take into account all
variables of her (potentially) complex environment in order to be behaviorally rational.
In particular, this holds independent of the parametrization of the extended production
function. For example, when p(x1, ..., x4 | a) factorizes according to R∗ in Figure ??, the
agent can ignore node 2 and still would behave as in the contracting model with common
priors. The intuition is that when H∗(R∗) ⊆ N , then the information captured through
the variables in H∗(R∗) already includes the probabilistic information from variables out-
side H∗(R∗). Conversely, if the agent’s subjective model does not include all variables
from H∗(R∗), she is not behaviorally rational. In this case, we can find a parametriza-
tion of p(x1, ..., xn | a) such that the incentive compatibility constraint is affected by the
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simplification in the agent’s subjective model R.
Next, Proposition 1.7 also shows that different misspecifications can have the same effect
on incentives. Consider the two models R1 and R2 from the job example in Figure
1.5. The set of nodes on fundamental active paths is the same for these two models,
H∗(R1) = H∗(R2) = {0, 2, 4}. This implies that the agent’s beliefs under these models
are identical. Thus, it does not matter for the equilibrium contract whether the agent
ignores node 1, node 3, or both nodes. Therefore, the ignorance about one channel of
causality may render another variable unimportant. A further interpretation is that two
agents with different subjective models may have the same beliefs about the production
function. We capture this result in a general statement. Consider a DAG R = (N,R) and
a subset Ñ ⊂ N . Denote by R[Ñ ] = (Ñ , R̃) with R̃ = (Ñ × Ñ)∩R the DAG R restricted
on Ñ .
Corollary 1.3. Let R1 = (N1, R1) and R2 = (N2, R2) be two perfect DAGs. Suppose
there exists a DAG R3 so that R[N1]3 = R1 and R
[N2]
3 = R2. If H∗(R1) = H∗(R2), then
we have that pR1(y | a; q) = pR2(y | a; q) for all a ∈ A and q ∈ ∆(A).
Finally, note that one can make any imperfect DAG perfect by adding links between nodes
that create v-colliders. If p(xN∗) is consistent with R∗, it is consistent with any DAG that
adds links to R∗. One can exploit this to partially extend Proposition 1.7 to imperfect
objective models.
1.6 Comparative Statics
One advantage of our approach to contracting with boundedly rational agents is that beliefs
are derived endogenously from the true production process. This allows us to analyze how
the optimal equilibrium contract varies in the parameters of the environment. As an
example, we briefly revisit the trade-off between risk and incentives. This comparative
static that has been discussed extensively in the contracting literature.14
In the canonical contracting model, the trade-off works as follows. A risk-averse agent
demands a risk premium for accepting a wage schedule with uncertain wage payments.
Thus, an increase in risk drives up the costs of providing incentives. Consequently, the
provision of effort incentives should decrease in the riskiness of the environment. However,
14In an earlier version of the paper, we also discussed the trade-off between team size and incentives (it
is available upon request from the authors).
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empirically this relationship does not hold in general (e.g., Prendergast, 2002). Field
evidence on the relationship between risk an incentives for CEO compensation is mixed,
and for other domains, such as franchising, a positive relationship can be observed. In
contrast, a negative relationship is obtained in lab experiments where subjects know the
true production function (Corgnet and Hernán-González, 2019).
We can use our marketer example to show how the relationship between risk and incentives
may become positive when the agent has a simplified model of the project; see Appendix
1.8.6 for details. We consider a mean-preserving spread in p(y | a), so that under the
objective model R∗ the provision of incentives becomes more costly when there is more
risk. However, if the agent’s subjective model is misspecified, there can be an additional
effect of risk on incentives: The agent may perceive the riskier environment as one in
which her action is more important for the output. This relaxes the incentive compatibility
constraint. If this effect is sufficiently strong relative to the risk premium effect, there can
be a positive relationship between risk and incentives.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we applied Spiegler’s (2016) Bayesian network framework to analyze optimal
contracting in a principal-agent setting where the agent forms beliefs about the production
function based on a misspecified model of the principal’s project. The objective causal
model may be very complex, and may contain empirical regularities that the agent does not
consider due to cognitive limitations or because they are never brought to her attention.
The optimal contract exhibits the following features. First, it does not exploit the agent
if her subjective model takes into account the correlation between variables in her model
that have a joint influence on a third variable (in which case it is “perfect”). Second, the
principal may nevertheless benefit from a misspecification in the agent’s perfect subjective
model if it makes the agent control optimistic so that the incentive compatibility constraint
is relaxed. Third, if the agent’s subjective model is perfect, the agent cannot infer from
the shape of incentives that her beliefs are biased. Fourth, when the agent correctly
anticipates the joint distribution of contractible variables, the optimal contract conditions
on an additional variable only if it is informative about the action according to the agent’s
model. Fifth, the optimal contract is identical to the rational benchmark if the agent is
behaviorally rational. We characterize when this is the case, and apply this finding to
show how the scope for control optimism may depend on the agent’s job. For example,
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a front-line worker may not fully understand the workings of the organization around
her, but still act as if she were fully rational. In contrast, a high-ranking manager, who
affects the output by influencing the behavior of many subordinates, overestimates her
own productivity if she does not take into account the challenges that her subordinates
face in their routines.
We focused on a simple contracting framework so that we can identify precisely how mis-
specifications in the agent’s model affect incentive contracts. Future research can extend
the framework by considering team incentives, relational contracts, and delegation. The
Bayesian network approach offers a very disciplined tool to study the effects of bounded
rationality on organizations, and we think that our results are useful in this respect.
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Brice Corgnet and Roberto Hernán-González. Revisiting the trade-off between risk and
incentives: The shocking effect of random shocks? Management Science, 65:1096–1114,
2019.
Enrique De la Rosa. Overconfidence and moral hazard. Games and Economic Behavior,
73:429–451, 2011.
41
Marci DeCaro, Robin Thomas, Niel Albert, and Sian Beilock. Choking under pressure:
Multiple routes to skill failure. Journal for Experimental Psychology: General, 140:
390–406, 2011.
Eddie Dekel, Barton Lipman, and Aldo Rustichini. Standard state-space models preclude
unawareness. Econometrica, 66:159–173, 1998.
Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler. A model of competing narratives. American Economic
Review, 110(3786-3816):3786–3816, 2020.
Kfir Eliaz, Ran Spiegler, and Heidi C. Thysen. Strategic interpretations. Journal of
Economic Theory, 192:105192, 2021.
Hanming Fang and Giuseppe Mocarini. Morale hazard. Journal of Monetary Economics,
52:749–777, 2005.
Emel Filiz-Ozbay. Incorporating unawareness into contract theory. Games and Economic
Behavior, 76:181–194, 2012.
Simon Gervais and Itay Goldstein. The positive effects of biased self-perceptions in firms.
Review of Finance, 11:453–496, 2007.
Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart. An analysis of the principal-agent problem. Econo-
metrica, 51:7–45, 1983.
Rema Hanna, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Joshua Schwartzstein. Learning through notic-
ing: Theory and evidence from a field experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
129:1311–1353, 2014.
Aviad Heifetz, Martin Meier, and Burkhard Schipper. Interactive unawareness. Journal
of Economic Theory, 130:78–94, 2006.
Aviad Heifetz, Martin Meier, and Burkhard Schipper. Unawareness, beliefs, and specula-
tive trade. Games and Economic Behavior, 77:100–121, 2013.
Bengt Holmström. Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics, 10:74–91,
1979.
Giovanni Immordino, Anna Maria Menchini, and Maria Grazia Romano. Contracts with
wishful thinkers. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 24:863–886, 2015.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Existence of a Personal Equilibrium
We first show that the agent’s subjective beliefs pR(y | a; q) are well-defined at any pair a, y
and for any pure or mixed strategy q ∈ ∆(A). Define pR(y | a; q) = limk→∞ pR(y | a; qk)
for a sequence q1, q2, . . . of fully mixed strategies with the property that qk → q as k →∞.
Let q̂1, q̂2, . . . be any alternative sequence of fully mixed strategies with q̂k → q as k →∞.
This implies that sk → 0 as k → ∞, where sk = qk − q̂k for k ∈ N. Since pR(y | a; ·)
is continuous, we have pR(y | a; q̂k) − pR(y | a; qk) → 0 as k → ∞, which proves the
statement. Next, we show that a personal equilibrium exists at any admissible R and
w ∈ W . Note that ∆(A) is non-empty, compact, and convex. Define the best-response
correspondence BR : ∆(A)→ ∆(A) by






q̃(a′)[pR(y | a′; q)u(w(y))− c(a′)]. (A.1)
For every q ∈ ∆(A) we have that BR(q) is non-empty and convex. The latter statement
follows since any convex combination of pure actions that are optimal for the agent is




′)[pR(y | a′; q)u(w(y))− c(a′)] is continuous in q. Hence, BR(q) is upper
hemi-continuous. The existence of a personal equilibrium then follows from Kakutani’s
theorem.
1.8.2 Omitted Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Proposition 1.3. Statement (a) is proven in the main text. We prove statement
(b). We assume w.l.o.g. that A = {0, 1} and Y = {yL, yH}, with the usual interpretation.
Since the principal strictly prefers (w∗, q∗) to the optimal contract under the objective
model R∗, and the agent correctly anticipates the equilibrium distribution over output,
the equilibrium action must be a∗ = 1 and w∗(1) > w∗(0). We show that from the agent’s
perspective the principal cannot gain by implementing a = 0. Denote by w̄ the fixed wage
that implements a = 0 at lowest costs to the principal under the objective model. The
agent anticipates that a fixed wage of w̄ would optimally implement a = 0. Since Y is
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binary we must have p(yH | a = 0) > pR(yH | a = 0; a∗). Thus, we get
∑
y∈Y
pR(y | a = 1; a∗)(y − w∗(y)) =
∑
y∈Y








pR(y | a = 0; a∗)(y − w̄),
where the first inequality follows from the fact that the principal strictly prefers (w∗, q∗)
to the optimal contract under model R∗. This completes the proof of statement (b).
1.8.3 Omitted Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Proposition 1.4. We first prove statement (b). Suppose the principal wishes to
implement q. Since the agent is risk-averse with unlimited liability and her action set A
is finite, we can use the arguments in Grossman and Hart (1983) to show that the Kuhn-
Tucker theorem yields necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimum. The optimal















for any a in the support of q. By assumption, we have pR(y, z; q) = p(y, z). We can rewrite
pR(y, z | a; q) as
pR(y, z | a; q) = pR(y | a; q)pR(z | y, a; q) = pR(y | a; q)pR(z | y; q), (A.3)
where the last equality follows from the assumption pR(z | y, a; q) = pR(z | y; q) for all
triples a, y, z. Similarly, we can write pR(y, z; q) = pR(y; q)pR(z | y; q). Hence, we get
pR(y, z | a; q)− pR(y, z | a′; q) =
pR(y, z; q)
pR(y; q)
[pR(y | a; q)− pR(y | a′; q)]. (A.4)







pR(y | a; q)− pR(y | a′; q)
pR(y; q)
. (A.5)
Since the right-hand side of this first-order equation is independent of z, the optimal
incentive scheme does not condition on z, which completes the proof. Next, we prove
statement (a). Risk-aversion and unlimited liability imply that the optimal incentive
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pR(y, z | a = 1;α = 1)




1− pR(y, z | a = 0;α = 1)
pR(y, z | a = 1;α = 1)
) ]
, (A.6)
where µ, λ are strictly positive constants. As above, we can write pR(y, z | a = 1;α =





1− pR(y, z | a = 0;α = 1)
pR(y, z | a = 1;α = 1)
)
. (A.7)
Statement (a) then directly follows from this equation.
1.8.4 Omitted Proofs from Subsection 5.1
We first derive the IC under the objective model R∗∗. The probabilities of high output
after high and low effort, respectively, are given by
p(yH | a = 1) = β4 + [β2 + β02 + (β1 + β01)β12]β24
+[β3 + (β1 + β01)β13 + (β2 + β02 + (β1 + β01)β12)β23]β34, (A.8)
p(yH | a = 0) = β4 + [β2 + β1β12]β24 + [β3 + β1β13 + (β2 + β1β12)β23]β34, (A.9)
so that the effect of effort on the probability of high output equals
p(yH | a = 1)− p(yH | a = 0) = (β02 + β01β12)(β24 + β23β34) + β01β13β34. (A.10)
Next, we drive the IC under the subjective model R when the equilibrium action is
α ∈ [0, 1]. We calculate
p(x1 = 1 | x2 = 1) =
α(β1 + β01)(β2 + β02 + β12) + (1− α)β1(β2 + β12)
β2 + β1β12 + α(β02 + β01β12)
, (A.11)
p(x1 = 1 | x2 = 0) =
α(β1 + β01)(1− β2 − β02 − β12) + (1− α)β1(1− β2 − β12)
1− β2 − β1β12 − α(β02 + β01β12)
,(A.12)
and
p(x3 = 1 | x2 = 1) = β3 + p(x1 = 1 | x2 = 1)β13 + β23, (A.13)
p(x3 = 1 | x2 = 0) = β3 + p(x1 = 1 | x2 = 0)β13. (A.14)
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The agent’s belief about the probability of high output after x2 = 1 and x2 = 0, respec-
tively, is therefore given by
p(yH | x2 = 1) = β4 + β24 + [β3 + p(x1 = 1 | x2 = 1)β13 + β23]β34, (A.15)
p(yH | x2 = 0) = β4 + [β3 + p(x1 = 1 | x2 = 0)β13]β34. (A.16)
The agent correctly anticipates p(x2 | a). Hence, her belief about the effect of effort on
the probability of high output under R equals
pR(yH | a = 1;α)− pR(yH | a = 0;α) = (β02 + β01β12)(β24 + β23β34) + (β02 + β01β12)β13β34
× [p(x1 = 1 | x2 = 1)− p(x1 = 1 | x2 = 0)]. (A.17)
Recall that β13 < 0. By comparing (A.10) and (A.17) we get that at α = 1 the misspeci-
fication in R relaxes the IC if and only if
β01 >
β12(β1 + β01)(1− β1 − β01)(β02 + β01β12)
(1− β2 − β02 − β12(β1 + β01))(β2 + β02 + β12(β1 + β01))
, (A.18)
which implies the statement in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 1.5 . We prove the statements in (a). Since β1 ∈ {0, 1}, we can
rewrite the probability model without variable 1. The corresponding objective model R̃∗
equals R∗ in Figure 1.4 without node 1. We now apply Propositions 1.7 and 1.8. In
model R̃∗, node 3 is not on a fundamental active path. Hence, the agent with subjective
model R is behaviorally rational, which yields the results. We prove the statements in (b).
The first statement is shown in the text. The second statement follows from Corollary
3. Note that, in all models of Figure 1.5, the set of nodes on fundamental active paths is
identical.
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1.8.5 Omitted Proofs from Subsection 5.2
To prove Proposition 1.7, we first state and prove Proposition 1.8 below.
Proposition 1.8 (Fundamental Links). Let R∗ be a perfect DAG and consider two ad-
jacent nodes i, j ∈ N∗. The link iR∗j is fundamental if and only if at least one of the
following conditions is satisfied:
(a) we have d(0, i) = d(0, j)− 1;
(b) there exists a node k ∈ N∗ such that kEi and k 6∈ R∗(j).
This result shows that nodes that are connected by fundamental links in perfect DAGs
exhibit characteristics that are easy to identify. It is not always simple to spot the nodes
that are not in H∗(R∗). In this case, Proposition 1.8 is helpful. Consider, for example,
the perfect DAG R∗ in Figure 1.6. Condition (a) from Proposition 1.8 implies that all
links which connect nodes of different distances to the action node are fundamental. The
remaining links are 1R∗2, 3R∗4, 3R∗5, 4R∗5, 4R∗6, and 5R∗6. Condition (b) from Propo-
sition 1.8 then implies that 4R∗6 and 5R∗6 are fundamental links, while the remaining
links are non-fundamental. We therefore get H∗(R∗) = N∗ \ {3}.
Figure 1.6: Example DAG R∗
In order to prove Proposition 1.8, we show several intermediate results. We first note
that, in a perfect DAG R∗, the link iR∗j is fundamental if the nodes i and j differ in their
distance to the action node 0.
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Lemma 1.1. Let i, j ∈ N∗ be adjacent nodes in R∗. If d(0, i) = d(0, j)− 1, then iEj.
Proof. First, suppose d(0, i) = 0 so that i = 0. Since node 0 is ancestral, we must have
iGj in every DAG G ∈ E . Next, suppose d(0, i) = d > 0. Since R∗ is perfect and node 0
is ancestral, there exists an active path of length d from node 0 to node i. Denote by k
the direct ancestor of i on this path. There cannot exist a link between k and j, otherwise
we would have d(0, i) = d(0, k), a contradiction. Thus, we must have iGk in every DAG
G ∈ E , otherwise we would have a v-collider at node i.
Lemma 1.2. Let i, j ∈ N∗ and iR∗j. If there exists a node k ∈ N∗ such that kEi and
k 6∈ R∗(j), then iEj.
Proof. If there is a fundamental link from node k to node i, then iR∗j implies that we
cannot have jR∗k. Otherwise, we would have a directed cycle. Node j and node k are
therefore not adjacent. Hence, if jGi in some DAG G ∈ E , there would be a v-collider at
i, a contradiction.
The “if”-statement of Proposition 1.8 follows directly from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. For
the “only if”-statement we need two more results. The first one provides a condition under
which a link is not fundamental.
Lemma 1.3. Let i, j ∈ N∗ \ {0} and iR∗j. If R∗(i) ⊂ R∗(j), then the link between i and
j is not fundamental.
Proof. Consider the DAG G = (G,N∗) that is identical to R∗ except that it reverses the
link between i and j. The assumption R∗(i) ⊂ R∗(j) rules out that there are v-colliders
in G. Assume that there is a cycle in G. Since R∗ is acyclic, the cycle must contain jGi.
Further, there must exists a node k and a link kGj which is part of the cycle. Since R∗
is perfect, we must have kR̃∗i. Assume first that we have kR∗i. Then jGi implies that
kGi is not part of the cycle. Thus, there must exist an active path τ of some length d so
that τ0 = i and τd = k. But then there is a cycle consisting of the link kGi and τ . This
cycle also exists in R∗, a contradiction. Next, assume that we have iR∗k. Since i 6= 0 and
R∗(i) ⊂ R∗(j), there exists a node l with lR∗i and lR∗j. Since R∗ is perfect, we also must
have lR̃∗k. The same applies to all l′ ∈ R∗(i). Hence, starting from R∗, we can reverse
the links between i and j as well as between i and k and obtain a DAG G′ ∈ E .
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The second result needed for the proof of the “only if”-statement of Proposition 1.8 demon-
strates that for each node i in a perfect DAG R∗ there exists a DAG G ∈ E in which there
is no non-fundamental link that points towards i.
Lemma 1.4. For all nodes i ∈ N∗ there exists a DAG G ∈ E in which all non-fundamental
links adjacent to node i point away from i.
Proof. Let Nd be the set of nodes that have distance d > 0 to the action node 0. Denote
by N
[κ]
d , κ = 1, 2, ..., the maximal subset of nodes that (i) are at distance d > 0 from
the action node 0, and (ii) are connected through non-fundamental links (i.e., for any two
nodes i, j ∈ N [κ]d there exists a path between i and j consisting of non-fundamental links).
Step 1. We show that all nodes in a given set N
[κ]
d have the same parents outside of N
[κ]
d .
Consider two nodes i, j ∈ N [κ]d that are connected through the non-fundamental link iR
∗j.
By definition, we have kEi for each k ∈ R∗(i) \N [κ]d for each i ∈ N
[κ]
d . Since R
∗ is perfect,
this implies that R∗(j) \N [κ]d ⊂ R
∗(i) \N [κ]d . Since iR
∗j is non-fundamental, we also must
have R∗(i)\N [κ]d ⊂ R
∗(j)\N [κ]d so that R
∗(i)\N [κ]d = R
∗(j)\N [κ]d . The result follows from
the fact that, by assumption, all nodes in N
[κ]
d are connected through non-fundamental
links. Step 2. Consider two links i ∈ N [κ]d and i
′ ∈ N [κ
′]
d with κ 6= κ
′ that are adjacent.
Assume w.l.o.g. that iR∗i′. By definition, iR∗i′ is a fundamental link. Step 1 then implies
that iEj′ for all j′ ∈ N [κ
′]
d . Thus, there cannot exist nodes j ∈ N
[κ]
d and j
′ ∈ N [κ
′]
d so that
j′R∗j. Otherwise, we would have j′Ej and j′Ei for all i ∈ N [κ]d , a contradiction. Thus,
there cannot exist nodes i, j ∈ N [κ]d and i
′, j′ ∈ N [κ
′]
d such that iR
∗i′ and j′R∗j. Step 3.
Note that, since R∗ is perfect, by Lemma 1 all links between Nd and Nd+1 point away
from the nodes in Nd. Step 4. We now can prove Lemma 4. Take any node i ∈ N∗ and




[κ]) where G[κ] is identical
to R∗ restricted on N
[κ]
d . Since R
∗ is perfect, G[κ] also must be perfect. Corollary 1 from
Spiegler (2019) implies that there exists a DAG Q[κ] in which node i is ancestral and that
is equivalent to G[κ]. Choose such a Q[κ] and replace G[κ] in the original DAG R∗ by Q[κ].
Call the resulting DAG Q∗. Step 1 implies that there are no v-colliders in Q∗, and Step
2 and 3 imply that there are no cycles in Q∗, which proves the result.
Proof of Proposition 1.8. The “if”-statement follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. We
prove the “only if”-statement. Consider any two adjacent nodes i, j ∈ N∗ with iR∗j and
d(0, i) = d(0, j). Suppose that for any node k ∈ R∗(i) with a fundamental link kR∗i we
also have k ∈ R∗(j). By Lemma 4, we can find a DAG G ∈ E in which all non-fundamental
links are turned away from node i. In this DAG, we have G(i) ⊂ G(j). From Lemma 3 it
then follows that the link iR∗j is not fundamental. This completes the proof.
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Before we can prove Proposition 1.7, we need two more results. We will use the following
definitions. Recall that a path τ of length d is directed if for any h ∈ {1, ..., d} we have
τh−1Rτh on this path. For any DAG, the topological ordering is a sequence of nodes such
that every link is directed from an earlier to a later node in the sequence.
Lemma 1.5. Let M ⊂ N∗ \H∗(R∗) be a set of nodes connected through non-fundamental
links. Suppose there are two nodes i, j ∈ H∗(R∗) with non-fundamental links to nodes in
M . Then i and j are adjacent.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 4, let Nd be the set of nodes that have distance d > 0
to the action node 0. Let E(i) be the set of nodes k with kEi. By Lemma 1, there is
a d > 0 so that i, j ∈ Nd and M ⊂ Nd. By Lemma 2, we must have E(i) = E(j) since
these nodes are connected through non-fundamental links. Choose any node k ∈ Nd−1
with k ∈ H∗(R∗) and kR∗i. By Lemma 2, we also have kR∗j. We can now choose two
fundamental active paths τ [i], τ [j] from node 0 to node n so that (i) k ∈ τ [i] and k ∈ τ [j],
(ii) i ∈ τ [i] and j ∈ τ [j], (iii) all nodes on τ [i] and τ [j] before k are identical, and (iv)
there is not any node on τ [i] (τ [j]) between k and i (k and j). Since i, j ∈ H∗(R∗) this is




1 ) the last node on τ





the penultimate node on τ [i] (τ [j]) before node n, and so forth. Since R∗ is perfect, m[i]1
and m
[j]









2 must be adjacent, and so forth. If nodes i and j are both the t’th node from n in τ
[i]
(τ [j]), we are done. Assume that this is not the case, and that w.l.o.g. node i is the t’th
node from n while node j is the t′’th node from n, with t′ > t. Then i is adjacent to m
[j]
t ,
and also to all nodes on τ [j] between m
[j]
t and j (including j) through non-fundamental
links, otherwise there would be a contradiction to E(i) = E(j).
The next result is crucial for the proof of Proposition 1.7. It shows that all nodes that are
not on a fundamental active path between action and output can be made “unimportant”,
in the sense that we can find a DAG in E in which any link between a node in H∗(R∗)
and a node in N∗ \H∗(R∗) points towards the node in N∗ \H∗(R∗).
Lemma 1.6. There exists a DAG G∗ ∈ E such that in G∗ all links with one end in H∗(R∗)
and the other in N∗ \H∗(R∗) point from H∗(R∗) to N∗ \H∗(R∗).
Proof. The proof proceeds by steps. Step 1. Consider any maximal set M ⊂ N∗\H∗(R∗)
of nodes connected through non-fundamental links and let M+ ⊂ H∗(R∗) be the set of
nodes that have non-fundamental links to nodes in M . By Lemma 1, there is a d > 0 so
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that M,M+ ⊂ Nd. Denote by M++ the set of nodes in Nd ∩H∗(R∗) with fundamental
links into M . Since the nodes in M are connected through non-fundamental links, there
is a fundamental link from any node i ∈M++ to any node in M . Thus, any node in M++
must also be adjacent to any node in M+, so M+∪M++ is a clique. Step 2. Consider the
DAG Ḡ = (N, Ḡ), where N = M ∪M+ ∪M++ and Ḡ is identical to R∗ restricted on N .
By construction, this DAG is perfect. Hence, Corollary 1 from Spiegler (2019) implies that
there exists a DAG Ḡ+ in which the clique M+ ∪M++ is ancestral and that is equivalent
to Ḡ. We choose such a Ḡ+ with the property that the ordering of the nodes in M+∪M++
is the same as in Ḡ (this is possible since M+ ∪M++ is a clique, and all links between
nodes M+ ∪M++ and nodes in M point towards the latter one). Consider now the DAG
G that is identical to R∗ except that Ḡ is replaced by Ḡ+. We show that there are no
cycles or v-colliders in G so that it is equivalent to R∗. Consider any node i ∈ Nd−1 ∪Nd
that is outside M ∪M+ ∪M++ and that has a fundamental link into a node in M . Since
the nodes in M are connected through non-fundamental links, node i has a fundamental
link into every node in M (otherwise, i would belong to M , a contradiction). This rules
out v-colliders. Any link between a node in Nd and a node in Nd+1 points into the latter
one. Hence, by construction, there cannot be cycles or v-colliders in G. We obtain G∗ by
performing the same changes for any maximal set M ⊂ N∗ \H∗(R∗) of nodes connected
by non-fundamental links in R∗.
Proof of Proposition 1.7. First, we show the “if”-statement. Assume that the agent’s
subjective model R contains all the nodes in H∗(R∗). Consider the DAG G∗ ∈ E in
which all links with one end in H∗(R∗) and the other in N∗ \H∗(R∗) point from H∗(R∗)
to N∗ \ H∗(R∗). By Lemma 6, this DAG exists. From Proposition 1.6 it follows that
pG∗(xH∗(R∗)) = p(xH∗(R∗)) for all distributions p(xN∗) ∈ ∆(XN∗). Consider the subgraph
G = (G,N) where G equals G∗ restricted on N . Since none of the nodes in N \H∗(R∗)
impacts on any node in H∗(R∗), we have pG(xH∗(R∗)) = pG∗(xH∗(R∗)) for all p(x) ∈
∆(X). By construction, the DAGs R and G are equivalent so that we have pR(xH∗(R∗)) =
pG(xH∗(R∗)) = pG∗(xH∗(R∗)) = p(xH∗(R∗)) for all distributions p(xN∗) ∈ ∆(XN∗), which
proves the “if”-statement. Next, we show the “only if”-statement. Assume that there
is one node i ∈ H∗(R∗) that is not in the agent’s subjective model. This node is on a
fundamental active path τ between the action node 0 and the output node n. We then
can find a probability distribution p(xN∗) ∈ ∆(X∗N ) so that pR(xn | x0) 6= p(xn | x0). Let
k be the k’th node in τ . Consider a probability distribution with the following properties:
p(xj | xR∗(j)) = p(xj) for all nodes j /∈ τ that are between the nodes 0 and n, and p(xk |
xR∗(k)) = p(xk | xk−1). Clearly, such a distribution can have the desired property.
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Proof of Corollary 3. Denote H∗(R1) = H∗(R2) = H. By Proposition 1.7, there exists a
DAG R[1]1 that is equivalent to R1 and in which all links between any node i ∈ H and any
























p(xi | xR[H]1 (i)
) = pR[H]1
(xH). (A.20)
Define R[1]2 and R
[H]




1 . By assumption, the link iR
[H]
1 j is in R
[H]
1 if
and only if we have iR
[H]
2 j or jR
[H]




2 have the same skeleton. Since
R1 and R2 are perfect, so are R[H]1 and R
[H]








From the equations (A.19) to (A.21), we get pR1(xH) = pR2(xH), which implies the
result.
1.8.6 Risk and Incentives
To study the relationship between risk and incentives, the literature typically uses a setting
with continuous actions, normally distributed output, and exponential utility so that the
optimal contract is linear. To properly apply our framework, we consider a setting with
discrete actions and outputs that captures the negative relationship between risk and
incentives.
Let there be a binary action a ∈ {0, 1} and three equidistant output levels, yL, yM , yH with
yH > yM > yL > 0. The level of risk is indexed by a parameter ξ ∈ [0, ξ̄]. The production
function is p(yL | a) = βL(ξ)− βa, p(yM | a) = βM (ξ), and p(yH | a) = βH(ξ) + βa, where
βL(ξ) = βH(ξ) for all ξ. An increase in risk ξ shifts probability mass from the medium




H(ξ) = ε for some ε > 0 and
β′M (ξ) = −2ε. The agent has a piecewise linear utility function u(w) = w for w ≥ 0, and
u(w) = λw with λ > 1 for w < 0. Her reservation utility is Ū = 0.
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We now fit the marketer example from Subsection 1.3.2 to the present setting. The
objective causal model is given by R∗ on the left of Figure 1.2, while the agent’s subjective
model is given by R on the right of this figure. We use our usual parametrization, except
for the output. The probability of low, middle, and high output conditional on x1 and x2
is given by
p(yH | x1, x2) = βH3 (ξ) + β13(ξ)x1 + β23(ξ)x2, (A.22)
p(yM | x1, x2) = βM3 (ξ), (A.23)
p(yL | x1, x2) = βL3 (ξ)− β13(ξ)x1 − β23(ξ)x2. (A.24)
The level of risk ξ changes the importance of consumer information and reputation for
the final output. The larger the risk, the more important are these two factors to obtain
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(A.25)
for two values β̄13, β̄23 > 0 with β01β̄13 + β02β̄23 = β. We choose the functions β
H
3 (ξ),
βM3 (ξ) and β
L
3 (ξ) so that the objective probability model generates the production function
from above.15
Proposition 1.9 (Risk and Incentives). Consider the marketer example of this subsection.
(a) Suppose the agent’s subjective model equals R∗. The expected wage payment needed
to implement α = 1 then increases in risk ξ, and there exists an interval [cL, cH ]
so that if c ∈ (cL, cH), then for some ξ∗ ∈ (0, ξ̄) the optimal equilibrium contract
implements α = 1 if ξ < ξ∗ and α = 0 if ξ > ξ∗.
(b) Suppose the agent’s subjective model equals R. The expected wage payment needed
to implement α = 1 then decreases in risk ξ if the slope β′L(ξ) = β
′
H(ξ) = ε is small
enough. In this case, there is an interval [cL, cH ] so that if c ∈ (cL, cH), then for
some ξ∗ ∈ (0, ξ̄) the optimal equilibrium contract implements α = 0 if ξ < ξ∗ and
α = 1 if ξ > ξ∗.
15Specifically, we derive βH3 (ξ) and β
L
3 (ξ) from βH(ξ) = β
H
3 (ξ)+β1β13(ξ)+β2β23(ξ) and βL(ξ) = β
L
3 (ξ)−
β1β13(ξ)− β2β23(ξ). Since βH(ξ) = βL(ξ) for all ξ, we have βM3 (ξ) = 1− 2[βH3 (ξ) + β1β13(ξ) + β2β23(ξ)].
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Below we provide the proof of Proposition 1.9. We explain why part (a) holds. When the
agent has rational expectations, the IC that ensures high effort equals
β(u(wH)− u(wL)) ≥ c, (A.26)








Note that a change in risk ξ affects neither the optimal wage schedule, nor the incentive
compatibility constraint in (A.26). In terms of effort incentives, the effect of risk on the
importance of consumer information and reputation cancel each other out. However, an
increase in risk exposes the agent to more variation, so that she requires a higher risk-
premium. Hence, when the principal implements high effort, his expected payment to the
agent under the optimal contract increases in risk. Therefore, there exists an interval of
cost levels [cL, cH ], so that if c ∈ (cL, cH), the optimal equilibrium contract implements
high effort if and only if the level of risk is sufficiently small. We thus obtain a negative
relationship between risk and incentives.
Next, consider part (b). If the agent does not take reputation into account, an increase
in risk appears to her as an increase in the productivity of her effort, as the association
between consumer information and sales becomes stronger. The IC that ensures high
effort now equals
β01β13(ξ)(u(wH)− u(wL)) ≥ c. (A.28)
Recall that β13(ξ) increases in ξ. Hence, an increase in risk ξ relaxes this IC. The optimal
wage schedule that implements α = 1 is now given by
w(yL) = −
βH(ξ) + β − β01β13(ξ)
λ(βH(ξ) + βL(ξ))β01β13(ξ)
c, w(yM ) = 0, and w(yH) =




A change in risk now has two countervailing effects on the expected payment when the
principal implements high effort. It again increases the risk premium that the agent
requires, but it also relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint. Which effect dominates
depends on the probability model and the utility function. If the slope β′L(ξ) = β
′
H(ξ) = ε
is small enough, an increase in risk reduces the expected payment to the agent at all risk
levels ξ ∈ [0, ξ̄]. We then obtain a positive relationship between risk and incentives: For an
interval of cost levels [cL, cH ], if c ∈ (cL, cH), the optimal equilibrium contract implements
high effort if the level of risk is sufficiently large, and otherwise low effort through a fixed
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wage.
Proof of Proposition 1.9. We first prove statement (a). For this, we derive the optimal
contract under the objective model R∗ that implements high effort. For convenience, we
abbreviate wH = w(yH), wM = w(yM ), and wL = w(yL). Standard arguments show that
both IC and PC must be binding at the optimal contract, and that wL < 0 and wH > 0
at the optimum. Assume for the moment that wM ≥ 0 under the optimal contract. The
IC is then
β(wH − λwL) = c, (A.30)
and the PC equals
(βH(ξ) + β)wH + βM (ξ)wM + (βL(ξ)− β)λwL = 0. (A.31)









c− βL(ξ) + βH(ξ)
βM (ξ)
λwL. (A.33)
The expected wage payment of the principal when he implements α = 1 equals
E[w | α = 1] = (βH(ξ) + β)wH + βM (ξ)wM + (βL(ξ)− β)wL. (A.34)
Using the results from above, we can write the expected wage payment as
E[w | α = 1] = c− (βL(ξ)− β)(λ− 1)wL. (A.35)
The optimal wage wL minimizes this term subject to the constraint that wM in (A.33)
remains weakly positive. The solution implies that wM = 0, and w(yL) = − 12λβ c as well
as w(yH) =
1
2β c. We obtain the same result when we go through the same steps while
assuming wM ≤ 0. With this we can compose the expected wage payment E[w | α = 1]
and obtain







c > 0. (A.36)
Hence, the expected wage payment to implement α = 1 strictly increases in risk. The
expected wage payment to implement α = 0 is zero for all risk levels. This yields us
statement (a).
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Next, we prove statement (b). We first derive the agent’s beliefs about the production
function at α = 1. As in the proof of Proposition 1.2, we calculate p(x2 = 1 | x1 = 1) and
p(x2 = 1 | x1 = 0). At α = 1, we have p(x2 = 1 | x1 = 1) = p(x2 = 1 | x1 = 0) = β2 + β02,
and thus
p(yH | x1 = 1) = βH3 (ξ) + β13(ξ) + (β2 + β02)β23(ξ), (A.37)
p(yH | x1 = 0) = βH3 (ξ) + (β2 + β02)β23(ξ), (A.38)
p(yM | x1 = 1) = p(yM | x1 = 0) = βM3 (ξ), (A.39)
p(yL | x1 = 1) = βL3 (ξ)− β13(ξ)− (β2 + β02)β23(ξ), (A.40)
p(yL | x1 = 0) = βL3 (ξ)− (β2 + β02)β23(ξ). (A.41)
From this, we can derive the agent’s beliefs about the production function at α = 1 as
pR(yH | a = 1;α = 1) = βH3 (ξ) + (β1 + β01)β13(ξ) + (β2 + β02)β23(ξ), (A.42)
pR(yH | a = 0;α = 1) = βH3 (ξ) + β1β13(ξ) + (β2 + β02)β23(ξ), (A.43)
pR(yM | a = 1;α = 1) = pR(yM | a = 0;α = 1) = βM3 (ξ), (A.44)
pR(yL | a = 1;α = 1) = βL3 (ξ)− (β1 + β01)β13(ξ)− (β2 + β02)β23(ξ), (A.45)
pR(yL | a = 0;α = 1) = βL3 (ξ)− β1β13(ξ)− (β2 + β02)β23(ξ). (A.46)
At α = 1, the IC is therefore given by
β01β13(ξ)(u(wH)− u(wL)) ≥ c. (A.47)
The rest of the proof proceeds as in the proof of statement (a). We derive the equilibrium
contract that implements α = 1 at lowest cost to the principal when the agent’s subjective





and from the PC we get that
wM = −
βH(ξ) + β − β01β13(ξ)
βM (ξ)β01β13(ξ)
− βL(ξ) + βH(ξ)
βM (ξ)
λwL. (A.49)
With this, we can calculate the expected wage payment under the optimal equilibrium
contract that implements α = 1 as
E[w | a = 1;R] = c− (βL(ξ)− β)(λ− 1)wL. (A.50)
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The optimal wage wL minimizes this term subject to the constraint that wM in (A.49)
remains weakly positive. The solution implies that wM = 0 as well as
wL = −
βH(ξ) + β − β01β13(ξ)
λ(βH(ξ) + βL(ξ))β01β13(ξ)
c and wH =
βL(ξ)− β + β01β13(ξ)
(βH(ξ) + βL(ξ))β01β13(ξ)
c. (A.51)
We obtain the same result when we go through the same steps while assuming wM ≤ 0.
We then can compose the expected wage payment at the optimal equilibrium contract
that implements α = 1 as
E[w | a = 1;R] = (λ− 1)(βH(ξ) + β)(βL(ξ)− β) + (λ+ 1)β01β13(ξ)
λ(βH(ξ) + βL(ξ))β01β13(ξ)
. (A.52)
We differentiate this expression with respect to risk ξ and find
lim
ε→0
∂E[w | a = 1;R]
∂ξ
= −λ(λ− 1)(βH(ξ) + βL(ξ))(βH(ξ) + β)(βL(ξ)− β)
[λ(βH(ξ) + βL(ξ))β01β13(ξ)]2
< 0. (A.53)
Hence, if ε is sufficiently small, the expected wage payment needed to implement α = 1






In the simplest textbook model of strategic communication, originated by Crawford and
Sobel (1982), a “sender” privately observes a state of Nature and chooses a costless message
from some given message space. Then, a “receiver” observes the message and takes an
action that affects both parties’ payoffs. A hallmark of this conventional approach is
that messages have no intrinsic meaning; their content - namely, their statistical relation
with the underlying state - is established in Nash equilibrium of the sender-receiver game.
According to the standard steady-state interpretation of this solution concept, the receiver
has access to a “dataset” that fully reveals the statistical relation between states and
messages.
In this paper we revisit the basic sender-receiver model and relax the assumption that the
receiver is fully capable of interpreting equilibrium messages. We focus on settings in which
the receiver has two available actions, y and n. In each state of Nature, exactly one of these
actions is appropriate. The prior probability of the states for which y is the appropriate
action is π < 12 . The receiver’s sole objective is to select the appropriate action. This
familiar setting is borrowed from Glazer and Rubinstein, Glazer and Rubinstein (2004,
2006) or Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). For most of the paper, we follow these papers
by also assuming that the sender always wants the receiver to play y (but we also examine
an alternative, “zero-sum” specification).
By default, our receiver lacks access to any data regarding the state-message mapping, and
therefore cannot decipher messages by himself. He is like a tourist in a foreign country who
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does not understand its language or cultural codes. However, if an “interpreter” handed
him a “dictionary” containing data regarding the statistical mapping from states to the
sender’s messages, he would have some ability to interpret the message he receives.
Our model makes room for the strategic supply of such dictionaries. The sender himself -
or a third party who acts as an interpreter on the sender’s behalf - chooses a dictionary
from some feasible set. He can condition the dictionary on the state and the message.
Thus, different messages may be accompanied by different dictionaries, and the same
message may be paired with different dictionaries in different states. Each dictionary
provides credible, yet possibly selective statistical data regarding the sender’s state-message
mapping (given by the sender’s strategy). The receiver uses this data to update his belief
given the message. Crucially, our basic model assumes that the receiver lacks any other
means for extracting the meaning of messages (we relax this assumption in Section 4).
Consequently, he does not draw any inferences from the provided dictionary itself, since
this would require some data regarding the joint distribution of messages, dictionaries and
states - data the receiver does not have.1 Consequently, the sender can manipulate the
receiver’s beliefs beyond what is feasible under rational expectations.
Strategic interpretation of messages - in the sense of providing selective statistical data
about their meaning - is pervasive in real-life situations, whether the messages are cheap
talk or hard-information disclosures. Consider an employee who wants to exert effort
only when sufficiently sure he is not about to be fired. He is summoned to the General
Manager’s office to hear about his prospects at the company. After the meeting is over,
the HR manager (who was present at the meeting) explains that when the GM says to
an employee “you have a future in the company”, this means a 50% chance of keeping
his job. This is an interpretation of the GM’s verbal message. It is selective because it
ignores other aspects of the GM’s communication, e.g. his body language. Alternatively,
the HR’s interpretation could focus on the latter: “The GM’s handshake was feeble; this
is definitely bad news”.
Another example involves a tenure case that is brought in front of a university promo-
tions committee. Although the candidate submits his CV, committee members outside his
discipline cannot decipher the connection between the candidate’s quality and indicators
such as the number of publications, conference lectures or supervised students. The can-
didate’s department chair will offer an interpretation by providing statistical data about
researchers in comparable departments (including their subsequent academic performance,
1A similar form of bounded rationality is documented in Jin et al. (2019), who find that in a laboratory
game of voluntary disclosure, receivers do not make correct inferences from no disclosure.
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which indicates their “true quality”). If the chair’s objective is misaligned with the uni-
versity committee’s, the data he provides may be strategically selective. In a similar vein,
imagine a foreign candidate for a graduate program. The candidate submits his grade
transcript, yet the admission committee does not know the grades’ meaning. A faculty
member writing a recommendation letter on the candidate’s behalf may provide such an
interpretation, by describing the grade distribution for a selected subset of courses.
Finally, suppose the sender is a political party and the receiver is a representative voter.
The party’s message is multi-dimensional, where each component describes public pro-
nouncements by a different party member. A political commentator interprets the party’s
message in some media outlet. He does so by providing historical data about the match
between the public pronouncements of selected party organs and the underlying reality.
These are all examples of selective interpretations where the receiver is presented with
partial statistics about the sender’s state-dependent, multi-dimensional message. These
interpretations can be strategic when the interpreter’s interests are misaligned with the
receiver’s. We analyze the sender’s choice of messages when he takes their subsequent
strategic interpretation into account. For instance, the way a political party structures
the public statements made by its members will be shaped by its expectation of how a
media outlet that is biased in its favor will interpret these statements.
One could argue that in these examples, the statistical data the interpreter provides need
not be perfectly credible or unbiased. However, because they are quantitative and verifi-
able, they are more likely to be credible than cheap-talk messages like “you have a future
in the company”. At any rate, we abstract from this consideration; our analytical task is
to quantify the effect of strategic provision of cheap-talk messages and their interpretation
on the sender’s ability to attain his objective, assuming perfect credibility of the statistical
data these interpretations involve. In the course of this paper, we will consider various
kinds of partial statistics that strategic interpretations can entail.
Preview of the analysis
We present our basic model in Section 2, where we define a dictionary as a non-empty
subset of the components of a K-dimensional message. The dictionary enables the receiver
to learn the state-dependent joint distribution of these components. We assume that the
interpreter’s preferences fully coincide with the sender’s. For expositional convenience, our
formal exposition regards them as a single player who commits to a state-dependent joint
distribution over messages and dictionaries. Neither of these two assumptions is necessary
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for our main findings. (In our informal description, we occasionally refer to the interpreter
as a distinct agent who shares the sender’s preferences.)
In Section 3, we present our main result, which characterizes the maximal probability of
persuasion as a function of π and K. In particular, we show that the sender can attain
full persuasion, as long as π is above a cutoff π∗(K) given by a simple formula that makes
use of Sperner’s Theorem and decays quickly with K.
Our assumption that the receiver draws no inferences from the dictionary he is given
raises natural questions. First, does the dictionary itself convey information about the
underlying state? The answer is negative: The sender-optimal strategy we construct has
the property that the distribution over dictionaries is state-independent. Second, would
the receiver be “suspicious” of a dictionary that does not cover all message components?
We address this question in Section 4, while insisting on sender strategies that induce a
state-independent dictionary distribution.
In Section 4.1, we perturb the model by assuming that the sender has a lexicographically
secondary preference for small dictionaries. We also introduce a refinement of the sender’s
strategy: if the sender’s interests were aligned with the receiver’s, he would want to play
a strategy that induces the same observed distribution over dictionaries. Thus, if the
receiver had independent access to data about the distribution of dictionaries, he could
reconcile the observed use of selective dictionaries with a benevolent sender. Under this
refinement, we show that full persuasion is attainable if and only if π ≥ 1/(K + 1). The
sender’s strategy only interprets single message components.
In Section 4.2, we modify the definition of dictionaries. When a dictionary D ⊆ {1, ...,K}
is provided, this now means that the receiver learns the state-dependent distribution of
mD as well as the state-dependent distribution of m{1,...,K}\D. Thus, the interpreter is
forced to provide statistical data about the behavior of all message components, though
in a format that can break them into two disjoint sets. Under a mild assumption on how
the receiver extrapolates a belief from these pieces of data, we show that full persuasion
is attainable whenever π exceeds a cutoff that decays quickly with K. The lesson from
these two variants of our basic model is that strategic interpretation can produce effective
persuasion without generating excessive “suspicion” regarding its selectivity.
Section 5 picks up the theme of Section 4.2 and present an example that illustrates a richer
notion of dictionaries, which involves data about other slices of the joint state-message
distribution. We show how this richer specification can enhance the sender’s ability to
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attain full persuasion. In Section 6 we perform partial analysis of our basic model when
the two parties have diametrically opposed preferences. We discuss related literature in
Section 7.
2.2 A Model
There are two players, a sender and a receiver. The sender observes a state of Nature
θ ∈ Θ = {Y,N}. The receiver does not observe the state but needs to take an action a,
which can be either “yes” (denoted y) or “no” (denoted n). Players’ payoffs take values in
{0, 1}. The receiver’s payoff is 1 if either < a = y and θ = Y > or < a = n and θ = N >,
and 0 otherwise. In contrast, the sender’s payoff is 1 if and only if a = y, and 0 otherwise.
The players’ common prior belief over Θ assigns probability π < 12 to state Y . Hence,
the receiver’s ex-ante optimal action is n. However, the sender can influence the receiver’s
belief and persuade him to play y. He commits to a strategy that maps each state to a
distribution over reports, where a report is a pair (m,D) such that:
(i) m = (m1, ...,mK) ∈ MK is a K-dimensional message, where K ≥ 1 and |M | ≥ 2. In
all the examples we use in the paper, M = {0, 1}.
(ii) D ∈ 2{1,...,K}\{∅} is a dictionary.





ment assumption is made for expositional simplicity; as we shall see, our results regarding
full persuasion are insensitive to it. The assumption that |Θ| = 2 could be replaced with
the weaker assumption that there is a function f : Θ → {n, y} such that the receiver’s
payoff is 1 if and only if a = f(θ), and 0 otherwise. The probability with which the sender
plays the report (m,D) in state θ is denoted σ(m,D | θ). With slight abuse of notation,
define σ(m | θ) =
∑
D σ(m,D | θ) and σ(D | θ) =
∑
m σ(m,D | θ). We refer to (σ(m | θ))
as the message strategy and to (σ(D | m, θ)) as the interpretation strategy.
The role of dictionaries is to grant the receiver “partial access” to the statistical regularities
of the sender’s strategy. When the receiver observes the report (m,D), he learns the
conditional probabilities (σ(mD | θ))θ∈Θ, where mD = (mk)k∈D and





That is, the receiver learns how the message components in D - and nothing but them - are
distributed conditional on the state. He cannot draw any statistical inferences from the
message components m{1,...,K}\D or the dictionary D itself. We will revisit this assumption
in the sequel. Note that in any report (m,D), D must be a non-empty subset of {1, ...,K};
that is, the sender is obliged to provide some interpretation of the message.
Upon receiving a report (m,D), the receiver updates his belief according to the following
expression:
P̃r(θ = Y | m,D) = π · σ(mD | θ = Y )
π · σ(mD | θ = Y ) + (1− π) · σ(mD | θ = N)
(2.1)
Compare this with the correct, rational-expectations posterior probability of Y conditional
on (m,D):
Pr(θ = Y | m,D) = π · σ(m,D | θ = Y )
π · σ(m,D | θ = Y ) + (1− π) · σ(m,D | θ = N)
(2.2)
The receiver best-replies to the subjective posterior belief given by (2.1), breaking ties in





σ(m′ | θ = Y )∑
m′|m′D=mD
σ(m′ | θ = N)
(2.3)
and chooses a = y if and only if ρσ(m,D) ≥ (1− π)/π.
The sender chooses his strategy under the assumption that the receiver best-replies to the
belief given by (2.1). Our main question is: What is the maximal probability of a = y
that the sender can attain?
Our model of how the receiver forms beliefs is motivated by the steady-state view of equi-
librium behavior, whereby the sender’s strategy σ describes a long-run statistical relation
between states and reports. The receiver moves once, against the background of a large
dataset consisting of many realizations of (θ,m1, ...,mK , D) resulting from previous inter-
actions between the sender with different identical receivers. The dataset can be visualized
as a large spreadsheet, where each column represents one of the variables θ,m1, ...,mK , D,
and each row represents an observation (an independent draw from the joint distribution
over states and reports). Rational expectations correspond to having full access to this
dataset. Our model relaxes this assumption and assumes that the receiver is granted ac-
cess to a subset of columns represented by D. The receiver can only rely on the accessed
data for drawing inferences.
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Example 1
To illustrate our notion of dictionaries and how the receiver reacts to them, suppose that
K = 4. Assume σ(m | Y ) is uniform over (1, 1, 1, 1) and (0, 0, 0, 0), while σ(m | N) is
uniform over (1, 1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1, 0) and (1, 0, 0, 1).
Suppose the sender accompanies the message (1, 0, 1, 0) with the dictionary D = {1, 3}.
This dictionary provides the receiver with data about the state-dependent distribution of
(m1,m3). In particular, he learns that the pattern (1, ∗, 1, ∗) occurs with probability 12 in
state Y and with probability 23 in state N .
2 Therefore,
P̃r(θ = Y | (1, 0, 1, 0), {1, 3}) =
π · 12






By comparison, the rational-expectations posterior on Y given m = (1, 0, 1, 0) is zero
(independently of the dictionary that accompanies this message).
Note that the message (1, 1, 1, 1) is sent with positive probability in both states. Suppose
that in state Y the sender accompanies this message with the dictionary D = {1, 2, 3}.
The receiver then learns that the pattern (1, 1, 1, ∗) occurs with probability 12 in state Y
and with probability 13 in state N. Hence,
P̃r(θ = Y | (1, 1, 1, 1), {1, 2, 3}) =
π · 12






Suppose next that in state N the sender accompanies the message (1, 1, 1, 1) with the
dictionary D = {3}. Then
P̃r(θ = Y | (1, 1, 1, 1), {3}) =
π · 12






Thus, by varying the dictionary across states, the same message induces the receiver to
hold a different belief in each state. In contrast, if the receiver had rational expectations,
then independently of the dictionary, his posterior on Y given m = (1, 1, 1, 1) would be
3π
2+π in both states. 
We close this section with comments on a few aspects of our model.
2The notation (1, ∗, 1, ∗) stands for all messages m for which m1 = m3 = 1.
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Multi-dimensional messages
The multi-dimensionality of messages has a few interpretations. First, different compo-
nents of m may represent different modes of communication (verbal statements, voice in-
tonation). When the sender is an organization, different components represent utterances
by different organs (party whip, corporate executive, spokesperson). Finally, the state
itself can be multi-dimensional (this requires |Θ| > 2), such that each message component
corresponds to a different state dimension.
Rational expectations and the full dictionary
Note that the full dictionary D = {1, ...,K} does not automatically endow the receiver
with rational expectations. The reason is that rational expectations mean that the receiver
knows the sender’s entire reporting strategy, whereas the full dictionary only enables him
to learn the message strategy. However, if the interpretation strategy happens to be
measurable with respect to messages (i.e. σ(D | m) ≡ σ(D | m, θ)), accompanying a
message with the full dictionary will enable the receiver to update his belief as if he had
rational expectations.
The “redacted message” metaphor
Our model could be alternatively described as follows. When the sender sends a message,
he selectively “redacts” parts of that message, such that the receiver gets to observe only
the unredacted parts. The belief-formation rule (2.1) means that the receiver takes into
account the sender’s pre-redaction message strategy but ignores the redaction strategy
(and therefore draws no inference from the redacted components).
We find this “selective redaction” description less appealing because it lacks a concrete
story for how the receiver forms correct expectations about the sender’s message strategy
but not about the redaction strategy. In contrast, our original description of D as a
representation of selective statistical data regarding the sender’s strategy entails an explicit
mechanism for this dichotomy: The receiver can only base his beliefs on the statistical
data provided to him by the sender.
More importantly, our description opens the door for other types of dictionaries that
correspond to other kinds of statistical data that the sender can transmit to the receiver.
We illustrate this idea in Sections 4.2 and 5, where we allow the sender to provide multiple
“datasets” that record different slices of the joint state-message distribution, and show how
this richer notion of dictionaries affects the sender’s problem. These extensions of our basic
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model go beyond the scope of the “redaction” metaphor.
Who interprets the messages?
Given that we model the situation as a two-player game, a literal interpretation of our
model would be that the sender interprets his own messages. A more plausible story is
that the two-player model is a reduced form of a larger model, in which interpretation is
done by a third party whose preferences are aligned with the sender’s: An accomplice, a
spokesperson or a captured media outlet. Such third parties provide selective data that
illuminate the meaning of utterances by the agent they serve.
We could turn the interpreter into an actual third player, producing the following timeline.
The sender moves first by choosing a message m. The interpreter moves after observing m
(but not θ) and chooses D. This means that the interpretation strategy must be measur-
able with respect to m. Unlike the receiver, the interpreter has rational expectations. The
conditional distribution σ over pairs (m,D) is induced by the combination of the message
and interpretation strategies, and it is restricted to satisfy the conditional-independence
property D ⊥ θ | m. The receiver moves last, having observed the history (m,D), and he
best-replies to the belief (2.1). If the sender and interpreter have common interests, the
situation can be reduced to our two-player formulation, under a suitably defined solution
concept for the three-player interaction. In Section 3 we will see that there is no loss of
generality in imposing D ⊥ θ | m directly on the two-player model, lending support to
this three-player interpretation of our model.
Thus, while we will adhere to the sender-receiver formal terminology, our model can be
regarded as a description of a situation in which the sender and interpreter are separate
entities who happen to share common interests.3
2.3 Analysis
We begin this section by presenting the rational-expectations benchmark for our model.
In this case, which coincides with the “prosecutor” example in Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011), the probability of persuasion is maximized by the following message strategy (the
dictionary component in the reporting strategy is redundant): In state Y , the sender
plays (1, ..., 1) with probability one, whereas in state N , he plays (1, ..., 1) with probability
3In a previous version of the paper (Eliaz et al., 2018), we analyzed an extension in which the inter-
preter’s preferences are aligned with the receiver’s with some probability; the sender does not know the
interpreter’s type when choosing his message strategy.
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π/(1−π) and (0, ..., 0) with the remaining probability. When the receiver gets the message
(0, ..., 0), he infers that θ = N for sure and takes the action n. When he receives the
message (1, ..., 1), his posterior is
Pr(θ = Y | m = (1, ..., 1)) = π · 1




such that he is just willing to play y. Consequently, the overall probability of persuasion
is
π + (1− π) · π
1− π
= 2π
This result crucially relies on the sender’s ability to commit to a strategy ex-ante. Without
the ability to commit, the probability of persuasion would be zero in any Nash equilibrium.
The following example demonstrates that in contrast to the rational-expectations bench-
mark, our model enables full persuasion as an equilibrium outcome.
Example 2: Full persuasion under K = 3 and K = 4
Let K = 3 and consider the following sender strategy (for convenience, we highlight the
interpreted components in each report in boldface). In each state, he mixes uniformly over
three reports:









Notice that in state Y only one message is sent, but the sender randomizes the dictionary
it is paired with. In contrast, in state N, three distinct messages are sent with three
distinct dictionaries, where each dictionary interprets a pattern that also appears in state
Y (namely, the component with the digit 1). For each of the six reports (m, {k}), the
receiver’s posterior belief P̃r(θ = Y | m, {k}) is
π · Pr(mk = 1 | θ = Y )
π · Pr(mk = 1 | θ = Y ) + (1− π) · Pr(mk = 1 | θ = N)
=
π · 1




The receiver weakly prefers playing y after each of these reports, as long as π ≥ 14 .
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If K = 4, the sender is able to achieve full persuasion for even smaller prior beliefs. He
achieves this by using the following strategy, which in each state, uniformly randomizes
over six reports:















For each of these twelve reports (m, {j, k}), the receiver’s posterior belief P̃r(θ = Y |
m, {j, k}) is
π · Pr(mj = mk = 1 | θ = Y )
π · Pr(mj = mk = 1 | θ = Y ) + (1− π) · Pr(mj = mk = 1 | θ = N)
=
π · 1
π · 1 + (1− π) · 16
The receiver weakly prefers playing y after each of these reports, as long as π ≥ 17 .
This example illustrates a number of key points.
Non-rational expectations
The receiver reaches wrong beliefs as a result of the strategically chosen dictionaries.
E.g., in the K = 4 case, although the reports ((1, 1, 1, 1), {2, 3}) and ((0, 1, 1, 0), {2, 3})
objectively reveal the state in which they are played, the receiver draws the same inference
from both of them. The reason is that the two messages coincide on the second and third
components, highlighted by the accompanying dictionary {2, 3}.
Irrelevance of commitment
Since the sender achieves full persuasion, his strategy would also constitute an equilibrium
in the absence of commitment. The reason is that the receiver plays y after any realized
report, hence the sender has no incentive to deviate from any realization of his mixed
strategy.
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More (interpretation) can be less
The receiver is clearly harmed by selective interpretation: If the sender were compelled
to interpret all message components, the problem would be effectively reduced to the
rational-expectations benchmark. However, this effect is not monotone. Suppose that
we made dictionaries even more selective by forcing them to be singletons. Then, in the
K = 4 case, the sender would only be able to attain full persuasion when π ≥ 15 , using a
similar strategy to the one we presented for K = 3.
Dictionary-state independence
Our model assumes that the receiver cannot draw any inferences from D. Suppose he
attempted such an inference - e.g. by acquiring data regarding the state-contingent dis-
tribution over dictionaries. Then, he would be unable to infer the state from D because
its probability is identical in both states. One might argue that the receiver should still
be “suspicious” of selective interpretations and discount their informational content. We
devote Section 4 to this critique.
The sender’s strategy satisfies another independence property: D ⊥ θ | m. That is,
given the realized message, the dictionary that accompanies it does not provide objective
information about the state. This means that if the receiver had rational expectations, he
could afford to draw inferences from m alone. The following lemma establishes that this
property is not specific to the example.
Lemma 2.1. The maximal probability of persuasion can be attained by a strategy that
satisfies D ⊥ θ | m.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary sender strategy σ. Suppose that for a given message m there
are two dictionaries D and D′, such that both reports (m,D) and (m,D′) are played with
positive probability under σ. Suppose without loss of generality that the action induced
by (m,D) is weakly more favorable to the sender (recall that the sender’s preferences are
state-independent). Consider a deviation that replaces (m,D′) with (m,D). Since the
deviation does not change the message strategy, it does not affect the receiver’s reaction
to any report (m′′, D′′) 6= (m,D); and by increasing the probability of (m,D), it weakly
increases the probability of persuasion. It follows that without loss of generality, we can
assume that under the sender’s strategy, every realized report m is accompanied by a
single dictionary Dm. In particular, this means that D is independent of θ conditional on
m.
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This lemma substantiates the three-player interpretation of our model that was described
at the end of Section 2, since a distinct interpreter would only be able to condition D on
m.
Should a dictionary interpret multiple messages?
The sender’s strategy in Example 2 has a notable feature: In every report (m,D) that is
played in state N , the pattern that D highlights does not appear in any other message
that is played in N . Compare this with the report ((1, 0, 1, 0), {1, 3}) in Example 1. The
dictionary {1, 3} highlights the pattern (1, ∗, 1, ∗), which also appears in another message,
(1, 1, 1, 1), that is played in state N . It turns out that this feature of the sender’s behavior
in Example 1 is weakly sub-optimal. That is, when solving the sender’s problem, we can
restrict attention to strategies that satisfy the following property: for every persuasive
report (m,D) that is played in state N , D highlights a pattern that does not appear in
any other message sent in that state. This property will facilitate the proof of our main
result.
Fix a sender’s strategy σ. Let Bσ be the set of reports (m,D) that are played with positive
probability in θ = N and persuade the receiver. That is,
Bσ =
{




Proposition 2.1. For every sender strategy σ, there exists a strategy σ′ with the following
properties: (i) the probability that the receiver chooses y in each state is at least as high as
under σ, and (ii) m′D 6= mD for every pair of distinct reports (m,D), (m′, D′) ∈ Bσ′.
Our proof employs a two-stage algorithm. In the first stage, we replace “redundant dictio-
naries”. We list the reports in Bσ according to an arbitrary ordering. Then, starting with
the report (m,D) at the top of the ordering, we identify messages m′ down the list such
that m′D = mD. We then replace the dictionaries that accompany these messages with D.
Setting aside the top report and all the reports that were subjected to this replacement,
we continue in the same manner with the remaining reports. At the end of the algorithm’s
first stage, Bσ is partitioned such that each cell consists of reports (m,D) with the same
D and mD. In the second stage, we replace “redundant messages”. We go up the list
of reports and modify messages only, such that each cell in the above partition ends up
consisting of a single report. (We may perform additional changes to the dictionaries that
accompany messages in state Y , to ensure that probability that a = y in this state does
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not go down.)
Our subsequent analysis makes use of the following concept.
Definition 2.1. For a given a strategy σ, a message m′ is said to justify the report
(m,D) ∈ Bσ if: (i) σ(m′ | θ = Y ) > 0, and (ii) m′D = mD.
In other words, what helps persuade the receiver to choose y when he gets the report
(m,D) is that the pattern highlighted by D appears in some messages m′ that are played
with sufficient frequency in state Y .
Proposition 2.1 is particularly useful because it places restrictions on the family of reports
that any given message can justify. This is captured by the following corollaries.
Corollary 2.1. Let (m,D), (m′, D′) ∈ Bσ. If there is a message m∗ that justifies both
(m,D) and (m′, D′), then D 6⊆ D′ and D′ 6⊆ D.






Corollary 2.1 says that the set of dictionaries that appear in reports that are justified by
a given message m∗ constitutes an anti-chain - i.e., no dictionary in this set contains an-
other. Corollary 2.2 then invokes Sperner’s Theorem. This fundamental result in extremal
combinatorics states that the largest anti-chain over {1, 2, . . . ,K} is the collection of all
subsets of size bK/2c.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section. The result makes use of the













Note that |B∗| = S.
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Theorem 2.1. The maximal probability of persuasion is min{1, π(1 + S)}. It can be
implemented by the following strategy:
σ((1, . . . , 1), D | θ = Y ) = 1
S










} for every (m,D) ∈ B∗









Furthermore, when π ≥ 1/(1 + S), this strategy is time-consistent and attains full persua-
sion.
The strategy that implements the maximal probability of persuasion generalizes Example
2. In state Y , the sender sends a single message, which we conveniently select to be
(1, ..., 1). Each of the components of this message can therefore be regarded as “good
news”. What happens in state N depends on the relation between the prior π and the
number S, which depends on K. Suppose K is even, for the sake of the argument. If
π ≥ 1/(1 + S), the sender randomizes uniformly over B∗, which is the set of all reports in
which the message consists of an equal number of 1’s (“good news”) and 0’s (“bad news”),
and the dictionary interprets only the good news. If π < 1/(1 + S), each of these reports
is played with probability 1/S, and the remaining probability is allocated to the message
(0, ..., 0) - i.e. all “bad news”.
Unlike the case of the “mixed” messages in B∗, there is considerable freedom in selecting the
dictionaries that accompany the “pure” messages (1, ..., 1) and (0, ..., 0). Our construction
has the property that (σ(D | m = (1, ..., 1)) and (σ(D | m = (0, ..., 0)) are both the same
as the distribution over D conditional on B∗. Consequently, the strategy satisfies the
independence property D ⊥ θ (on top of the property D ⊥ θ | m that was established by
Lemma 2.1). Thus, even if the receiver attempted to draw inferences from D, he would
be unable to learn anything about θ from the realization of D itself.
As to the question of how large dictionaries should be (discussed in the context of Example
2), note that the sender’s optimal strategy makes use of dictionaries that interprets exactly
half of the message components.
Let us examine the receiver’s reaction to various realized reports under the sender’s strat-
egy. When he confronts the message (0, ..., 0), each of the dictionaries that accompany it
interprets some “bad news”, and the receiver learns that θ = N for sure. In contrast, every
other realization of (m,D) satisfies mk = 1 for all k ∈ D. The receiver thus learns that the
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probability of mD conditional on θ = Y is one, while the probability of mD conditional






which is, by definition, weakly above (1− π)/π and therefore persuasive.
A receiver with rational expectations would realize that the “mixed” messages in B∗ only
occur in state N . However, our receiver can only draw inferences from message components
that the sender interprets for him. Since the sender only interprets persuasive patterns, he
manages to convey a false sense that the mixed message is actually good news. Moreover,
as K gets large, each (m,D) ∈ B∗ identifies a distinct pattern that becomes increasingly
rare in state N while occurring with probability one in state Y . Therefore, even when π
is quite small and even if B∗ is played with high probability in state N , the receiver will
be persuaded by the reports in B∗.
When π ≥ 1/(1 + S), the sender can attain full persuasion. This means that the sender’s
strategy is time-consistent : Since the receiver plays a = y after every report, the sender
would not want to deviate from any realized report even if he could. In other words,
the assumption that the sender has commitment power is not required in this range of
parameters.
Theorem 2.1 assumes an unrestricted domain of feasible dictionaries. The proof of Theo-
rem 2.1 makes the result easily extendible to restricted domains.
Remark 2.1. Let D be the set of feasible dictionaries. Let D∗ ⊆ D be an anti-chain, such
that every D′ ⊆ D with |D′| > |D∗| is not an anti-chain. Then, the maximal probability of
persuasion is min{1, π(1 + |D∗|)}.
In particular, when the feasible set of dictionaries is the set of all singletons, the maximal
probability of persuasion is max{1, π(1+K)}. This suggests that if the sender were free to
determine the dimensionality of the message space, he could trivially attain full persuasion
with singleton dictionaries. However, K should be interpreted as an exogenous constraint:
there is a limited set of variables about which statistical data is available. For instance,
if message components correspond to non-verbal aspects of the sender’s communication,
only few of those aspects are typically documented (it is unlikely to have data about the
sender’s pupil dilation, blood pressure or EEG measurements). Similarly, if the sender is a
political party and message components correspond to different party members, only the
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messages of a few senior members are likely to be documented.
2.4 Suspicion of Selective Interpretations
In our discussion of Theorem 2.1, we raised the concern that the receiver may try to infer
the state from the dictionary the sender provides. The sender strategy we presented in
the theorem’s statement addressed this concern, in the sense that it satisfied the inde-
pendence property D ⊥ θ. However, one may argue that even this feature would not
quell the receiver’s suspicion regarding the selectiveness of the provided dictionary - i.e.,
some message components are not interpreted. The receiver may view the mere neglect
of message components as a signal that the state is N (even though the state-contingent
distribution over dictionaries offers no basis for this suspicion).
While intuitive, this argument is actually unconventional. The receiver draws a correct
Bayesian inference from the message components for which he gets data. In the absence of
additional data on how dictionaries and messages are jointly distributed, there is nothing
to guide the receiver on how to modify this Bayesian posterior. Any assertion that he
should ignore his available data and conclude that the state must be N simply because
he was given selective data by a strategic sender is merely an additional assumption. By
the same token, one could argue that in the partially informative “interval equilibria”
in Crawford and Sobel (1982), the receiver should ignore his statistical knowledge of the
sender’s behavior and trust nothing the sender says simply because he is known to lie or
withhold information.4
This methodological discussion notwithstanding, we now address the possibility that re-
ceivers may be suspicious of selective interpretations by proposing two notions of robust-
ness to this suspicion. In both cases, we show that full persuasion is attainable for a large
range of parameters π,K, albeit smaller than in Theorem 2.1.
2.4.1 Benevolent Selectiveness
Even if the sender’s interests were fully aligned with the receiver’s, it would be reasonable
for him to refrain from interpreting all message components and provide a selective dictio-
4If we interpret the sender’s strategy as recommending an action or communicating the interval to
which the state belongs, this is a case of witholding information. If we interpret his strategy as some
mixture over states that belong to the interval, then his message misrepresents the state with probability
one.
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nary. To see why, let K = 2 and suppose that the message strategy is as follows: m = (1, 1)
with certainty in state Y , whereas m = (0, 0) and m = (1, 1) with equal probability in
state N . Because m1 and m2 are fully correlated, the small dictionary {1} induces the
same receiver beliefs as the full dictionary {1, 2}. If the smaller dictionary is less costly to
provide, a benevolent sender would use it (recall that D must be non-empty). In this case,
the receiver would not be suspicious of the sender simply for providing a small dictionary.
To capture this idea, we modify our model by introducing an intrinsic preference for
smaller dictionaries. Specifically, we assume that the sender has lexicographic preferences.
His primary criterion is to maximize the probability that the receiver plays y. However,
if he can induce the same receiver behavior with two alternative dictionaries D and D′
such that |D′| < |D|, he prefers D′ to D. In addition, we impose a refinement of the
set of permissible sender strategies, which is based on a hypothetical benevolent sender.
Such a sender has lexicographic preferences, too: His primary criterion is to maximize
the receiver’s payoff; his secondary criterion is to minimize |D|. Refer to this hypothetical
sender as type H; whereas the actual sender will be referred to as type A.
Definition 2.2. The strategy (σ(m,D | θ)) is robust if it satisfies the following properties:
(i) D ⊥ θ and D ⊥ θ | m.
(ii) Given (σ(m | θ)), the interpretation strategy (σ(D | m)) prescribes, for each m,
lexicographically optimal dictionaries for a type-A sender.
(iii) Given (σ(m | θ)), there is an interpretation strategy (σ′(D | m)) that prescribes,
for each m, lexicographically optimal dictionaries for a type-H sender, such that σ′(D) ≡
σ(D).
Condition (i) imposes the independence requirements we have already encountered in
Section 3. Condition (ii) was redundant in Section 3 because we focused on optimal
sender strategies anyhow. Here, it also means that the sender always uses the smallest
dictionary that attains a given outcome.
As to condition (iii), our motivation is the following. Throughout the paper, we have
assumed that the receiver lacks any data about the distribution of D. However, imagine
now that the receiver has access to an independent dataset that enables him to learn the
marginal distribution of dictionaries. (By condition (i), this is the same as learning the
distribution of D at each state.) He can therefore see that the use of selective dictionaries
is not a fluke, but an event that occurs with positive frequency. Condition (iii) requires
further that if the dictionaries were chosen by a benevolent sender of typeH, their marginal
77
distribution could be the same. From this point of view, the receiver is less likely to be
suspicious of selective interpretations, because he can reconcile their observed statistical
pattern with the existence of a benevolent interpreter having a lexicographically secondary
preference for small dictionaries.
In what follows, we conveniently assume that the receiver always breaks ties in favor of a
type-A sender.
Proposition 2.2. Full persuasion is attainable with a robust strategy if and only if π ≥
1/(1 +K).
Thus, requiring the sender’s strategy to be robust in the sense of Definition 2.2 restricts his
ability to attain full persuasion, because it effectively eliminates the use of non-singleton
dictionaries. Example 2 in Section 3 illustrates a robust strategy that achieves full per-
suasion for K = 3.
2.4.2 Full-Coverage Dictionaries
In this subsection we use a different line of attack to address the selective-interpretation
problem. Here, we assume that the sender is obliged to present statistical data about all
message components. However, he is allowed to present the data in two separate chunks.
As before, a dictionary is represented by a non-empty subset D ⊆ {1, ...,K}. Yet this now
means that the sender provides two datasets, formalized as two collections of conditional
probabilities: (Pr(mD | θ)) as well as the (Pr(mDc | θ)), where Dc = {1, ...,K}\D. We
refer to this form of data provision as full-coverage dictionaries.
How does the receiver extrapolate a belief from the two datasets? We make the mild
assumption that his subjective belief P̃r(m,D | θ) satisfies
Pr(mD | θ) · Pr(mDc | θ) ≤ P̃r(m,D | θ) ≤ max{Pr(mD | θ),Pr(mDc | θ)} (2.4)
The upper bound given by the R.H.S reflects an assumption that mDc is uninformative
of θ given mD, or vice versa - i.e., the two parts of m are perfectly correlated given the
state. The lower bound given by the L.H.S reflects an assumption that these two parts
are independent conditional on the state.
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Thus, although the sender is forced to provide data about all message components, his
ability to present the data in two “installments” enables him to attain full persuasion for
a large range of parameters. Moreover, the strategy we construct in the proof satisfies
the familiar independence properties D ⊥ θ and D ⊥ θ | m. Finally, the result relies
on the relatively weak condition (2.4) on how the receiver extrapolates a belief from the
two separate datasets he receives. Note that Proposition 2.3 only provides a sufficient
condition for full persuasion. Finding a necessary condition is an open problem.
To illustrate the basic idea of the construction, let K = 4. In state Y , there is perfect
correlation among all message components. The objective correlation is weaker in state
N . Specifically, only the messages (1, 1, 1, 1) and (0, 0, 0, 0) are played in Y , whereas all
messages containing exactly two 1’s are played in N . Thus, patterns like (∗, 1, 1, ∗) or
(0, ∗, ∗, 0) are considerably more likely in Y than in N . By accompanying the message
(0, 1, 1, 0) with two datasets that separately highlight these two patterns, the sender can
manipulate the receiver’s likelihood ratio.
This subsection also illustrates that the form a dictionary can affect the sender’s ability
to persuade the receiver. This reinforces a point we made in Section 2: Our concept of
“selective interpretation” is richer than what the “selective message redaction” metaphor
might suggest.
2.5 Richer Dictionaries
In this section we follow up on the final paragraph of the previous section. So far, we
have assumed that dictionaries provide data about the joint distribution of a collection
of message components conditional on θ. However, statistical data can involve other
combinations of marginal and conditional distributions, with implications for the sender’s
ability to persuade the receiver.
Example 3
Let K = 2. Let p denote the joint distribution over (θ,m) that is induced by the prior
over θ and the sender’s strategy. There are three feasible dictionaries: D1 gives access to
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the conditional distribution (p(m1 | θ)); D2 gives access to the conditional distribution
(p(m2 | θ)); and D3 gives access to the marginal distribution (p(m1)) as well as the
conditional distribution (p(m2 | θ,m1)). It does not contain data about how m1 varies
with θ.
The dictionaries D1 and D2 are familiar from Section 2; we apply the same belief-formation
rule (2.1) for the receiver as in Section 2. However, D3 is different because it provides
two datasets. We assume that the receiver extrapolates a belief using the maximum
entropy principle - i.e., his belief over (θ,m1,m2) maximizes (Shannon) entropy subject
to the constraint that it is consistent with the marginal and conditional distributions he
has learned. This principle has a rich tradition in AI (dating back to Jaynes (1957)).
Spiegler (2020) has recently applied it in a similar context of games with players who
extrapolate a belief from partial data. In the model of Section 4.2, the principle induces
the L.H.S of (2.4). In the present context, the receiver’s subjective distribution over
messages conditional on the state, given D3, is P̃r(m1,m2 | θ) = p(m1)p(m2 | θ,m1).
Consider the following sender strategy:
State Y State N
m D Pr(m,D | Y )
(1, 1) D3 ε
(0, 0) D2 1− ε
m D Pr(m,D | Y )
(1, 1) D3 α
(1, 0) D2 β
(0, 1) D1 1− α− β






, there exist α, β, ε ∈ (0, 1) such that the
sender attains full persuasion with the above strategy.
Let us calculate the receiver’s likelihood ratio for each report. Consider the report
((1, 1), D3). Our definition of the receiver’s posterior belief given the dictionary D3 implies
the following likelihood ratio:
p(m1 = 1)p(m2 = 1 | θ = Y,m1 = 1)








Next, consider the reports ((0, 0), D2) and ((1, 0), D2). Since D2 only interprets m2, both
reports induce the same subjective likelihood ratio:
p(m2 = 0 | θ = Y )





Finally, consider the report (0, D1). Since D1 only interprets m1, this report induces the
subjective likelihood ratio
p(m1 = 0 | θ = Y )




In order to attain full persuasion, the three likelihood ratios must all be weakly greater than







can find α, β, ε that will satisfy these three inequalities. In particular, ε will be arbitrarily
small. 
Compare this finding with the result of Section 3. Given our original specification of
dictionaries, the sender can attain full persuasion if and only if π ≥ 13 . This is higher
than the threshold we obtained in Example 3. The general problem of optimal persuasion
under the broader definition of dictionaries as collections of marginal and conditional
distributions remains open.
2.6 An Adversarial Sender
In this section we revisit the basic model of Section 2 and modify the sender’s preferences,
such that the sender-receiver interaction becomes a zero-sum game: In state Y (N), the
sender’s payoff is 1 if the receiver plays n (y) and −1 if he plays y (n). Rescale the
receiver’s payoff function to be minus the sender’s payoff. In what follows, we assume that
the receiver always breaks ties in the sender’s favor.
Consider the rational-expectations benchmark in this case. On one hand, the receiver can
guarantee an expected payoff of at least π·(−1)+(1−π)·1 = 1−2π > 0 by always playing n.
On the other hand, the sender can force this expected payoff on the receiver by sending the
same report in all states. Therefore, by the Minimax Theorem, the sender’s equilibrium
payoff in the rational-expectations benchmark is exactly 2π − 1 < 0. In contrast, the
following result establishes that in our model, the sender can attain the maximal possible
payoff of 1 under the same condition as in Theorem 2.1, whenever K ≥ 3.
Proposition 2.4. Let K ≥ 3. Then, whenever π ≥ 1/(1 + S), there is a strategy for the
sender that induces a payoff of 1 with certainty.
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Proof. Construct the following strategy. Let mk ∈ {0, 1} for every k. In state Y , the
sender plays m∗ = (1, 1, ..., 1) with probability one and accompanies this message with
the dictionary D = {k} for some arbitrary k. In state N , the sender assigns probability
(1 − γ)/S to every (m,D) satisfying mk = 1 for exactly bK/2c components k and D =
{k | mk = 1}, where γ is selected to be the unique solution of the equation
1




The sender assigns the remaining probability γ to the message m∗ and accompanies it
with an arbitrary dictionary of size bK/2c. This is a feasible strategy whenever γ ∈ [0, 1]
or equivalently π ∈
[
1/(1 + S), 12
]
.
By construction, ρ(m,D) = (1− π)/π for every (m,D) that is played in state N , whereas
ρ(m∗, {k}) = 1




As a result, the receiver plays y in state N and n in state Y , generating a payoff of 1 for
the sender.
Thus, strategic interpretation can attain the sender’s first-best even under maximal conflict
of interests with the receiver. As in Section 3, this means that the commitment assumption
is unnecessary.
However, the strategy we employed in the proof of this result violates two independence
properties that we emphasized in Section 3: D ⊥ θ and D ⊥ θ | m. Let us now see how
to fix this limitation when K ≥ 3 and π ≥ 1/K. As before, mk ∈ {0, 1} for every k.
Let ek denote the message m for which mk = 1 and ml = 0 for all l 6= k. For every m,
let −m denote the message m′ for which m′k = 1 − mk for every k. Now consider the
following sender strategy. In state Y , he randomizes uniformly over all (m,D) such that
m = −ek and D = {k} for some k = 1, ...,K. In state N , he randomizes uniformly over
all (m,D) for which m = ek and D = {k} for some k = 1, ...K. It is easy to verify that
ρ(m,D) ≥ (1− π)/π for every (m,D) that is played in N , while ρ(m,D) ≤ (1− π)/π for
every (m,D) that is played in Y , as long as π ≥ 1/K.
The following result expands the set of parameters for which the sender’s first-best is
attainable by a strategy that satisfies the two desiderata, making use of a more elaborate
strategy.
82
Proposition 2.5. Let K = 2L for some integer L > 1. Then, there is a strategy that







This result provides a sufficient condition for attaining the sender’s first-best with a strat-
egy that satisfies the two desiderata. The following table illustrates the strategy for K = 4
(the strategy induces the sender-optimal action in each state, as long as π ≥ 13):
State Y State N










Finding a tight necessary condition remains an open problem.
2.7 Related Literature
Our paper joins a small literature on strategic communication that departs from the stan-
dard paradigm of rational expectations under a common prior. Levy et al. (2018) study a
sender-receiver model in which the receiver exhibits “correlation neglect”. Specifically, the
sender submits multiple simultaneous signals and the receiver erroneously treats them as
being conditionally independent. This belief distortion is related to the model of Section
4.2. In that variant on our basic model, the receiver does not learn the state-contingent
correlation between mD and mDc . We allowed the receiver to hold a variety of beliefs re-
garding this correlation, including the possibility that they are conditionally independent,
as in Levy et al. (2018). The reason that unlike Levy et al. (2018), the sender in our
model can attain full persuasion is that he can tailor the data to the submitted message.
Patil and Salant (2020) consider a receiver (a statistician) who estimates a parameter
based on a random sample whose size is strategically determined by an informed sender.
As in our model, the receiver has boundedly rational expectations in the sense that he
makes no inferences from the sample size he gets. Schwartzstein and Sunderam (2019)
examine a persuasion game in which both parties observe a signal that is drawn from
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a state-dependent distribution. The receiver’s non-rational expectations are captured by
the assumption that the sender knows the signal distribution, while the receiver believes
in whatever signal distribution the sender reports. Galperti (2019) analyses a model of
persuasion with non-common priors, where the sender can influence the receiver’s prior
belief. In particular, when the receiver observes a message that has zero probability
according to his prior, he abandons it in favor of a new belief. We, on the other hand,
maintain the common prior assumption but allow the sender to strategically determine
the receiver’s understanding of the equilibrium distribution.5
Our basic model of dictionaries and how the receiver reacts to them is closely related
to the concept of analogy-based expectations equilibrium (ABEE) due to Jehiel (2005).
According to this concept, players form coarse beliefs that are measurable with respect
to an “analogy partition” of the possible states of the world. Our basic notion of a
dictionary D as a subset of components of multi-dimensional messages corresponds to
an analogy partition. A cell in the partition consists of all messages m with the same
mD. This version of the model can thus be viewed as an extensive game in which the
sender chooses the message as well as the receiver’s analogy partition (from a restricted
domain of feasible partitions), and the solution concept is ABEE. (However, the variants
of Sections 4.2 and 5 cannot be embedded in the ABEE framework.) This description
raises a natural question: How well can the sender perform under an unrestricted domain
of feasible analogy partitions? For the sake of brevity, we do not analyze this question
here but in a separate note (Eliaz et al. (2019)).
Jehiel and Koessler (2008) modify the Crawford-Sobel model by assuming that the receiver
bundles states into analogy classes according to an interval analogy partition. They show
that certain analogy partitions give rise to ABEE with partial information transmission,
even when the unique equilibrium under rational expectations is the babbling equilibrium.
Hagenbach and Koessler (2019) analyze cheap-talk games where the sender aggregates the
receiver’s equilibrium strategy into analogy classes. In a similar vein, Mullainathan et al.
(2008) study a cheap-talk game where the receiver uses a coarse analogy partition. In
contrast to our model, the partitions in these papers are exogenous. Endogenous partitions
arise in Jehiel (2011), where auction designer controls bidders’ learning feedback regarding
the distribution of past bids.
Glazer and Rubinstein, Glazer and Rubinstein (2012, 2014) study persuasion when the
5Independently of our paper, Salcedo (2019) considers a persuasion game with one sender who sends
private messages to multiple rational receivers. The sender wishes to persuade at least m receivers in order
to attain his objective. When m = 1, the sender’s problem is essentially the same as the sender’s problem
in our model when he is restricted to singleton dictionaries.
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sender is boundedly rational in the sense of having limited ability to misrepresent the
state. They show that a rational receiver can construct intricate disclosure mechanisms
that take advantage of this element of the sender’s bounded rationality. Blume and Board
(2013) and Giovannoni and Xiong (2019) study cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain
ability to distinguish between distinct messages. In contrast to our framework, receivers
in these papers have rational expectations and the sender is unable to influence their
interpretative abilities.
Finally, Spiegler (2020) introduces a general framework for static games, in which the
description of players’ types includes “archival access”, defined as selective data about
correlations among the variables that constitute the state of the world. Dictionaries in
our model are a form of archival access. Indeed, our model is an example of how to
extend the formalism of Spiegler (2020) to sequential games. Our approach to modeling
the receiver’s partial understanding of the sender’s strategy is also related to Glazer and
Rubinstein (2019), where a “problem solver” has partial understanding of the equilibrium:
He observes a summary statistic of the other players’ strategies, and then best-replies to
a uniform belief over all the strategy profiles that are consistent with this statistic.
2.8 Conclusion
Conventional models of strategic communication focus on the role of selective transmission
of information. And yet, real-life communication also involves strategic interpretation of
information. This paper formalized this aspect as selective provision of statistical data
regarding the mapping from states to messages, under the assumption that this data is
the sole basis for the receiver’s inferences. In a pure persuasion model, we showed that
strategic interpretation significantly enhances the sender’s ability to persuade the receiver
- to the point that full persuasion is sometimes possible, in sharp contrast to the standard
rational-expectations benchmark.
From a broader perspective, the modeling innovation in this paper is the idea that one
player can influence another player’s understanding of equilibrium regularities, by affecting
the statistical data regarding the equilibrium distribution that the latter player has at his
disposal (his “archival access”, to use the terminology of Spiegler (2020)) - just as in a
standard extensive-form game, one player’s information set can be determined by prior
moves of other players. Exploring this idea outside the context of strategic communication
is an interesting problem for future research.
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Let σ be an optimal sender strategy. We now change it into a new strategy that satisfies
the property in the statement of the proposition and does not lower the probability of
persuasion. We proceed in two stages.
Stage 1. Construct a partition {T1, ..., TL} of Bσ as follows. For every l = 1, 2, ..., select
an arbitrary report (ml, Dl) ∈ Bσ − ∪h<lTh, and define
Tl = {(m,D) ∈ Bσ − ∪h<lTh | mDl = mlDl}
Modify σ as follows. For each l = 1, ..., L and any (m,D) ∈ Tl with D 6= Dl, shift the
probability of (m,D), conditional on θ = N, to the report (m,Dl). By the definition
of Bσ, both (m,D) and (ml, Dl) persuade the receiver. Perform the following additional
modification. By the definition of Bσ, there must be a message m that justifies (ml, Dl).
That is, mDl = m
l
Dl
, and there is a dictionary D such that (m,D) is played with positive
probability in Y . If the receiver was persuaded by (m,D) in the original strategy, then




. Therefore, (m,Dl) persuades the receiver. And since the deviation does
not affect the distribution over messages conditional on any state, it does not change the
receiver’s response to any other realized report.
Stage 2. Start this stage by shifting the probability of any (m,DL) ∈ TL conditional on
θ = N to some report in TL, denoted (m̃
L, DL). This effectively transforms TL into a




. Therefore, the deviation does not change the receiver’s subjective likelihood
ratio of (m̃L, DL), such that he continues to be persuaded by this report. Moreover,
by the construction of the first stage, for every l < L and every (m,Dl) ∈ Tl, mDl 6=
m̃L
Dl
. Therefore, the deviation does not affect the receiver’s subjective likelihood ratio of
(m,Dl) ∈ Tl for all l < L.
Now suppose that for some l < L, we have transformed the cells Tl+1, ..., TL into singletons
{(m̃l+1, Dl+1)}, ..., {(m̃L, DL)} in such a manner. Suppose that there is some (m,Dl) ∈ Tl
such that mDh 6= m̃hDh for every h > l. Rename this report (m̃
l, Dl), and shift the
probability of any (m,Dl) conditional on N to (m̃l, Dl). Alternatively, suppose that for
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every (m,Dl) ∈ Tl there is some h > l such that mDh = m̃hDh . For any such (m,D
l), shift
its probability conditional on N to one of the reports (m̃h, Dh) satisfying m̃h
Dh
= mDh . By
the same logic as in the previous paragraph, the deviation in these two alternative cases
does not affect the receiver’s subjective likelihood ratio of any report.
At the end of the second stage, Bσ has been effectively transformed into the set {(m̃1, D1)}, ..., {(m̃L, DL)},
which by construction satisfies the property in the lemma’s statement.
In the next two corollaries, we restrict attention to sender strategies σ that satisfy Propo-
sition 2.1.
Corollary 2.1
Assume, by contradiction, that there exist (m,D), (m′, D′) ∈ Bσ that are justified by a





D∩D′ . But D ∩D′ = D, which implies that mD = m′D, in contra-
diction to Proposition 2.1.
Corollary 2.2
By Corollary 2.1, if m∗ justifies two reports (m,D) and (m′, D′), then D and D′ do not
contain one another. It follows that the set of all dictionaries that are part of reports
justified by m∗ constitutes an anti-chain - i.e. a collection of subsets of {1, ...,K} that do
not contain one another. By Sperner’s Theorem, the maximal size of such a collection is
S.
Theorem 2.1
To derive an upper bound on the probability of persuasion, we restrict attention to sender
strategies σ that satisfy Proposition 2.1. We begin with a basic observation that simplifies
notation and the construction of the sender’s strategy that maximizes the probability of
persuasion in the N event. Fix a sender’ strategy.
Observation 2.1. There is no loss of generality in restricting attention to strategies with
the following property: If the reports (m,D) ∈ Bσ and (m′, D′) 6∈ Bσ are both realized with
positive probability in the N state under σ, then m′D 6= mD.
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Proof. Assume the contrary - i.e. m′D = mD. Suppose the sender deviates to a strategy
that replaces (m′, D′) with (m′, D) in the N state, but otherwise coincides with σ. By
definition of Bσ, (m′, D′) does not persuade the receiver prior to the deviation. And since
the deviation does not affect the distribution of messages conditional on any state, it does
not change the response of the receiver to any report (m′′, D′′) 6= (m′, D′). Therefore, the
deviation weakly raises the probability of persuasion.
Henceforth, we will restrict attention to strategies that satisfy Observation 2.1. In addi-
tion, whenever we refer to a generic report in the N state, we mean a report in Bσ.
Lemma 2.2. Without loss of generality, ρσ(m,D) is the same for all (m,D) ∈ Bσ.
Proof. Let (m,D) and (m̄, D̄) be two reports in Bσ such that ρσ(m,D) ≤ ρσ(m,D) ≤
ρσ(m̄, D̄) for each (m,D) ∈ Bσ. Assume that ρσ(m,D) < ρσ(m̄, D̄). Suppose that the
sender deviates from σ to a strategy σ̂ that shifts a weight of ε > 0 from (m,D) to (m̄, D̄)




σ(m | θ = Y )∑
m|mD=mD








σ(m | θ = Y )∑
m|mD̄=m̄D̄
σ(m | θ = N) + ε
< ρσ(m̄, D̄)
By our initial assumption, ρσ̂(m,D) < ρσ̂(m̄, D̄) for sufficiently small ε. By (2.5), this
implies that ρσ̂(m̄, D̄) >
1−π
π . By Proposition 2.1 ρσ̂(m,D) = ρσ(m,D) for every (m,D) ∈
Bσ − {(m,D), (m̄, D̄)}. Since the deviation does not involve reports outside Bσ, it cannot
alter the probability of persuading the receiver for messages outside of Bσ. It follows that
the deviation does not alter the probability of persuasion.
Therefore, we can assume without loss of generality that ρσ(m,D) is the same for all
(m,D) ∈ Bσ.
The remainder of the proof computes an upper bound on the probability of persuasion.
Let σ be a sender strategy. Let MY = {m | σ(m | θ = Y ) > 0}. Denote I = |MY |.
Let C = {C1, · · · , CL} be a partition of Bσ, where each cell Cl is defined by the (distinct)
subset of messages J(l) ⊆MY that justify every report in the cell. Therefore, L ≤ 2I − 1.
For the final piece of notation we let g(l) =| Cl | and β(l) =
∑
(m,D)∈Cl σ(m,D | θ = N).
Consider some (m,D) ∈ Cl ⊆ Bσ and a message m′ ∈ J(l). Since m′ justifies (m,D),
m′D = mD. By Proposition 2.1, there cannot be a dictionary D
′ such that (m′, D′) ∈ Bσ.
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It follows that for any l = 1, ..., L, the receiver’s subjective likelihood ratio of a report
(m,D) ∈ Cl ⊆ Bσ is ∑
m′∈J(l) σ(m
′ | θ = Y )




From lemma 2.2 we have ρ(m,D) = ρ(m′, D′) for every (m,D), (m′D′) ∈ Bσ. So in
particular for every (m,D), (m′D′) ∈ Cl we have σ(m,D) = σ(m′, D′) = β(l)g(l) . We can
therefore rewrite inequality 2.6 as:
∑
m′∈J(l) σ(m






























where the second equality follows from changing the order of summation. By definition,∑
l∈J−1(m′) g(l) is the number of reports that are justified by m
′. By Corollary 2.2, this
















where the final equality follows since
∑
m′∈M∗ σ(m
′ | θ = Y ) = 1. Since the receiver can at
most be persuaded with probability one, the upper bound on the probability of persuasion








Verifying that the strategy described in the statement of Theorem 2.1 implements the
upper bound is straightforward. This completes the proof.
Proposition 2.2
Sufficiency. Use the notation ek for the binary K-vector for which mk = 1 and ml = 0
for all l 6= k. Consider the following strategy: When θ = Y , play m = (1, ..., 1) with
probability one and randomize uniformly over all D = {k}, k = 1, ...,K. When θ = N ,
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randomize uniformly over all reports (m,D) = (ek, {k}), k = 1, ...,K. It is easy to see
that ρ(m,D) = K for every (m,D) in the support of this strategy. Therefore, when
π ≥ 1/(1 + K), the receiver always plays a = y. Let us now verify that the strategy is
robust. First, by construction, the distribution over D is state-independent, thus satisfying
part (i) in the definition of robustness. Second, given the message strategy, a type-
H interpreter can attain his first-best with the following interpretation strategy: When
m = (1, ..., 1), he mimics the given interpretation strategy; and when m = ek, he plays
D = {k + 1 modK}, thus inducing a = n with the smallest possible dictionary.
Necessity. Suppose that σ is a robust strategy that attains full persuasion. Let D denote
the set of all non-singleton dictionaries that are played with positive probability under σ.
The proof will proceed stepwise, after making the following preliminary observation.
Observation 2.2. Fix a message strategy (σ(m | θ)) and consider two dictionaries D,D′
such that |D| 6= |D′|. Then, for any realized m, neither sender type is indifferent between
D and D′.
This follows immediately from the lexicographic preferences.
Step 1: Pr(D) < 1.
Assume the contrary - i.e., no singleton dictionary is played in equilibrium. Consider a
message realization m for which Pr(θ = Y | m) < 12 under σ. Since π <
1
2 , there must
exist such m. By the full-persuasion assumption, any D for which σ(D | m) > 0 satisfies
ρ(m,D) ≥ (1−π)/π. By condition (ii) in the definition of robustness, it must be the case
that
ρ(m, {k}) < 1− π
π
(2.9)
for every k = 1, ...,K - otherwise, the type-A sender would use a singleton dictionary at m.
It follows from (2.9) that a type-H interpreter would necessarily prefer to use a singleton
dictionary at m. By condition (iii) in the definition of robustness, singleton dictionaries
must be played with positive probability under σ, a contradiction. 
Step 2: Suppose |D| = 1 for some report (m,D) that is played with positive probability
under σ. Then, |D′| = 1 for every (m′, D′) that is played with positive probability under
σ, such that m′D = mD.
Assume the contrary - i.e. there exist reports (m,D) and (m′, D′) that are played with
positive probability under σ, such that |D| = 1, |D′| > 1 and m′D = mD. By definition,
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ρ(m′, D) = ρ(m,D). Therefore, the realization (m′, D′) is inconsistent with condition (ii)
in the definition of robustness. 
By Observation 2.2, we can partition the set of equilibrium messages into two classes: M0
is the set of messages that are accompanied by singleton dictionaries, whereas M1 is the
set of messages that are accompanied by non-singleton dictionaries. Recall that
Pr(mD | θ) =
∑
(m′,D′)|m′D=mD
σ(m′, D′ | θ)
By Step 2, if m ∈ M0, the R.H.S summation only covers reports (m′, D′) such that
m′ ∈M0. Furthermore, by condition (i) in the definition of robustness, Pr(M0 | θ = Y ) =
Pr(M0 | θ = N) = α under σ. By Step 1, α > 0.
It follows that we can rewrite the joint distribution over (θ,m,D) that is induced by σ as
a three-stage lottery. In the first stage, before θ is realized, the classes M0 and M1 are
drawn with probability α and 1−α, respectively. In the second stage, θ is realized, where
θ = Y with probability π, independently of the lottery’s first stage. Finally, (m,D) is
realized conditional on θ, with the restriction that m must belong to the class that was
realized in the first stage.
Therefore, in order for the receiver to play a = y with probability one, it must be the case
in particular that he plays a = y with probability one conditional on the realization M0
in the first stage of the three-stage lottery. But this can only hold if the condition for full
persuasion given in Remark 2.1 for the case of singleton dictionaries. Therefore, it must
be the case that π ≥ 1/(1 +K).
Proposition 2.3
Construct the following strategy for the sender.
Message strategy. In state Y , the sender randomizes uniformly between m = (1, ...1) and
m = (0, ..., 0). In state N , he randomizes uniformly over the set of all messages m for
which mk = 1 for exactly bK/2c values of k.
Interpretation strategy. Every m that is played in state N is accompanied by D = {k |
mk = 1}. In state Y , the sender mixes uniformly over all sets D of size bK/2c, indepen-
dently of m.
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By construction, Pr(mD | θ = Y ) = Pr(mDc | θ = Y ) = 12 and Pr(mD | θ = N) =
Pr(mDc | θ = N) = 1/S for every (m,D) that is played. By (2.4), the receiver’s likelihood
ratio for any realized message m satisfies
P̃r(m,D | θ = Y )
P̃r(m,D | θ = N)
≥ Pr(mD | θ = Y ) · Pr(mD
c | θ = Y )


















. Construct the message strategy first. In state Y , randomize
uniformly over two messages: m1 satisfies m1k = 1 for all k ≤ L and m1k = 0 for all k > L;
m2 satisfies m2k = 0 for all k ≤ L and m2k = 1 for all k > L. In state N , assign probability
1
2S(L) to every message m such that mk = 1 for bL/2c values of k ∈ {1, ..., L}, and mk = 0
for all other k. Likewise, assign probability 12S(L) to every message m such that mk = 1
for bL/2c values of k ∈ {L+ 1, ..., 2L}, and mk = 0 for all other k.
The conditional dictionary distribution is as follows. Conditional on any m that is played
in state N , let D = {k | mk = 1} with certainty. Conditional on m1, D is distributed
uniformly over all subsets of {L + 1, ..., 2L} of size bL/2c. Finally, conditional on m2, D
is distributed uniformly over all subsets of {1, ..., L} of size bL/2c.
It is easy to verify that this strategy satisfies the two desiderata and induces the sender’s
first-best whenever π ≥ 1/(1 + S(L)).
94
Chapter 3
Political Budget Cycles under a
Flexible Election Regime
3.1 Introduction
Political business cycles have been suggested as a tool for politicians that allows them to
signal their type to voters. This has been analysed for institutions in which the timing of
elections are fixed: first by Nordhaus (1975) with naive voters and later by Rogoff (1990)
with rational voters. However, in many countries the incumbent has the power to call for
a snap election at will within the term length. This implies that the election timing is
not fixed, but endogenously determined. It raises the possibility that politicians may have
more than one signalling tool, and that these tools can interact.
I analyse a model where I assume that elections have to take place in every second period.
In off-election periods, the politician leader (incumbent) has the power to call for a snap
election, and thereby has two periods before the next election has to take place. In every
period the incumbent chooses how much to invest in a public good that benefits the voters
in the subsequent period. The level of public investment determined by the fiscal policy
(the level of lump sum taxes or subsidies) also depends on the incumbent’s ability, which
follows a first order moving average process. The voters observe past periods’ ability
shocks, whether the election is a snap election as well as the fiscal policy choices. Based
on these observations the voters make inferences about the incumbent’s current period
ability shock (which influences the incumbent ability to produce public investment goods
in the future). When the incumbent is not in office she is an ordinary citizen and thus
in the absence of re-election concerns the preferences of the voters and the incumbent are
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aligned. However, the incumbent gets a utility boost from being in office. Therefore, the
incumbent may have an incentive to distort her fiscal policy choices to signal her ability,
and thereby increase her expected time in office.
In the benchmark of full information I show that the incumbent never calls for a snap
election when her current ability shock is low. However, there is a range of parameter
values for which the incumbent calls for a snap election whenever her current ability shock
is high. This happens whenever the expected loss from having an election is outweighed
by the expected gain from not being forced to have an election in the next period (where
her re-election probability may be worse). An equilibrium with snap elections leads to a
lower citizen utility in the long run compared to when election timing is fixed.
In the case of asymmetric information, I show that when the ego-rents are high enough
fiscal policy distortion and snap elections are signalling substitutes and the welfare loss of
the voters under the flexible election regime is mitigated compared to the full information
benchmark. The basic intuition is that when an incumbent faces a low probability of
re-election, she strictly prefers to postpone the election for another period as this ensures
at least one additional period in office and is likely to improve her re-election probability.
This implies that the low ability incumbent has a strictly higher outside utility in periods
without elections compared to election periods. Therefore, she has greater incentives to
mimic the incumbent with a high ability shock in the periods where she is forced to face
an election. Whether there exists an equilibrium in which the flexible election regime
improve the voters’ welfare remains an open question. For the parameter values in which
the incumbent faces the same probability of election in an equilibrium with snap election
as under the fixed election regime there are two main forces. In an equilibrium with snap
elections, there is less distortion of fiscal policies, but the overall distribution of the political
leader’s ability is worse. I show that when fiscal policies are distorted regardless of the
previous period’s ability shock then the utility loss from policy distortion is higher when
the ability shock from the previous period is high. This implies that an incumbent with
a low ability shock is relatively more likely to get re-elected when there are fiscal policy
distortions in periods with snap elections. However, an incumbent with a low ability shock
always faces a lower probability of re-election than an incumbent with a high ability shock
and there does not exist any separating equilibria in which such an incumbent calls for a
snap election.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next subsection reviews the related literature. Section
3.2 introduces the model and the timing of events. Section 3.2.7 formalises the equilibrium.
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The full information equilibria are analysed in section 3.3. Proposition 3.1 characterises
when there exists a full information equilibrium without any snap elections and provides a
sufficient condition for the existence of a full information equilibrium in which the incum-
bent calls for a snap election when her current period ability shock is high. Proposition
3.2 shows that the fixed election timing is always better in the face of full information.
Section 3.4 analyses the more realistic situation of asymmetric information. Proposition
3.3 establishes properties that hold in any separating equilibrium. Sufficient conditions
for existence of equilibria with and without snap elections are provided in Proposition 3.4.
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.1.1 Related literature
This paper falls into two strands of literature. First and foremost the literature on political
budget cycles, which started with the seminal papers of Rogoff (1990) and Rogoff and
Sibert (1988) in which the voters are rational. Nordhaus (1975) was a precusor to this -
in which voters are naive about the politicians economic manipulations. Carlsen (1997)
provided a version of Rogoff (1990)’s model to accomodate a negative relationship between
incumbent ability and political business cycles. Lohnmann (2003) provides a model similar
to Nordhaus (1975) that allows the voters to have rational expectations. Alesina and
Perotti (1997), Drazen (2000), Smith (2004) and Dubois (2016) provide good overviews of
the development of the literature of political cycles.
Most modern democracies allow the political agents some freedom to influence the election
timing. Therefore, the empirical study of political business cycles are tightly linked to that
of timing of election. There is however no universal consensus on the results. Some papers
primarily find support for political budget cycles (such as Blais and Nadeau (1992), Alesina
et al. (1993), Schultz (1995), Reid (1998), de los Angeles Gonzalez (2002) and Brender and
Drazen (2005)), or cycles in inflation (see Grier (1989), Alesina and Roubini (1992) and
Carlsen (2007)). Schneider (2010) found evidence for political policy cycles in the absence
of the ability to manipulate the budget. While other papers find the timing of elections
seems to be prevalent (see Ito and Park (1988), Ito (1990), Cargill and Hutchinson (1991),
Alesina et al. (1993) in the case of Japan, Heckelman and Berument (1998), Schleiter
and Tavits (2016)). Yet others find support for both of these mechanisms (Chowdhury
(1993) and Palmer and Whitten (2000), who find that the policies manipulated by the
incumbent depend on their political convictions). Williams (2013) finds a correlation
between elections and international disputes. Schleiter and Tavits (2016) and Aaskoven
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(2020) estimate that the use of an early election leads to a 5 percentage point increase in
vote share and a 5% increase in election funds, respectively. Smith (2003) find that called
for an unexpectedly early election leads to worse electoral outcomes for the incumbent.
Ferris and Olmstead (2017) argue that there is a sufficiency gain from introducing a fixed
term election in Canada.
Although election timing has received extensive attention in empirical literature, the same
cannot be said about theoretical literature. Baron (1998) and Lupia and Strom (1995)
analyse endogenous election timing in the light of coalition formation. Chappell and Peel
(1979), Lachler (1982) and Ginsburgh and Michel (1983) extend Nordhaus’s (1975) model
to allow for endogenous election timing. Smith (2003) analyses a model in which politicians
are better at forecasting the future. Thus, in this model, calling for an unexpectedly
early election is a bad signal of future economic performance. Balke (1990) and Kayser
(2005) analyse early election timing as an optimal stopping problem. In Kayser (2005) the
incumbent as in Rogoff (1990) has the ability to manipulate the voters’ learning through
policy choices. However, the model does not take the equilibrium effect of the continuation
value into account, when analysing the optimal election timing. Baleiras and Santos (2000)
and Canes-Wrone and Park (2012) also provide versions of Rogoff (1990) that allow for
early elections, but in a 2(3) period model.
3.2 Modelling Framework
This is an infinite period model, T =∞.
3.2.1 Preferences of the Representative Voter
Electoral base consists of a large number of (ex-ante) identical voters. Each of the voters
values the consumption of a private and a public good. The representative voter wants to
maximise her expected utility, EPt [Γt], where E
P
t denotes the expectation conditional on




[U(cs) + V (ks) + F (ηs)]β
s−t, (3.1)
c is the voter’s consumption of the private good and k is provision of the public investment
good. Assume that c and k are both normal goods. U and V are assumed to satisfy the
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usual Inada conditions 1, and limk→0 V (k) = −∞. β < 1 is the common discount factor,
η is a random popularity shock, which will be discussed in more details below, F (x) is a
function that equals x/2 when the incumbent is re-elected and −x/2 otherwise and the t
subscripts denote time.
3.2.2 Technology
At the beginning of each period, all voters obtain y units of a non-storable good, which
can either be consumed privately or used as an input in the production of the public
investment good. The amount used in the production of the public investment good is
given by the period t lump sum tax, τt. The remaining y− τt units are the voter’s private
consumption in period t, ct.
The period t budget for public investment good provision is given (per capita) by
kt+1 = τt + εt,
where εt is the competency of the politician in charge in period t, and the production of
the public goods take a period to become beneficial to the voter. At the end of period
t+ 1, kt+1 perish.
3.2.3 Stochastic Structure
All voters are possible leaders, but they differ in their innate ability to produce public










and αH > αL > 0. The αs are drawn independently across time and voters. When there
is no room for confusion the superscript is dropped for the incumbent.
Although I formally model citizens’ ability to produce public investment goods as some-
thing that changes over time, my preferred interpretation is that it is the world rather than
ability that is ever changing. Thus, if the incumbent is very good at dealing with current
problems, then she might be mediocre (but not bad) at dealing with next year’s problems.
1f satisfy the Inada conditions if f : R → R+ is a continuously differentiable function, such that (1)
f(0) = 0, (2) f is strictly increasing and concave, (3) limx→0 ∂f(x)/∂x =∞, and limx→∞ ∂f(x)/∂x = 0.
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However, further out into the future there is no telling how useful the incumbent’s skill
will be.
Furthermore, before voting the voters receive a common popularity shock towards the






with ηt and ηs independent for all t 6= s. ηt > 0
indicates that the voters prefer the incumbent to the opponent above and beyond their
ability to produce public investment good. The popularity shock covers how charismatic
the voters find the incumbent relative to the opponent.
3.2.4 The Incumbent’s Utility Function
The politician in charge is drawn from the pool of voters. Therefore, she values the private
consumption good and the public investment good the same way any other voters do. In
addition she receives an ego-rent of X per period in office, where 0 < X <∞. The utility





where EIt denotes the expectation conditional on the incumbent’s information set at time
t, Γ is given by (3.1), and πt,s is the incumbent’s estimate of being in office at time s
conditional on being in office at time t. The population of voters is taken to be sufficiently
large such that the probability that a given voter is elected for office is minuscule. This
is why the ego-rents are not featured in the utility of the representative voter and for the
incumbent after she leaves office.
3.2.5 Structure of Elections
The country’s constitution specifies the election structure. The maximal term length is
two years. After which an election must be held. The voters can either re-elect the current
incumbent or elect the opposition leader, who is randomly drawn from the pool of voters.
Under the flexible election regime the incumbent has the power to call a snap election in
non-election years. There are no term limits. θt ∈ {0, 1} denotes the number of periods
before an election has to take place (θt = 1 if there was an election in period t − 1), and
et ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether or not an election will take place at the end of period t.
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3.2.6 Information Structure and Timing of Events
At the beginning of period t, the incumbent observes her new ability shock αt and the
number of periods before the next election has to take place θt. She chooses the tax level
τt and whether to call for a snap election if possible, et (if θ = 0 then et = 1). The
voters observe the public investment made in period t − 1, kt−1, the incumbent’s ability
shock from the previous period αt−1,
2 θt, et and τt, and utilise this information to draw
inferences about the public investment kt+1 and the incumbent’s current ability shock.
These inferences will be confirmed in the next period, but not before. The incumbent
therefore has a temporary information advantage over the voters. However, the voters’
inferences are correct and in any separating equilibrium (which is the main focus of this
paper) they can deduce the incumbent’s private information.
The information structure here is plausible, when it is costly for the voters individually to
closely monitor and evaluate the government’s performance. When there is no uncertainty
about αt−2, then it is costless for the voters to infer αt−1 given θt−1, et−1, τt−1 and kt. Thus,
the assumption that the voters observe αt−1 directly only has bite in the first period after
a new politician takes office.
The voters have no way of inferring the ability shock of the opponent leader αOt , where O
superscripts denote the opponent. However, the distribution of α is common knowledge.
At the end of period t the voters observe the popularity shock ηt. The popularity shock
encompasses issues the voters might care about that are orthogonal to the candidates
ability to generate public investment goods, such as the latest gossip about one of the
candidates.
If et = 0, the period ends after the popularity shock has been realised and the incumbent
continues into period t+ 1 as the leading politician. If et = 1, then an election takes place
after the popularity shock is realised. The representative voter decides which candidate
goes into office in the next period. He votes for the candidate that maximises his expected
utility. If v = 1 denotes a vote for the incumbent and v = 0 a vote for the opponent, then
vt =

1 if EPt [Γt+1] ≥ EPt [ΓOt+1]
0 otherwise.
2This assumption is made to ensure that there is no residual uncertainty about the previous ability
shock, when the opposition leader takes office.
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3.2.7 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
In this subsection, we define the markov perfect equilibrium. Before we define the equi-
librium, we recap the timing and decisions within each period: (1) In the beginning of
every period t nature draws αt ∈ {αL, αH} as described above. (2) After observing
αt the incumbent chooses the tax level and whether to call for a snap election (when
possible) (τt, et) ∈ AI(αt−1, αt, θt) where AI(αt−1, αt, 0) = [−αt−1 − αt, y] × {1}, and
AI(αt−1, αt, 1) = [−αt−1−αt, y]×{0, 1}. (3) Nature then draws the incumbent’s popular-
ity shock ηt. (4) Finally, the voters observe (αt−1, θt, τt, et, ηt) before electing next period’s
incumbent. That is vt ∈ Av where Av = {0, 1} (Av = {1}) when et = 1 (et = 0). The
elected politician becomes the incumbent in period t+ 1 and θt+1 = et.
As the only variables from previous periods that restrict the agents’ actions are αt−1 and θt,
it is therefore natural in this setting to restrict attention to strategies that only depend on
the history of play through the variables αt−1 and θt. Thus, we restrict attention to Markov
Perfect Equilibria in pure strategies, with the state variables (αt−1, θt). The incumbent’s
pure markov strategy is given σI : {αL, αH}2 × {0, 1} → AI , the representatives voter’s
belief about αt = α
H is given by a function ρ̂ : {αL, αH} × {0, 1} × AI → [0, 1], and the







Definition 3.1 (Equilibrium). The triple (σI , ρ̂, v) is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in
pure strategies (henceforth equilibrium) if (1) the incumbent chooses the fiscal policy and
election timing (whenever possible) to maximise her expected continuation value:






(2) when an election takes places the representative voter always elects the politician which
gives him the highest expected value given the voter’s belief:
v =

1 if ρ̂EPt [Γt+1 | αt = αH ] + (1− ρ̂)EPt [Γt+1 | αt = αL] ≥ EPt [ΓOt+1] or e = 0
0 otherwise,
and (3) the voter’s belief about the incumbent’s current equilibrium ability shock ρ̂ is given
by Bayes rule whenever possible.
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3.3 Full Information Case
Before analysing the effects of flexible election timing under asymmetric information, it is
useful to consider the effects under full information, i.e. when αt is observable to both the
incumbent and the voters in period t. The main result of this Section is Proposition 3.1
that shows that snap elections can arise in equilibrium when αt = α
H , and Proposition
3.2 that shows this can have detrimental effects for welfare.
When the voters observe αt in period t, there is no uncertainty about the incumbent’s
ability. We therefore have ρ̂ = 1αt=αH , and
v =

1 if EPt [Γt+1 | αt] ≥ EPt [ΓOt+1]
0 otherwise,
Similar to Grossman and Hart (1983) the incumbent’s decisions in period t, can be viewed
as a two-stage procedure: in the first stage the incumbent chooses the optimal fiscal policy
choices given an (no) election takes place at the end of period t, et = 1 (et = 0). From
this we derive the incumbent’s indirect utility as a function of et. In the second stage, the
incumbent then chooses et ∈ {0, 1} to maximise her indirect utility.
Stage 1: When the voter directly observes αt, the incumbent’s pre-election policy choice
cannot influence her re-election probability by manipulating the voter’s posterior beliefs
about her current ability shock. Thus, τt is independent of θt, and et. This observation in
combination with the simple production technology and storage process, the incumbent’s
fiscal policy choices can be broken down into a series of static maximization problems:
max
ct,τt,kt+1
U(ct) + βV (kt+1), ∀t ≥ t̄,
subject to ct = y − τt, kt+1 = τt + εt, kt+1, ct ≥ 0 and kt̄ = k̄. By substituting ct and kt+1
into the maximization problems we derive the following first order condition with respect
to τt:
−U ′(y − τt) + V ′(τt + εt) = 0.
As U and V both satisfy the Inada conditions the first order condition is both necessary
and sufficient, and the solution is unique.3 We denote by xFI(ε) the optimal policy choice
3To see this, note that as ε → y, then U ′(y − τ) → ∞, so U ′(y − τ) > βV ′(τ + ε). Similarly, when
τ → −ε, then V ′(τ + ε)→∞, so U ′(y − τ) < βV ′(τ + ε).
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of the variable x, when the incumbent’s ability is ε. Let
WFI(ε) = U(y − τFI(ε)) + βV (τFI(ε) + ε)
denote the indirect utility when the incumbent’s ability is ε (henceforth citizen utility). It
is easy to see that WFI(ε) is increasing in ε. Furthermore, as both private consumption c
and public investment good k are both normal goods, cFI(ε) and kFI(ε) are both increasing
in ε and τFI(ε) is decreasing.
Because ε follows a MA(1) process and the popularity shock is temporary, the voter’s
expected utility is the same for both candidates from period t + 2 onwards. Thus, if
et = 1, the incumbent is re-elected, vt = 1, if and only if
ηt ≥ EPt [WFI(εOt+1)]− EPt [WFI(εt+1)].
When the voter knows that αt = α
i i = L,H, then
EPt [W
FI(εt+1)] = ρW
FI(αi + αH) + (1− ρ)WFI(αi + αL),
which we denote Ωi. Similarly, we denote
EPt [W
FI(εOt+1)] = ρ
2WFI(2αH) + 2ρ(1− ρ)WFI(αL + αH) + (1− ρ)2WFI(2αL)
by ΩO. Clearly, ΩH > ΩO > ΩL. So in the absence of a popularity shock, the voter
re-elects an incumbent if and only if the current period ability shock is high. With the
popularity shock the probability of being re-elected is higher for an incumbent with a high
current period ability shock, αt = α
H . In particular, the representative voter will re-elect
the incumbent with current ability shock αt = α
i if η ≥ ΩO − Ωi.
Stage 2: When θt = 0, there has to be an election at the end of period t, and hence the
analysis ends here. However, when θt = 1, the incumbent can call for a snap election. In
the absence of any popularity shock an incumbent with αt = α
H (αt = α
L) will clearly
(not) call for a snap election as the incumbent in this case is ensured a win (loss). However,
with the popularity shock the picture is less clear-cut. The decision depends both on the
current and future probability of being re-elected. Let πt,s(ρ̂, et) denote the probability
that incumbent is in office in period s when et is the election status, and ρ̂ is the public’s
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belief about αt = α
H . When there is no risk of confusion we denote by
πi = πt,t+1(1i=H , 1) and π
ρ = πt,t+1(ρ, 1) = ρπ
H + (1− ρ)πL (3.2)
the probability of winning an election, when it is known that αt = α
i, and when the ability
of the incumbent is unknown, respectively.
A necessary condition for an equilibrium in which the incumbent with αt = α
i always
(never) calls for a snap election is:








The main trade-off for the incumbent is whether to have the risk of an election today, and
thereby be able to avoid an election in the next period, or avoid the risk today knowing
that there will be an election in the following period.
To rule out uninteresting cases in which an incumbent with αt = α
L calls for a snap
election because ego-rents are so low, that she prefers to have the opponent in office (as
this would increase the citizen utility in the next period).
Assumption 3.1 (Strong office motive). ΩO − ΩL < X
That is, even if the incumbent knows that she will be ill-prepared to deal with next
year’s challenges compared to the opponent, the ego-rents from being in office are high
enough that she still wants to be in office. Although strong office motives ensure that
the incumbent never calls for a snap election to get out of office, this does not shed light
on when the incumbent calls for a snap election for opportunistic reasons. The next
proposition addresses this question.
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Proposition 3.1. Given Assumption 3.1.
1. There exists no equilibrium in which the incumbent calls for a snap election when
αt = α
L.
2. There exists a full information equilibrium in which the incumbent never calls for a
snap election if and only if
ΩH − ΩO
X
(1− πH) ≥ 2(1 + β)π
H − (2 + β)
2− β2
.
3. There exists a full information equilibrium in which the incumbent calls for a snap




(1− πH) ≤ πH
(









where X̄ = 2X
2−β2(1+β[ρπH+1−ρ]) .
The proof is given in the next subsection. Having strong office motives deter the incumbent
from calling a snap election as a means of retiring from office, as the incumbent with
αt = α
L faces a low probability of being re-elected if an election were to take place in
the current period. However, by postponing the election one period, there is a chance
she will recover (the situation will change for something more suited for her skill set),
and her expected re-election probability will therefore increase in the next period. When
αt = α
H , the incumbent is relatively well-equipped to deal with the challenges in the near
future. Therefore, she faces a relatively high re-election probability if there is an election in
the current period compared to the expected re-election probability in the next period. In
order to take advantage of this, she will have to face the risk of election today. Proposition
3.1.(2) provides a condition that is both necessary and sufficient for the incumbent to be
unwilling to take that risk in equilibrium. The RHS of the inequality in Proposition 3.1.(2)
is increasing in the discount rate. Thus, this is more likely to hold when β is low. The
absence of a pure strategy equilibrium with no snap elections does not imply that there is
a pure strategy equilibrium with snap elections, as the incumbent’s strategy influences the
continuation value of winning an election. When the incumbent calls for a snap election
whenever αt = α
H , then the expected ego-rents from being in office cannot be written
as a geometrical sum. However, it is possible to bound the expected rent from below.
Proposition 3.1.(3) uses such a lower bound and provides a sufficient condition for when
the incumbent is willing to face the risk of a snap election in order to utilise her high
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re-election probability. This condition is akin to a situation in which there are only three
periods and the incumbent with α1 = α
H prefers to have an election in the first period and
an election in the second period only if α2 = α
H over having a single election in period 2
with the ego-rents properly adjusted. As
2πH
(
1 + β[ρπH + 1− ρ]
)
− (2 + β)
2− β2 (1 + β[ρπH + 1− ρ])
is increasing in β, the condition in Proposition 3.1.(3) is more likely to hold when β is
high.
As the incumbent only calls for a snap election when she is relatively well-equipped to
deal with next year’s challenges, snap elections decrease the voters’ welfare. This is easy
to see if we compare average citizen utility over a full election cycle as t goes to infinity.
Proposition 3.2. As t→∞, the average citizen utility is strictly higher under the fixed
election regime compared to the flexible election regime when snap elections take place.
When there are no snap elections the distribution over the incumbent’s ability does not
converge, instead it is periodic with two periods. In any period immediately following
an election the probability that the incumbent’s ability shocks (αt−1, αt) are (α
H , αH),
(αH , αL), (αL, αH) and (αL, αL) equal ρ2
(
πH + 1− πρ
)
, ρ(1 − ρ)
(





πH + 1− πρ
)
and (1 − ρ)2
(
πL + 1− πρ
)
, respectively; whereas in periods before an
election the probabilities equal ρ2, ρ(1− ρ), ρ(1− ρ) and (1− ρ)2, respectively.
In an equilibrium with snap elections the distribution of the incumbent’s ability shocks
converge. The distribution is given by the next lemma. Let νt be the probability that the
incumbent calls for an early election, δt be the probability that there is no election and
ξit be the probability that αt = α
i and the incumbent is forced to have an election, for
i = L,H. Finally, let x̃ = limt→∞ xt.
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Lemma 3.1. In an equilibrium in which the incumbent calls for a snap election when
αt = α
H , we have ν̃ = ρ2−ρ , δ̃ =
1−ρ
2−ρ , ξ̃




The incumbent’s ability shocks (αt−1, αt) equals




1 + ρ+ 4πH(1− ρ)
)
,
 (αH , αL) with probability ρ(1−ρ)2(2−ρ)
(
1 + ρ+ 4πH(1− ρ)
)
,
 (αL, αH) with probability ρ(1−ρ)2(2−ρ)
(
4− 4ρπH + ρ
)
and




4− 4ρπH + ρ
)
.
Using Lemma 3.1 we can calculate the average citizens’ utility over an election cycle.
3.3.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
First, we observe that we can write the probability of being in office in period t + s as
πt,s(ρ̂, et) = πt,t̄(ρ̂, et)π̄s−t̄ with et̄ = 1, where π̄s′ is the probability of being in office s
′
periods after having won an election, and π̄0 = 1. To see this, notice that the voter’s
belief about αt will only influence the incumbent’s re-election probability in period t, as
the incumbent’s ability follows an MA(1) process. Thus, only the outcome of an election
matters for the incumbent’s future survival in office and not the voter’s belief prior to the
election.
The rest of the proof proceeds in steps. In Step 1, we show that the incumbent will never
find it optimal to call for a snap election. Step 2 shows that if the incumbent never calls
for a snap election, then it is indeed optimal for incumbent to not call for a snap election
when αt = α
H if and only if the inequality in Proposition 3.1.(2) holds. Given a strategy
in which the incumbent calls for a snap election whenever αt = α
H , we re-write π̄s as a
function of π̄s−1 and π̄s−2. We show this in Step 3 use it to provide a lower bound for the
probability of being in office in period t+ s. In Step 4, we show that we can use the lower
bound from Step 3 to provide a sufficient condition such that calling for snap election is
optimal when αt = α
H .
Step 1: We show that it is never optimal for the incumbent to call for a snap election
when αt = α
L. As there is no re-election concern, the incumbent’s policy choice does not
depend on whether there is an election. Using π̄s, we can re-write the condition for snap
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elections to be optimal for the incumbent with αt = α
L as









sπ̄s = 0 as β ∈ (0, 1) and π̄s′ ≥ π̄s′+1 for every s′ ∈ N. Because the
incumbent has strong office motives, a necessary condition for the incumbent to call for
a snap election when αt = α



















≤ −ρ(πH − πL)
∞∑
s=0




= −ρ(πH − πL)
∞∑
s=0
βs+1π̄s − βπL(1− π̄1) < 0,
where the first inequality follows from π̄1 ≥ π̄s for all s ≥ 1. The second inequality follows
as πH > πL and π̄1 ≤ 1. Thus, the incumbent never calls for a snap election when αt = αL.
Step 2: We show that there exists an equilibrium in which the incumbent never calls
for a snap election if and only if the inequality in Proposition 3.1.(2) holds. To this end,
suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which the incumbent never calls for a snap
election. From Step 1, we know that the incumbent has no incentive to deviate when
αt = α










By assumption the incumbent never calls for a snap election, so π̄s = π̄s−1 for every odd
s (there is never an election in two consecutive periods). For every even s > 1, we have
π̄s = π̄s−2π
ρ. This follows from the fact that an election takes place every second period
regardless of the realisation of the incumbent’s ability shock in an equilibrium with no






























πH(1 + β)− (1 + βπρ)
1− β2πρ
.







For Step 3 and 4, suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which the incumbent calls
for a snap election when αt = α
H , but not when αt = α
L.





ρπH + 1− ρ
) s




ρπH + 1− ρ
) s+1
2 when s is
odd.
First, we observe that π̄s can be written as π̄s = ρπ
H π̄s−1 +(1−ρ)πρπ̄s−2 for s ≥ 2. To see
this, notice that if the incumbent won an election s periods ago, then she would also face
an election s− 1 periods ago if and only if her utility shock was αH (which happens with
probability ρ). The probability of re-election is then πH . If she did not have an election
s−1 periods ago (which happens with probability 1−ρ), then she would be forced to have
an election s− 2 periods ago (regardless of her ability shock). Her average probability of
winning such an election is πρ. By combining the above observations we derive the desired
expression for π̄s.
Using this, we show that we can bound π̄s from below. When s = 1, then we know that
the incumbent won an election in the previous period: thus if her current period ability
shock is αL, then she will survive with probability one, as there will be no election. If her
current period ability shock is αH , then she will call for a snap election and be re-elected
with probability πH . Thus,
π̄1 = ρπ




ρπH + (1− ρ)πL
)
.
For s = 2, we have
π̄2 = ρπ
H π̄1 + (1− ρ)πρπ̄0 = πρ
(
ρπH + 1− ρ
)









where the inequality follows as πL < πH ≤ 1.
Inductive step: Assume that the result holds for any n ≤ s− 1. We want to show that
is holds for s. If s is even, then
π̄s = ρπ





ρπH + 1− ρ
) s











−1 (ρπH + 1− ρ) s2−1 ≥ (πρ) s2 (ρπH + 1− ρ) s2 ,
where the inequalities follows from the inductive hypothesis. If s is odd, then
π̄s = ρπ





ρπH + 1− ρ
) s−1











ρπH + 1− ρ
) s+1
2 ,
where the inequality follows from the inductive hypothesis. This completes Step 3.
Step 4: From Step 1, we know that the incumbent has no incentive to deviate from the
conjectured strategies when αt = α
L. When αt = α
H the incumbent will deviate and not








βsπ̄s − 1 + πH lim
s→∞
βsπ̄s.








1 + β(ρπH + 1− ρ)
)
for every




















1 + β(ρπH + 1− ρ)
)
− (1 + βπρ)
1− β2πρ (ρπH + 1− ρ)
.
This implies that the incumbent has no incentives to deviate if the inequality in Proposition
3.1.(3) holds. This completes the proof.
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3.4 Asymmetric Information Case
We now return to the asymmetric information case in which the incumbent has a tem-
porary informational advantage. As the government’s investments made in period t only
influence the voters’ utility in period t+1, it is more realistic that the voters cannot observe
the period t ability shock before period t+ 1. At which point the voters can infer αt from
kt+1 provided they know αt−1. The main result in this Section is Proposition 3.3 which
states that snap election can substitute policy distortions, and in some environments this
can mitigate the negative effect snap elections have on the voters welfare.
Given an equilibrium, let (τ∗(αt−1, αt, θt), e
∗(αt−1, αt, θt)) = σ
I(αt−1, αt, θt) denote the
incumbent’s equilibrium strategy, and
W ∗(αt−1, αt, θt) = U(y − τ∗(αt−1, αt, θt)) + βV (αt−1 + αt + τ∗(αt−1, αt, θt)),
be the citizen utility when the incumbent follows the equilibrium strategy in period t given
αt−1, αt and θt. We can use the above to express the expected citizen utility from having
an incumbent in office in period t+ 1, when the belief that αt = α
H is ρ̂ and et = θt+1:
Ω(ρ̂, θt+1) = ρ̂ρW
∗(αH , αH , θt+1) + (1− ρ̂)ρW ∗(αL, αH , θt+1)
+ ρ̂(1− ρ)W ∗(αH , αL, θt+1) + (1− ρ̂)(1− ρ)W ∗(αL, αL, θt+1).
Given the distribution of η, the probability of being re-elected is
πt,t+1(ρ̂, 1) = Pr(ηt ≥ Ω(ρ, 1)− Ω(ρ̂, 1)) =
1
2
+ ψ (Ω(ρ̂, 1)− Ω(ρ, 1)) ,
when the voter’s beliefs that αt = α
H is ρ̂. As in the full information case, we denote the
probability of election when the voter believes with probability one that αt = α
i by π̂i for
i = L,H, and π̂ρ = ρπ̂H + (1− ρ)π̂L = 12 = π
ρ. Whenever there is no policy distortion in
the periods following an election, then π̂i = πi for i = L,H.
An incumbent who faces the highest probability of re-election might find it optimal to
distort fiscal policies in order to signal her type. For a fixed τ , the difference in the
citizen utility for two levels of ability εH > εL is given by β
(
V (εH + τ)− V (εL + τ)
)
> 0,
where the inequality follows as V is increasing. Because V is concave, this implies that
the marginal cost of decreasing (increasing) taxes is lower for an incumbent with εH (εL)
compared to εL (εH). Thus, if an incumbent wants to signal a high current ability shock,
she does so by distorting taxes downwards. As limk→0 V (k) = −∞, it is always possible
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for an incumbent to signal that αt = α
H . We will focus on undominated separating
equilibria by imposing the intuitive criterion proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987). The
next proposition summarises properties common to every separating equilibrium.
Proposition 3.3. Given Assumption 3.1. In any separating equilibrium the following
properties hold:
1. π̂H > π̂L.
2. When Ω(ρ, 1) − Ω(0, 1) < X, the constraint facing the incumbent with αt = αH is
strictly relaxed when θt = 1 compared to when θt = 0.
3. In this case, fiscal policy and snap elections are signalling substitutes.
4. If the incumbent with αt = α
H distorts the fiscal policy to deter the incumbent with
αt = α
L from mimicking her for any αt−1 ∈ {αL, αH}, the utility loss from fiscal
policy distortion is larger when αt−1 = α
H compared to αt−1 = α
L.
Furthermore, there exists no separating equilibrium in which an incumbent with αt = α
L
calls for a snap election.
We first provide an outline of the proof, and below we discuss the proposition’s implica-
tions. The formal proof is delegated to the appendix. If there is no election, then as the
incumbent’s ability follows an MA(1) process there are no re-election concerns, and thus
no incentives for the incumbent to distort her policy choices, i.e. when e∗(αt−1, αt, 1) = 0,
then τ∗(αt−1, αt, 1) = τ
FI(αt−1 + αt) for any (αt−1, αt) ∈ {αL, αH}2. This implies that
in any separating equilibria with no snap election we have Ω(1i=H , 1) = Ω
i for i = L,H,
and π̂i = πi for i = L,H. That is, the probability of re-election is the same as in the
full information case. The incumbent may still have an incentive to distort her policy
choices in order to influence the voter’s inference about her ability shock in election pe-
riods. Thus, in a separating equilibrium with snap election the incumbent may distort
her policy choices in the periods immediately following an election. In which case, it may
influence the probability of re-election, i.e. π̂i 6= πi for i = L,H. We therefore need to
show that in every separating equilibrium π̂H > π̂L. In order to do this, we first show
that if Ω(ρ, 1) −min{Ω(0, 1),Ω(1, 1)} < X and Ω(1, 1) > (<)Ω(0, 1) then the incumbent
with αt = α
L (αt = α
H) has a strictly lower incentive to mimic when θt = 1 compared to
when θt = 0. This follows from similar arguments as in Step 1 of Proposition 3.1. Second,
if Ω(ρ, 1)−min{Ω(0, 1),Ω(1, 1)} > X and Ω(1, 1) > (<)Ω(0, 1), then the utility loss from
distortion is largest when αt−1 = α
L (αt−1 = α
H). Third, we show that π̂H > π̂L in every
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separating equilibrium in which the incumbent with the lowest probability of re-election
does not call for a snap election. Afterwards, we show that there exists no separating equi-
librium in which the incumbent who faces the lowest probability of re-election calls for a
snap election. Thus, establishing that π̂H > π̂L in every separating equilibrium. Finally,
we show that when the constraint is binding for an incumbent with αt = α
H regardless
of the realisation of αt−1, then the utility loss from distortion is largest for the incumbent
with αt−1 = α
H .
Proposition 3.3.(1) implies that the incumbent will only distort her policy choices when
αt = α
H . The incumbent with αt = α
L has higher incentives to mimic an incumbent with
αt = α
H when she is forced to have an election. Thus, under a flexible election regime
the incumbent has two signalling tools, and fiscal policy distortions are less pronounced
in periods with snap elections. This means that the detrimental impacts of a flexible
election regime we observed in the full information case is somewhat mitigated in the
asymmetric information case. Furthermore, when the incumbent with αt = α
H faces a
binding constraint regardless of whether αt−1 = α
L or αH , then the utility loss from
policy distortion is larger when αt−1 = α
H . When this happens in periods with a regular
election (and there is no distortion in periods with a snap election), there is a further
mitigation of the negative consequences of a flexible election regime. In particular, the
flexible election regime improves the citizens’ utility, if such an equilibrium exists and the




WFI(2αH)−W ∗(αH , αH , 0)−
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where the weights are derived using the distributions of the incumbent’s ability from the
end of Section 3.3. The first three terms are positive and the last term is negative: The
first term is positive by Proposition 3.3.(4), the second term is trivially positive as policy
distortion leads to a utility loss and the third (fourth) term is positive (negative) as WFI
is an increasing concave function and 12ρ− (3ρ− 2)(1− π






ρ ∈ (0, 1). Whether there exists an equilibrium in which flexible election timing improves
welfare remains an open question.
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In equilibria in which fiscal policies are distorted in periods with snap election the com-
parison to the fixed election regime becomes more complicated, as the tax level influences
the incumbent’s re-election probabilities above and beyond what it signals about the in-
cumbent’s ability. In particular, if the constraints in snap elections are binding when
(αt−1, αt) = (α
H , αH) and (αt−1, αt) = (α
L, αH), then the difference in re-election proba-
bilities decreases compared to the full information case. A decrease in π̂H − π̂L decreases
the incumbent’s incentive to mimic an incumbent with αt = α
H , but further strengthen
the perverse effects snap elections has on the long run distribution of the incumbent’s
ability.
In addition the parameter values for which separating equilibria with and without snap
elections exist differs compared to the full information benchmark. The next proposition
provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium in which the
incumbent never calls for a snap election and when the incumbent with αt = α
H always
calls for a snap election.
Proposition 3.4. Given Assumption 3.1, there exists a separating equilibrium in which




H − Ω(1, 0)
X
≥ 2(1 + β)π
H − (2 + β)
2− β2
2. the incumbent with αt = α
H calls for a snap election if
WFI(2αH)−W ∗(αH , αH , 1)
βX
+
Ω(1, 1)− Ω(ρ, 1)
X





1 + β[ρπ̂H + 1− ρ]
)
− (2 + β)
2− β2 (1 + β[ρπ̂H + 1− ρ])
and when θt = 1 the utility loss from policy distortion is weakly larger when αt−1 =
αH .
In an equilibrium without snap elections, the benefits of calling a snap election depends
on the voter’s off-equilibrium beliefs. An incumbent with αt = α
H will achieve the highest
utility from deviating and calling a snap election, if this leads the voter to believe that
αt = α
H without any fiscal policy distortion. In this case the incumbent with αt = α
H
prefers to not call for a snap election if and only if the inequality in Proposition 3.4.(1)
holds. Notice that the only difference between this inequality and the one in Proposition
3.1.(2) is the additional term on the RHS. This term accounts for the fact that the citizen
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utility is higher in the periods just after an election for a given level of ability, as there is
less utility loss due to policy distortions. The inequality in Proposition 3.4.(2) differs from
the inequality in three ways. The first term on the LHS comes from the immediate gain
of no policy distortion when incumbent does not call for a snap election. As above, the
third term on the LHS stems from the fact that the policy distortion is lower in periods
with a snap election relative to periods in which elections have to take place. Finally, as
the utility loss from policy distortions is largest when αt = α
H , this implies that in face
of policy distortions prior to snap elections we have Ω(1, 1) − Ω(ρ, 1) < ΩH − ΩO and
consequently π̂H < πH .
3.5 Conclusion
This paper analyses the impact of having a flexible election regime. I show that allow-
ing the incumbent to opportunistically call for snap elections has detrimental effect on
welfare in the benchmark with full information. When the incumbent has a temporary
informational advantage compared to the voters, the flexible election timing provides the
incumbent with two signalling tools. Whenever the ego-rents are high enough such that
even an incumbent who is relatively unsuited to deal with next year’s challenges still
prefers to be in office the two tools are signalling are substitutes. This mitigate some of
the detrimental effects from having a flexible election regime in the full information case.
Whether a flexible election regime ever improve welfare remains an open question.
Even in the bench mark case of full information snap election changes the political budget
cycles in equilibrium. If there exists a separating equilibrium in which any incumbent
with calls for a snap elections when her current ability shock is high and her fiscal policies
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Proof of Lemma 3.1. Consider an equilibrium in which the incumbent calls for a snap
election if and only if αt = α
H . We observe that given νt−1, δt−1, ξ
i
t−1 for i = L,H the
incumbent’s ability shock (αt−1, αt) is given by











(1− πH) + ξLt−1(1− πL)
)
ρ2,











(1− πH) + ξLt−1(1− πL)
)
ρ(1− ρ),










(1− πH) + ξLt−1(1− πL)
)
(1− ρ)ρ, and
 (αL, αL) with probability






(1− πH) + ξLt−1(1− πL)
)
(1− ρ)2.
To see this, notice that if the incumbent has αt−1 = α
H , then she will face an election
in period t − 1. Thus, she will become a (αH , αH) incumbent if she wins the election







πHρ. If the opponent comes into office after
an election in period t − 1, then the incumbent in period t will have (αH , αH) with





(1− πH) + ξLt−1(1− πL)
)
. The probability that the incumbent in period t
has (αH , αL) follows the same reasoning. When the incumbent has αt−1 = α
L, there is
an additional term as she will not call for a snap election, and thus is sure to continue in
office in the next period.
Given the equilibrium, the only reason for a snap election is if there was an election in the
previous period and αt = α
H . Thus, we have νt = (1− δt−1)ρ. If there was no election in
the previous period, the incumbent will be forced to call an election in the current period
regardless of the realisation of αt. As αt is independent of whether there was an election
in the previous period, we have ξHt = δt−1ρ and ξ
L
t = δt−1(1 − ρ). Finally, if there was
an election in the previous period and αt = α
L, then there will be no election in period t:
δt = (1− δt−1)(1− ρ).
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Observation 3.1. δt = (1− ρ)
∑t−1
s=0(ρ− 1)s for every t ∈ N .
Proof. We prove this by induction. Since there is no forced election in period 1, this
trivially holds for t = 1. Suppose that it holds for every t′ < t. We have


























where the last equallity follows since |ρ − 1| < 1. Using the above, we derive ν̃ = ρ2−ρ ,
ξ̃H = ρ(1−ρ)2−ρ and ξ̃
L = (1−ρ)
2
2−ρ . This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Under the fixed election regime the distribution of the incum-
bent’s ability does not converge, but alternates between the distribution immediately after
an election and the distribution prior to any election. In the long run the expected citizen
utility over a business cycle is given by:
Efixed = δ1W
FI(2αH) + δ2W
FI(αH + αL) + δ3W
FI(2αL),
where δ1 = ρ
2
[
πH + 12 + β
]
, δ2 = ρ(1−ρ)
[
1 + πH + πL + 2β
]
and δ3 = (1−ρ)2
[
πL + 12 + β
]
.
The long run the expected citizen utility (averaging over the two periods) is given by:
Eflex = γ1W
FI(2αH) + γ2W


















4− 4ρπH + ρ
]
. We can write the difference between the citizen utility under
the fixed and flexible election regime as:










as δ1 + δ2 + δ3 = 1 and γ1 + γ2 + γ3 = 1. Thus, if δ1 − γ1 > 0 and γ3 − δ3 > 0, this
completes the proof.
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First consider δ1 − γ1:










1− 2ρ(1− πH) + β(1− ρ)[3− 4πH ]
]
.
As ρ ∈ (0, 1) and πH > 12 , then 1 − 2ρ(1 − π
H) > 0. Thus, if πH ≤ 34 then δ1 − γ1 > 0.
Therefore suppose this is not the case. We can bound δ1 − γ1 from below by




1− 2ρ(1− πH) + (1− ρ)[3− 4πH ]
]
.
If πH = 12 , then δ1 − γ1 >
2ρ2(1−ρ)
2(2−ρ) > 0. If π
H = 1, then δ1 − γ1 > ρ
3
2(2−ρ) > 0. As





, we conclude that δ1− γ1 > 0. Next, we show that
γ3 − δ3 > 0.










ρ(1− 2ρ(1− πH)) + βρ(1− ρ)(3− 4πH)
]
,
where the second equality follows as ρπH + (1 − ρ)πL = 12 . If π
H = 12 , then γ3 − δ3 =
[1+β]ρ(1−ρ)2
2(2−ρ) > 0, and if π
H = 1, then γ3 − δ3 = ρ(1−ρ)2(2−ρ) [1 − β(1 − ρ)] > 0. This completes
the proof.
3.6.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3
First, we observe that when there is no election, i.e. et = 0, then there is no re-election
concerns and thus no policy distortion. So τ∗(αt−1, αt, θt) = τ
FI(αt−1, αt) whenever
e∗(αt−1, αt, θt) = 0. This implies that in any separating equilibria in which there are
no snap elections, Ω(1, 1) = ΩH > ΩL = Ω(0, 1) and π̂H = πH > πL = π̂L.
Similarly, the incumbent facing the lowest probability of re-election has no incentives the
distort fiscal policy, as there is no risk of being mimicked. That is, τ∗(αt−1, α
i, θt) =
τFI(αt+1, α
i) whenever Ω(1i=H , 1) ≤ Ω(1i 6=H , 1).
The remainder of the proof proceeds in steps. In Step 1, we show that if Ω(ρ, 1) −
min{Ω(0, 1),Ω(1, 1)} < X and Ω(1, 1) > (<)Ω(0, 1), then the constraint facing the incum-
bent with αt = α
H (αt = α
L) is strictly relaxed when θt = 1 compared to when θt = 0.
Step 2 shows that if Ω(ρ, 1) − min{Ω(0, 1),Ω(1, 1)} ≥ X and Ω(1, 1) > (<)Ω(0, 1), then
the utility loss from distortion is largest when αt−1 = α
L (αt−1 = α
H). Step 3 shows that
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in every separating equilibrium in which the incumbent who faces the lowest probability
of re-election does not call for a snap election we have Ω(1, 1) > Ω(0, 1). Step 4 asserts
that there exists no separating equilibrium in which the incumbent who faces the lowest
probability of re-election calls for a snap election. By combining Step 3 and 4 it implies
that Ω(1, 1) > Ω(0, 1) and hence π̂H > π̂L in every separating equilibrium. Furthermore,
there exist no separating equilibria in which an incumbent with αt = α
L calls for a snap
election. Finally, Step 5 shows that in any election in which the constraints are binding for
(αt−1, αt) = (α
H , αH) and (αt−1, αt) = (α
L, αH) the utility loss from distortion is highest
when αt−1 = α
H , which concludes the proof.
Step 1: Suppose that Ω(ρ, 1) −min{Ω(0, 1),Ω(1, 1)} < X and Ω(1, 1) > (<)Ω(0, 1). We
show that the constraint facing the incumbent with the highest probability of re-election
is relaxed when θt = 1 compared to when θt = 0.
Let Ω(1i=H , 1) > Ω(1j=H , 1) for i ∈ {L,H} and j 6= i. The constraint facing the incum-
bent with αt = α
i is not relaxed when θt = 1 compared to when θt = 0 if
Ω(1j=H , 1)π̂
j + Ω(ρ, 1)(1− π̂j) + π̂jX
∞∑
s=0











βsπ̄s − βXπ̂ρ + (Ω(1j=H , 1)− Ω(1j=H , 0)) .
By assumption the LHS of the inequality is positive. By the same arguments as in Step 1





sπ̄s − βXπ̂ρ < 0. Thus, a necessary condition for
the constraint not to be relaxed when θt = 1 is Ω(1i=H , 1) > Ω(1j=H , 0). This implies that
the there is more distortion when θt = 0 than when θt = 1. However, this only happens if
the constraint facing the incumbent with the highest probability of re-election is relaxed
when θt = 1 compared to θt = 0. This concludes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2: We show that if Ω(ρ, 1) − min{Ω(0, 1),Ω(1, 1)} > X and Ω(1, 1) > (<)Ω(0, 1),
then the utility loss from distortion is largest when αt−1 = α
L (αt−1 = α
H).
First, assume that there exists a separating equilibrium in which Ω(1, 1) > Ω(0, 1) and
Ω(ρ, 1)− Ω(0, 1) ≥ X. This implies that






As Ω(1, 1) > Ω(0, 1), an incumbent with αt = α
L does not distort her fiscal policy choices.
Therefore, we can re-write the above as
WFI(αL + αH)−W ∗(αL, αH , 1) > WFI(2αH)−W ∗(αH , αH , 1).
This proves the claim.
Assume, now that there exists a separating equilibrium Ω(0, 1) > Ω(1, 1) and Ω(ρ, 1) −
Ω(1, 1) ≥ X. This implies that





As Ω(1, 1) < Ω(0, 1), an incumbent with αt = α
H does not distort her fiscal policy choices.
Therefore, we can re-write the above as
(1− ρ)
(
WFI(αH + αL)−W ∗(αH , αL, 1)−
(
WFI(2αL)−W ∗(αL, αL, 1)
))
> ΩH − ΩL > 0,
which implies that the utility loss is largest when αt−1 = α
H .
This concludes the proof of Proposition 3.3.(2) and 3.3.(3).
Step 3: Consider a separating equilibrium in which the incumbent who faces the lowest
probability of re-election does not call for a snap election. Assume for contraction that
Ω(1, 1) ≤ Ω(0, 1). As the incumbent with αt = αH faces the lowest probability of re-
election, she has no incentive to distort her policy choices. Thus, Ω(1, 1) ≤ Ω(0, 1) implies
that
W ∗(αH , αL, 1) < W ∗(αL, αL, 1) (3.4)
AsWFI(αH+αL) > WFI(2αL), the constraint is binding for an incumbent with (αt−1, αt) =
(αH , αL) when θt = 1, and τ
∗(αH , αL, 1) > τFI(αL + αH). Therefore,
WFI(2αH)− U(y − τ∗(αL, αH , 1))− βV (2αH + τ∗(αL, αH , 1)) (3.5)
= A ≤WFI(αL + αH)− U(y − τ∗(αL, αL, 1))− βV (αL + αH + τ∗(αL, αL, 1)),











sπ̄s is the ex-
pected gain from mimicking the incumbent with αt = α
L. Inequality (3.5) can be re-
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arranged to
W ∗(αL, αL, 1)−W ∗(αL, αH , 1) ≤WFI(αH + αL)−WFI(2αH)
+ β
(




V (αH + αL + τ∗(αL, αL, 1))− V (2αL + τ∗(αL, αL, 1))
)
.
By inequality (3.4), the LHS is strictly positive, and WFI(αH + αL)−WFI(2αH) < 0 as
WFI is increasing. As V is concave, we have an immediate contradiction unless
αH + τ∗(αH , αL, 1) < αL + τ∗(αL, αL, 1) (3.6)
So suppose that inequality (3.6) holds. This implies that
0 < αH − αL < τ∗(αL, αL, 1)− τ∗(αH , αL, 1).
As the incumbent with αt = α
L distorts her fiscal policy by increasing taxes, this also
applies that the constraint is binding for the incumbent with (αL, αL). Recall, that
k∗(αi, αL, 1) = αi + αL + τ∗(αi, αL, 1) and c∗(αi, αL, 1) = y − τ∗(αi, αL, 1) for i = L,H.
We can re-write inequality (3.4) as
U(c∗(αH , αL, 1))− U(c∗(αL, αL, 1)) < β
(
V (k∗(αL, αL, 1))− V (k∗(αH , αL, 1))
)
. (3.7)
As the incumbent increases taxes when distorting, then
βV ′(k∗(αi, αL, 1)) < U ′(c∗(αi, αL, 1)). (3.8)
We use this to show that inequality (3.7) cannot hold
U(c∗(αH , αL, 1))− U(c∗(αL, αL, 1)) ≥ U ′(c∗(αH , αL, 1))
(
τ∗(αL, αL, 1)− τ∗(αH , αL, 1)
)
> βV ′(k∗(αH , αL, 1))
(
αL + τ∗(αL, αL, 1)− αH − τ∗(αH , αL, 1)
)
≥ β(V (k∗(αL, αL, 1))− V (k∗(αH , αL, 1)))
where the first inequality follows from the fact that τ∗(αL, αL, 1) > τ∗(αH , αL, 1), which
implies that U ′(c∗(αL, αL, 1)) > U ′(c∗(αH , αL, 1)). The second inequality follows from
inequality (3.8) and αH > αL. The concavity and k∗(αH , αL, 1) < k∗(αL, αL, 1) gives us
the last inequality. This contradicts inequality (3.7), and thereby completes this step.
126
Step 4: We now show, that there exists no separating equilibrium in which the incumbent
with the lowest re-election probability calls for a snap election.
We assume that there exists a separating equilibrium in which Ω(1, 1) > Ω(0, 1) and the
incumbent calls for a snap election when αt = α
L. We note, that if the incumbent calls
for a snap election when (αt−1, αt) = (α
i, αL) for i ∈ {L,H}, then Ω(ρ, 1) − Ω(0, 1) > X
(by Step 1) and






as the incumbent with (αi, αL) prefers to call for a snap election by assumption. This
implies that the incumbent will also call for a snap election when (αt−1, αt) = (α
j , αL)
for j 6= i, as the above inequality does not depend on the realisation of αt−1. When
the incumbent calls for a snap election whenever αt = α
L, the incumbent with αt = α
H
faces the same constraint whether θt = 0 or θt = 1 (if θ = 0 is reached in equilib-
rium). Thus, τ∗(αi, αH , 0) ≤ τ∗(αi, αH , 1), Ω(0, 1) ≤ Ω(0, 0) and Ω(1, 1) ≤ Ω(1, 0),
where the inequalities follows from the fact that θt = 0 may not be reached in equi-
librium, so the value depends on the voter’s belief. Furthermore, Ω(0, 1) < ΩL implies
that τ∗(αL, αH , 1) < τFI(αL + αH). As she only distorts her policy choices in periods
with an election, e∗(αL, αH , 1) = 1.
As Step 2 implies that the utility loss from distortion is largest when (αt−1, αt) = (α
L, αH),
then






≥WFI(αH + αL)−W ∗(αL, αH , 1) > WFI(2αH)−W ∗(αH , αH , 1).
(3.9)
Thus, the incumbent with (αt−1, αt) = (α
H , αH) also prefers to call for a snap election,
i.e. e∗(αH , αH , 1) = 1. This implies that θ = 0 is never reached in equilibrium.
Furthermore, it implies that the incumbent always calls for a snap election, so π̄s =
βs (π̂ρ)s, and depending on the off-equilibrium beliefs Ω(1, 0)−Ω(1, 1) ∈ [0, ρ(WFI(2αH)−








Inserting this into inequality (3.9) we derive
β (Ω(ρ, 1)− Ω(1, 1)) (1− π̂H)− β (Ω(1, 0)− Ω(1, 1))− βX(1− π̂
H)
1− βπ̂ρ
≥WFI(αH + αL)−W ∗(αL, αH , 1) > WFI(2αH)−W ∗(αH , αH , 1).
As Ω(1, 1) > Ω(ρ, 1), Ω(1, 1) ≥ Ω(1, 0) and π̂H ≤ 1, the LHS is weakly negative. However,
WFI(αH + αL) > W ∗(αL, αH , 1), so we have a contradiction.
Now, assume that there exists a separating equilibrium in which Ω(0, 1) > Ω(1, 1) and the
incumbent calls for a snap election when (αt−1, αt) = (α
i, αH) for some i ∈ {L,H}. By
the same arguments as above this implies that Ω(ρ, 1) − Ω(1, 1) > X and the incumbent
always calls for a snap election when αt = α
H . Thus, the constraints for separating are the
same for θt = 0 and θt = 1, and therefore we have τ
∗(αi, αL, 0) ≥ τ∗(αi, αL, 1), Ω(0, 1) ≤
Ω(0, 0) and Ω(1, 1) ≤ Ω(1, 0). Furthermore, Ω(1, 1) < ΩH implies that τ∗(αH , αL, 1) >
τFI(αH + αL). As she onlu distorts her policy choices in periods with an election, then
e∗(αH , αL, 1) = 1.
As Step 2 implies that the utility loss from distortion is largest when (αt−1, αt) = (α
H , αL),
then







≥WFI(αH + αL)−W ∗(αH , αL, 1) > WFI(2αL)−W ∗(αL, αL, 1).
Thus, the incumbent with (αt−1, αt) = (α
L, αL) also prefers to call for a snap election, i.e.
e∗(αL, αL, 1). This implies that θ = 0 is never reached in equilibrium, and π̄s = β
s (π̂ρ)s.
Hence, as above we can re-write inequality (3.10) as follows
−β (Ω(0, 1)− Ω(ρ, 1))− β(Ω(0, 0)− Ω(0, 1))− βX(1− π̂
L)
1− βπ̂ρ
≥WFI(αH + αL)−W ∗(αH , αL, 1) > WFI(2αL)−W ∗(αL, αL, 1).
As Ω(0, 1) > Ω(ρ, 1), Ω(0, 1) ≥ Ω(0, 0) and π̂L ≤ 1, the LHS is weakly negative. However,
WFI(αH +αL > W ∗(αH , αL, 1)), so we have a contradiction. This concludes the proof of
Step 4.
Step 3 and 4 implies that Proposition 3.3.(1) holds, as well as the last statement of
Proposition 3.3.
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Step 5: Finally, we show that if there exists a separating equilibrium in which the con-
straint is binding for an incumbent with (αt−1, αt) = (α
L, αH) and for an incumbent with
(αt−1, αt) = (α
H , αH), then the utility loss from separating is largest when αt−1 = α
H .
Therefore, we assume that such an equilibrium exists. If both constraints are binding
in an equilibrium when θt ∈ {0, 1}, then the fiscal policy choices of the incumbent with
(αt−1, αt) = (α
i, αH) for i ∈ {L,H} is implicitly defined by the binding constraint























(Ω(0, 1)− Ω(ρ, 1) +X) + β (Ω(0, 1)− Ω(0, 0)) .
Note, that A(θt) does not depend on α
i. As V and U are C1 functions we can view
τ∗(z, αH , θt) as a continuous function of z ∈ R. Thus, by the implicit function theorem
we derive
∂τ∗(z, αH , θt)
∂z
= − βV
′(z + αL + τ∗(z, αH , θt))
βV ′(z + αL + τ∗(z, αH , θt))− U ′(y − τ∗(z, αH , θt))
. (3.11)
As the incumbent with αt = α
H distorts her fiscal policy by decreasing taxes and V and
U are concave functions, we have
U ′(y − τ∗(z, αH , θt)) < U ′(y − τFI(z + αH)) = βV ′(z + αH + τFI(z + αH))
< βV ′(z + αH + τ∗(z, αH , θt)) < βV
′(z + αL + τ∗(z, αH , θt)).
(3.12)
This implies that the distorted taxes are higher when αt−1 = α




βV ′(z + αL + τ∗(z, αH , θt))− U ′(y − τ∗(z, αH , θt))
)−1
> 0, where the inequality
follows from inequality 3.12).
The utility loss from distortion is given by C(z) = WFI(z + αH)−W ∗(z, αH , θt). By the
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envelope theorem, we have
∂C(z)
∂z
= βV ′(z + αH + τFI(z + αH)) + U ′(y − τ∗(z, αH , θt))
∂τ∗(z, αH , θt)
∂z
− βV ′(z + αH + τ∗(z, αH , θt))
(
1 +
∂τ∗(z, αH , θt)
∂z
)
= BU ′(y − τ∗(z, αH , θt))β
(
V ′(z + αH + τ∗(z, αH , θt))− V ′(z + αH + τFI(z + αH))
)
+BβV ′(z + αL + τ∗(z, αH , θt))
(
βV ′(z + αH + τFI(z + αH))− U(y − τ∗(z, αH , θt))
)
> 0,
where the equality follows from equation (3.11), and the inequality follows from inequality
(3.12) and V and U being strictly increasing functions. Thus, we conclude that the utility
loss from distortion is largest when αt−1 = α
H . This concludes the proof.
3.6.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof of Proposition 3.4.(1). Assume that there exists a separating equilibrium in which
the incumbent never calls for a snap election.
As nobody calls for a snap election in equilibrium, then Ω(1i=H , 1) = Ω




1−β2πρ and the appeal of snap elections depend on the voters off-equilibrium
beliefs. However, we can bound utility of the incumbent with (αt−1, αt) = (α
i, αH) for
i ∈ {L,H} from above by:




which corresponds to the case in which the voters attach probability one the incumbent
having αt = α
H when τ = τFI(αi + αH), e = 1 and θ = 1. Thus, the incumbent (αi, αH)
does not benefit from deviating and calling for a snap election if:








which can be re-written to the condition in Proposition 3.4.(1). By Proposition 3.3 and
Assumption 3.1 the incumbent strictly prefers to call for a snap election when αt = α
L
compared to facing an election today with a re-election probability of πL. Therefore, there
exist off-equilibrium beliefs that sustain such an equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.(2). Assume that there exists a separating equilibrium in which
the incumbent calls for a snap election whenever αt = α
H in which the conditions from
Proposition 3.4.(2) holds.
The incumbent with (αt−1, αt) = (α
i, αH) for i = {L,H} will not deviate and refer from
calling a snap election when θt = 1 if:
WFI(αi + αH)−W ∗(αi, αH , 1)
βX
+
Ω(1, 1)− Ω(ρ, 1)
X








As the utility loss from distortion is weakly larger when αt−1 = α
H by assumption and
θt = 1, this implies that if the incumbent with (α
H , αH) prefers to call for a snap election,
then so does the incumbent with (αL, αH).
Furthermore, as in Step 3 and 4 in the proof of Proposition 3.1 we can bound the RHS of
the above inequality from below by :
2π̂H
(
1 + β(ρπ̂H + 1− ρ)
)
− (2 + β)
2− β2 (1 + β(ρπ̂H + 1− ρ))
.
Thus, there is no profitable deviation for an incumbent with αt = α
H . As in the proof
of Proposition 3.4.(1) there exists off-equilibrium beliefs such that an incumbent with
αt = α
L has no incentive to deviate either. This completes the proof.
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